

ASPECTS OF HOME RULE

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

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ASPECTS OF HOME RULE

"Whatever be the combination of forces arrayed on the side of this iniquitous measure, the forces against it are so united and so strong in principle, and, above all, so strong in the righteousness and justice of their cause, that surely in the end they will prevail."

MR. BALFOUR, AT BELFAST,
April 3rd, 1893.

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ASPECTS OF HOME RULE

SELECTED FROM THE SPEECHES OF
THE RT. HON.
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.P.

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NOTE

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ASPECTS OF HOME RULE

I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES *

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U-4-14.
It must be twenty years or more since I first addressed this Association upon this subject. Our meetings at that time were followed, first, by the rejection of the Home Rule Bill by the House of Lords; secondly, by the loudly expressed approval of the country of the course which the Second Chamber took on that occasion. The blow which we then dealt at the cause of separation has sufficed to keep it quiet seventeen or eighteen years. Slowly it has begun to revive, and our opponents, remembering the double check which they received, first in 1886, and then in 1893, and knowing what fate would await their scheme if it was first riddled by criticism in the House of Commons, then discussed and rejected in the House of Lords, and then referred to the people, have taken their precautions.

* London, Nov. 6, 1911.

In order to carry out the violation of the Constitution of this Kingdom which they so passionately desire, they have, as a preliminary step, destroyed the yet more ancient Constitution of our Second Chamber ; and while professing a desire to place it upon a sounder and stronger basis, have, in fact, in the meanwhile, and during the whole period over which they expect this controversy to last, destroyed that assembly's great and beneficent power of referring great constitutional changes to that public opinion which is the master of us all. It behoves us, the veterans of twenty years ago, and the new recruits whom I rejoice to see round me, to do all we can to defeat these tactics.

There are members of this Association who differ on various important points from the policy of the party to which I belong, who do not view with entire favour all the measures passed by Unionist Governments since 1895, but who, irrespective of party, and in the face of this great national and Imperial crisis, have sunk all minor differences in order again to unite in one irresistible phalanx those who have in the past done their best to make impossible the dismemberment of the United Kingdom, and those younger spirits who have not gone through the school and training that we have on this question, but who already see with

clear and undisturbed vision how great a danger to every national interest, every Imperial interest, is involved in these plausible schemes put before us by the present leader of the Nationalist Party, as if they concerned nothing more than the parish pump.

Now it has always seemed to me that Home Rule obtained a perfectly undeserved plausibility from the fact that two entirely different trains of thought are mixed up in the arguments adduced by those who endeavour to persuade the people of this country that it is to their interest to carry it into effect. There is a whole set of arguments based upon the allegation that the introduction of Home Rule, the giving of a separate Parliament and Administration to Ireland, probably as a preface to giving a separate Cabinet and Parliament to Scotland—and I suppose some day poor England will come in for the same privileges—is a great administrative advantage. That is the first argument. The second argument is that Ireland is a nation, that a nation has a right to self-government, and that those who refuse it self-government are refusing it what the primary rights of mankind require us to give. Those are perfectly, I will not say inconsistent, but perfectly different lines of thought. They appeal to entirely different audiences ; they are supported by entirely different arguments ; and

if we would think clearly upon the point we must distinguish absolutely between them.

Let me, if you will allow me, say something upon them briefly in succession. The whole plausibility of the administrative argument is really based upon the fact that, for example, in the Commonwealth of Australia, or in the United States, or in Canada, or in the German Empire, in many of these great self-governing communities, which are made up of what were originally separate units now aggregated together, either by war, conquest, matrimony, or, as in the case of our own Colonies, by voluntary arrangement, under the guidance of the Home Government—in all these cases you start from separate entities, and you make up a whole community. And in that unity there remain the traces of the original separation, and, as we all know, in the United States, in each one of the separate States there is a Government and a Legislature; so in Canada, so in Australia, so in Germany. And people, looking at these facts, say, “Well, if this system has succeeded in other great Empires or communities, why not adopt it in the United Kingdom, why not make the United Kingdom on the pattern, let us say, of the United States, or of Australia, or of any other of these Federal or *quasi*-Federal communities?” It is a very plausible

argument, especially when addressed to our brethren across the seas, gentlemen who know intimately their own affairs, but, naturally and necessarily, are imperfectly acquainted with ours. I believe the whole of that argument to rest upon a fallacy.

Do not suppose that the United States is stronger because it consists of thirty-eight—I think it is thirty-eight—States of separate origin under the Constitution. It is not stronger. Do not suppose that the German Empire is stronger because you see within it the great States—the great historic States of Germany. These systems work well and they are the most legitimate stage on the road from complete separation to growing unity. But to tell us that because they work well in many cases, although often with difficulty, with friction, with inconvenience, and in some cases with civil war—although they work on the whole reasonably well, to tell us they are an ideal Commonwealth, and that we all should start from unity and go to this federal system because they have started from separation and are tending towards unity—to tell us to adopt their system is to misunderstand the whole train of policy, the whole working of human institutions, the whole way that Constitutions develop. If you find two trains at Grantham, trains similarly constituted in the same place, is it to be a matter of

indifference into which you get? Not at all. One lands you at York, the other in London. So if you go from unity to federalism you are on the way to separation. If you go from separation to federalism you are on the way to unity. That really makes the whole difference. These things are dynamic, they are not static. We are dealing with motion, and you must consider in what direction to move. I tell you, if you move in this direction you are moving in exactly the opposite direction to that of the communities, cited to us as examples. They know how necessary it is, if ever they are to hold their place in the world, to be a great unity, and they have gradually worked up to unity through federalism—or *quasi*-federalism. That is a consideration from an administrative point of view which I earnestly commend to everybody who wishes to look at this matter in a dispassionate spirit.

There is a further criticism on the administrative side of the question. These great communities of which I am speaking had to carry out their federalism logically. That is to say, they have established a unity under which each separate part has equal rights and equal powers. In the United States, for example, there is a central Government, and under, or within—I will not say under, that

would be resented perhaps—within the central Government there are all these States, each with identical rights. Is that the proposal under Home Rule? That, at all events, though I think it far inferior to the stage we have already reached in the United Kingdom, is a logical system.

But what is the system proposed by the present Government, or by the Bill which they are going to bring in? We know that it is intended to give privileges to Irishmen which are to be denied to Scotchmen and to Englishmen, and that the Irish are to be at Westminster. That is not federalism. It is giving Ireland rights with regard to its own affairs and rights with regard to the affairs of England and Scotland, while it gives England and Scotland no rights with regard to Ireland.

But do observe what the Government are doing. I read a speech of Mr. Redmond's in which he said that no doubt Scotland would soon have its turn, or words to that effect, but he said nothing about England. What are we going to say of these revolutions carried out by gradual steps? Or, let me put it in another way: what are we to say of a Government which is always carrying out its revolutions under an interim Constitution? We have an interim constitution at the present moment. The House of Lords—the Second Chamber—has

been deprived of the power which every other Second Chamber in the world possesses. But that is an interim measure, and some time it is going to be put right. I understand Home Rule to be an interim measure. Ireland is to have Home Rule now; Scotland, perhaps, a few years afterwards; and then, I suppose, in the dim distance, England is to follow suit. But while this interim Constitution is in force observe that the Radical Government, with Irish support, can deal with England and can deal with Scotland, while neither Scotland nor England can deal with Ireland. When the Constitution is thus played in parts the United Kingdom will be on a level—I will not say a high level—but we shall be in the happy condition of having an Imperial Parliament at Westminster, another Parliament, sitting, I do not know where, but I presume in London, another Parliament and another Executive in Edinburgh, and another Parliament in Dublin. Then we shall be complete. Possibly then we shall be happy, but in the meanwhile it seems that legislation for England and for Scotland is to go on by the help of Irishmen, whose votes will be given, not with a view to English interests, or Scottish interests, but Irish interests.

Whether, when the English and Scotch public realize that, if we are to imitate the Colonial, or

American, or German system, or any federal or *quasi*-federal system, it means that there are to be four Parliaments and four Executives besides an Imperial Executive sitting in London, whether they will tolerate it or treat it as nothing but as a huge and a very bad joke, I do not know. But what I am quite sure of is this, that it is perfect lunacy for us, in the meanwhile, to start this *quasi*-federal scheme by giving Home Rule for Ireland on administrative grounds until we know exactly how we are going to complete the building which these administrative reformers desire us to commence.

Though I have been looking at the question from the administrative side, I have not examined it completely. But I think I have said enough to show how utterly illusory it is to go to any models outside these three Kingdoms, and how absurd it is, if you do go outside to borrow the half-example which these other States give us and to imitate Constitutions which no doubt work successfully within their limits, to imitate them only up to a certain point, leaving the whole illogical absurdity of Home Rule in one part of the country but no Home Rule in any other part of the country. But I almost regret having spent so much time over what is not the motive underlying Home Rule. The arguments I have dealt with are those advanced for

Colonial and English use alone; they have no relation to the true motive which is underlying this revolution. They are devised by those who know perfectly well that, if you look at the realities of the relation between England and Ireland, the idea of Home Rule would seem absurd, and who raise their whole case upon this imperfect analogy between the conditions of the United Kingdom and the conditions of the great self-governing communities elsewhere. I put them aside because I do not believe that is the real essence of the case. Nobody would have heard of Home Rule, nobody would have ever dreamed of breaking up the United Kingdom, nobody would have done anything so grotesquely absurd as having a Parliament in each fragment of the United Kingdom if there had not been behind the whole movement something which can only be described as a desire for national separation.

It is because there has been fostered and fomented by generations of agitators in the minds of large sections of the Irish population the idea that Ireland ought to be a separate entity from the United Kingdom, carrying out its own life apart from the United Kingdom—it is only because Irishmen have been told over and over again that their destinies ought to be worked out separately and apart from

the other portions—it is only for that reason that there is any vitality whatever in the movement for Home Rule. It is not an administrative question, it is not because the British House of Commons is overworked, it is not because the Colonies or America are framed on this or that model: it is because the Irish agitators have for generations appealed to sentiments in a great and generous people who draw their whole strength from the memory—sometimes a very imperfect and erroneous memory—of ancient wrongs and ancient difficulties, it is for that reason, and that alone, that Home Rule has any vitality at this moment in British politics. There are Englishmen and Scotchmen who really suppose that England has deprived Ireland of its own national institutions, has absorbed Ireland, which had a polity and a civilization of its own—has absorbed it in the wider sphere of British politics; and who think that a great wrong has thereby been done to a separate nationality, and that that separate nationality has an inherent and inalienable right to govern itself. There are Englishmen and Scotchmen who hold that view, and on that view base their whole support of Home Rule.

It is a profound illusion. It has no basis in historical fact at all. There have been cases—plenty of them—in which the more powerful country

has dealt with a less powerful country on an equal plane of civilization, having its own institutions and its own unity, has destroyed it, and has absorbed it. That really does not represent the relations of England and Ireland in the least degree. You would suppose, to hear the Home Rulers talk, that a Parliament in Ireland was an Irish invention. It is an English invention. You would suppose that when England gradually became the paramount power in Ireland, it destroyed a civilized unity. That is really no representation of the facts. If anybody will understand Ireland let him consider the Highlands of Scotland—the same race, the same language, the same tribal polity. Anybody who had read about the relations of England and Ireland must have been disgusted constantly at the contemptuous terms in which the Englishman spoke of what are called the “native Irishry.” We all know that the Irish as a race are the equal of any race in the world, and it disgusts us to read these views, honestly expressed by honest Englishmen. The reason is not that the Englishman was superior to the Irishman; the reason is that the English polity was superior to the Irish polity, and my Lowland ancestors in Scotland had precisely the same contempt for my Highland fellow-countrymen in Scotland as the English had for the Irish

in Ireland—not because the Highlander is inferior to the Lowlander in the least, but because under the clan system or the tribal system it was perfectly impossible either economically or in any other way to rise to a higher grade of civilization. And when England dealt with Ireland, Ireland was completely under the tribal system. Every political idea in Ireland is of English growth—the Irish dependent Parliament, the Irish independent Parliament—it is all of British extraction; and those whom the Nationalists choose more particularly and especially to describe as Irishmen, namely, the original inhabitants of Ireland—those who were there before the Celt and before the Saxon, and before the Norman—they never had the chance of developing—they never could have developed a polity of their own any more than the Highlanders. That does not mean that they are in any sense inferior, but it does mean that all this talk about restoring to Ireland Irish institutions and governing Ireland according to Irish ideas has no historic basis whatever.

An Irish Parliament is a British invention. It was first an English invention, and it was first tried in the form of a dependent Parliament. It was then tried in the form of an independent Parliament, and neither in the form of a dependent

Parliament nor in the form of an independent Parliament did it succeed ; and to those two failures has to be added what I regard as a success —namely, a Parliament for the whole of the United Kingdom. These experiments were tried at a time when those whom the Nationalists call the Irish were not consulted upon Irish affairs. Grattan's Parliament was a Protestant Parliament ; Grattan's Parliament only contained Protestants. The dependent Parliament, the Parliament that is to be the model, I suppose, of the new Parliament, was entirely an ascendancy Parliament, representing a state of things which, I hope, has gone for ever. Now, what folly it all is to go over the same series of failures again, to end with the same conclusions. We have tried the dependent Parliament, we have tried the independent Parliament, and they have both failed ; the Union Parliament has been a success. You reject it, and you begin the same weary circle again, first with the dependent Parliament, to be inevitably followed by the independent Parliament, and then, I suppose, by revolution or conquest, coming back to the Union Parliament.

You ask me why I assume that a dependent Parliament must inevitably end in an independent Parliament, and an independent Parliament must finally again end in a Union Parliament. I will

tell you. If this was really a purely administrative change nobody could want it and nobody would use it. But if it be, as I am sure it is, an attempt of a certain section of the population in Ireland to work upon a purely national basis, and to have in their Parliament and in their Government a centre round which national feelings are to crystallize, it cannot remain dependent. The very fact that it is based upon that kind of sentiment—elevated sentiment, if you will—will drive your dependent Parliament by inevitable stages on and on until it becomes independent. When Mr. Parnell said, “No man can put a limit to the march of a nation,” he spoke the words of statesmanlike wisdom. And if Ireland is really the nation which that sentence assumed, no man could put a limit to its march, and certainly the paper limitations of your Act of Parliament are as powerless to stop the development of this separatist and Nationalist feeling as a child’s sand castle is to stop the advance of the sea.

Astronomers tell us that when by some cataclysm a planet is rent asunder dynamic forces are set in motion which drive the separate fragments further and further apart. They were a united whole, but once they were broken they no longer remained together and by an inevitable but slow operation

one fragment was driven further and further from the other. So it must be if you choose to divide, to break up, your Constitution in obedience to this separatist, this Nationalist feeling. It either has a meaning or it has not. It is either a reality or a sham. I do not say that it is a reality. I greatly doubt whether it is.

If there is any basis of fact in that statement the idea of satisfying that national feeling by giving them a Parliament is grotesque. It ought never to enter into the minds of statesmen. In my belief there are only for the self-governing parts of this Empire two kinds of institution which are tolerable or practicable. There is the free and independent Parliament, and there is the municipality. But this hybrid independent Parliament, which is neither one nor the other, which is to discharge the duties of a municipality with the framework of a Parliament, which is expected to work in trammels under the guidance of Westminster, which is to be given duties more or less municipal in their character and which is yet to be animated by a national feeling and to cover the whole island, the idea that that sort of Constitution can succeed seems to be the dream of political idiots. If they have nothing to do, and if nobody cares whether they have anything to do or not, if

the whole interest is still centred in Westminster, why all this trouble and bother? The idea that you can effect it up to a certain point and then say, "So far you may go and no further," the idea that you can give Ireland a Parliament and all the machinery of a separate nation and yet keep it in trammels is not only contrary to all we know of human nature, but it is in particular contrary to all we know of Irish human nature. It is the very experiment which has been tried and which has failed. Are we in this country going to allow this Government under the Parliamentary coercion of the Nationalist Party to break up the unity which we have inherited from our forefathers, under the illusion that you can cut so deep and no deeper, that you can sever up to a certain point and yet no further? Do you believe that a toy of a Parliament of its own and a Ministry of its own is going to satisfy the love of sport and fairplay of the Irish people? It either will not satisfy any demand at all that is worth considering, or else it is a mere instalment of something far greater which they must demand, which they ought to demand.

We depend as an Empire upon the co-operation of absolutely independent Parliaments. I am not talking as a lawyer; I am talking as a politician. I believe, from a legal point of view, the British

Parliament is supreme over the Parliament of Canada or Australasia, or the Cape, or South Africa. But in fact they are independent Parliaments, absolutely independent, and it is our business to recognize that, and to frame the British Empire upon the co-operation of absolutely independent Parliaments. I would much rather, if you mean to tamper with the United Kingdom, see that system tried in Ireland than the rotten hybrid system which you mean to try. It would fail—of course it would fail. There is no analogy between the position of Ireland and the position of Canada and Australasia. But although that is doomed to failure, it would not be the discreditable and absurd failure which this subordinate Parliament necessarily carries with it.

We are bribed with the idea that much of our own Parliamentary trouble will be saved if we satisfy Irish demands. I tell you that if you try this futile experiment your troubles will double, treble, increase by geometrical progression. There will be constant friction between the body at Dublin, which wants more, and the body at Westminster, which will have to give more if the balance be held as it is held now. This Government are going to try to give Home Rule—not because they like it, not because they take a more favourable view of

those results than I have attempted to lay before you to-day, but simply and solely because their offices depend upon it—simply and solely because the Irish hold the balance. The Irish are to be left with us. They will hold the balance, presumably, again, and this, which is presented to you now as a final settlement of all our difficulties, will prove but to be an instalment, and there will be demands made from each successive Government under the pressure of the Irish, who hold the balance, until the final consummation is reached under which England and Scotland will not only have to pay heavily for the privilege of having given a subordinate Parliament to Ireland, but having paid out of the hard money of the English and Scottish taxpayers for the privilege of seeing their Empire dismembered, will see the subordinate Parliament stage approaching that which, if you are to have Home Rule at all, I think ought to be given at once—namely, complete and absolute freedom to do absolutely what they like, irrespective of what goes on at Westminster. For those reasons I do ask those who I am addressing, who have had fewer opportunities than some of my friends around me of considering the various aspects of this question, to throw their whole might into this controversy.

Please notice that I have refused deliberately on this occasion to say anything about Ulster, anything about the oppressed minority, anything about the evils which must come to those whose interests we are bound to observe. I have tried to look at it from the broad view of a Constitutional statesman. When you add all the arguments I have addressed to you to-night, when you remember who and what are they who plead with you that the Union should be maintained, and who and what are they who profess now for the first time to have this benevolent regard for the interests of the British Empire, when you compare from our point of view the character and the merits of those who ask for Home Rule in Ireland, and the character and the merits of those who implore you not to hand over the minority helpless to a majority, then I think the Constitutional statesman will feel a generous and irresistible irritation at the cowardly policy of the Government, which has proposed this nefarious end by means, I think, as nefarious as are to be found in the political intrigues of which Parliamentary history gives a record, who for no great end of liberty, or freedom, or civilization, are prepared to sacrifice the interests of those who of all others in the United Kingdom surely deserve the protection of England and of Scotland.

II

✓ THE ENGLISH ASPECT OF THE QUESTION *

IN words far too kind as far as they concern myself, but not unworthy as far as they concern the great Union, reference has been made to that great subject which at this moment is nearest to the hearts of every Englishman, Scotchman and Irishman, who loves the great Empire of which he is a citizen. I, in rising to address myself to that great theme, am sure that you would feel that I was not doing my duty if I addressed not myself to the one aspect of that theme that is absorbing all our interests at this moment—namely, the Home Rule Bill. In touching upon that subject I must confine myself to one small fraction of the endless subjects of controversy, which this nightmare of a proposal suggests to the political speaker. It would be impossible, it would be foolish, of me to attempt to survey the whole ground that has been touched upon by a measure which in Ireland as in England affects the interests of every class and of every

* Ealing, March 8, 1893.

individual in every class. Under these circumstances I shall confine myself to-night solely to the English aspect of the Bill. It is described by its authors as a Bill for the better government of Ireland. This description I shall not at the moment dispute, for my opinions on that point are well known and I shall not defend them here. But the proposition which I shall venture to lay before you, and which I think I can prove, is that, whether the Bill be or be not a Bill for the better government of Ireland, it is unquestionably, and beyond all doubt, a Bill for the worse government of Great Britain. And I shall show you briefly, but I think conclusively, that in the great interests which Englishmen and Scotchmen, as Englishmen and Scotchmen, have at heart—namely, our interest in matters of national defence, in the smooth working of our institutions, and in other matters—this Bill is absolutely ruinous and destructive. On the first of these themes I shall not detain you long, but I want to remind you of a well-known episode in the history of Ireland which occurred when Ireland had a Parliament of her own. At that time England was at war with all, or almost all, of the great nations of the world; she was struggling in all quarters of the globe against overwhelming odds. The Irish Parliament, feeling, and feeling with perfect

truth, that it had not all the privileges which an independent Legislature had a right to demand, if it were to be independent, used that moment, by the help of the Volunteer force in Ireland, to exact from Great Britain a change in the Irish Constitution which gave Ireland a practically sovereign legislature free from every possible restriction on the part of the English Parliament. I think there is a lesson to be drawn from that part of Irish history which may well give English politicians pause. True it is that there is a clause in the Bill by which the Irish Parliament is not permitted to raise a military force, but the Irish Parliament is permitted, as far as I can see, to raise a police force of unlimited numbers, disciplined if you please in military fashion, and taking their orders from the central government of Ireland. There is, moreover, nothing in the Bill that can by possibility prevent any number of Irishmen, under any name you please, drilling themselves so as to prepare for any eventuality which the necessarily chequered history of a great empire may bring forth. I have heard it said that under the existing system Ireland requires 30,000 troops in Ireland, no doubt to keep her in submission, that being the number of troops actually quartered in that country. With my experience in Ireland I tell you that a more idiotic

and senseless proposition was never stated. Were I responsible for the government of Ireland I would guarantee to preserve that country from anything in the nature of an organized outbreak without the assistance of a single regiment more than is required for an equal population in England and Scotland. There are 30,000 troops in Ireland, no doubt, because there is accommodation for that number of troops there, and because for very obvious commercial reasons the Irish are unwilling that the custom which 30,000 troops bring them should be taken away; but under the existing system as long as the union is preserved the presence of 30,000 troops is no more required in Ireland than that of 300,000 or three millions of them are. But if you give Home Rule to Ireland you place it in the power of an Irish Government to make demands upon the Imperial Legislature which that Legislature may be most reluctant to grant, and we see forces raised in Ireland under the name of police or of some other name which may require you to keep your 30,000 troops in Ireland, and may so cause you to lock up that amount of the national forces in that country instead of their being available for duty in other parts of the world.

I pass from that perhaps rather remote contingency to a matter of more immediate and obvious

interest. There is not a man in this room who is not a voter, and who therefore is not vitally interested in preserving our Parliamentary institutions and especially the House of Commons, as an effective working machine responding to the popular will and carrying out the wishes of the electorate. What will be the effect of Home Rule upon the House of Commons, that most subtly contrived political machine, the growth of centuries of self-government, which we have now got at our command for the purpose of carrying out national desires? I observe that, even in the opinion of the framer of this Bill, after this Bill is passed the House of Commons cannot be the House of Commons which we have known. No human being in all the experiments in Constitutions which the world has seen, has ever yet thought of contriving a Constitution in which the assembly shall have within it two kinds of majorities. Under this Bill, as it stands, there will be Irish members present appointed to vote upon Imperial affairs, but not permitted to vote upon English affairs. Probably I could not make any one who is not a member of the House of Commons see the extravagant absurdity of such a condition of things. Every one, however, will understand me that the House of Commons will cease to be the House of Commons in its present shape if this Bill is passed. What

will be the state of things in that House if you have two majorities, if you have two systems of taxation, one for the British Empire, with regard to which the Irish members can vote, and one for Great Britain, in respect to which they cannot vote. In such a case you must have two Budgets, two Committees of Ways and Means, and two Appropriation Bills. It may happen that circumstances will constantly arise under which a Ministry which has the confidence of the Imperial Parliament, that is to say, of the House of Commons including the Irish members, will not have the confidence of the British House of Commons, namely the House of Commons excluding the Irish members. What will follow? It will then follow that a Ministry which has the confidence of the Imperial Parliament will no doubt be able to carry the Imperial Budget, but it would not be able to carry the British Budget. If, on the other hand, it has only the confidence of the British House of Commons and not the confidence of the Imperial House of Commons, it will be able to carry the British Budget, but it would not be able to carry the Imperial Budget. Everybody has admitted that if a balance of parties such as I have indicated were to take place, constructive legislation would be paralysed, but I want to show you what might happen. Not merely would it be impossible

for a Ministry that only had the confidence of the Imperial Parliament to carry any measure for Great Britain, or for a Ministry which has the confidence of the British Parliament but not the confidence of the Imperial Parliament to carry any measures for the Empire, but they would not be able to conduct the current business of the country: they would not be able to get the necessary money to carry on everyday affairs: and the whole system of government from top to bottom would be absolutely paralysed by this crazy scheme which we should naturally think was the outcome of a lunatic's mind if we did not know that it was the inevitable result of attempting to solve a problem, which in its essence is absolutely insoluble—namely, that of giving a parliament to Ireland and preserving the rights of the Imperial Legislature.

I pass from that and I go to another point, on which I venture to think a large class of Englishmen and Scotchmen are vitally interested. I should imagine that most persons who now listen to me are themselves personally interested through their friends in the great insurance societies which, as I am given to understand, have vast sums invested in Irish mortgages, and I want to ask what the value of Irish mortgages will be if this Bill becomes law. Is there any human being who supposes that,

with the duty of protecting the sheriff in collecting the rents due to a landlord left to the Irish Executive, it will ever be performed? Is there any one sanguine enough to suppose that, if the sheriff is left unprotected, he will be able to collect sixpence of rent from anybody? I am confining my attention to English interests, and I do not ask what would happen to Irish landlords or those in Ireland interested in the land question. But, I ask, what is going to happen to the English mortgages? to the great societies interested in Irish mortgages? Their security is not worth the paper on which they are written, and that is not all. I suppose many of you have noticed the way in which Irish securities have fallen since the details of this precious scheme have become known to the Irish investors. What does that mean? It means that Home Rule will be followed by the exodus from Ireland of all that capital by which the prosperity of Ireland, such as it is, is maintained at its present level. If Irish capital leaves Ireland, what is to happen to the Irish labourer? The Irish labourer will follow Irish capital, and he will leave Ireland: and let every working-man in England take this truth to heart. Home Rule will be most inevitably followed by a great increase in England of the competition with Irish labour. In the counties and boroughs

alike the Irish labourer will be compelled, whether he likes it or not, to come over and compete with his English brother: and more and more you will see the value of English labour driven down by Irish competition, more and more you will see the results of English Municipal and Parliamentary elections not decided by the votes of Englishmen and Scotchmen, but decided by the votes of those who look for guidance, not to English and Scottish advisers, but to advisers on the other side of St. George's Channel.

There remains the most important interest on which I have to address you—the interest of English and Scottish finance. I do not suppose many of you have endeavoured to master—I am perfectly certain that none of you have succeeded in mastering—the financial propositions of this Bill. But the peculiarity of the new state of things which it sets up is this that, while by the testimony of the Irish members themselves it is likely to produce bankruptcy in Ireland, it must undoubtedly inflict a very great wrong and hardship in England and Scotland. Its injury is double. It injures Ireland and it injures us: it is a separation of partnership by which both partners are injured, and of which both partners have a right to complain. I do not mean now to touch the Irish case. It will be

sufficient if I say that Ireland, under the Bill, can only remain solvent so long as she is drunk. Irish sobriety would be followed by Irish bankruptcy with absolute certainty under the provisions of this measure ; for her sole, substantial resource is Excise, and the Excise from which practically the whole of the money is obtained is the duty on spirits. Ireland, however, is not at present my business. I am going to explain what your interests and the interests of the English and Scottish taxpayers are in this matter.

In the first place, the collection of taxes will become hopelessly complicated. No human being can tell what will be the state under this Bill—where any man's income-tax is to be levied. It is now a comparatively simple matter, though not always an easy matter. Under this new Bill it will become a very complicated matter, and, as a matter of fact, almost impossible in many cases. But there is a far worse evil to which we shall be subjected by this measure than the mere complication which will be introduced in our whole system of collecting taxes : and that evil is, we shall cease to be masters of our own taxation. At the present moment it is open to any Chancellor of the Exchequer to come down, and if he thinks fit, to propose an increase to the income-tax or a decrease in the Customs

duty, and to think only of the general bearings of such propositions upon the classes who are asked to contribute more to the national resources and of the general effects on trade which will follow from his propositions. But put yourselves for a moment in the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the future. Under this Bill Irish Customs are to be handed over wholly to the Imperial Exchequer; Irish Excise remains entirely with the Irish Government. Therefore, you will see, the contribution of Ireland to the Imperial Exchequer depends wholly on the amount which is produced by the Customs duty. Supposing for general reasons it occurred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Westminster that either because he wanted to alter the incidence of taxation as between classes, or for any other reason, he desired to alter the Customs duty—say, to lower it—what would be the result? The result would be that Ireland would cease to contribute even the inadequate amount she does now; so that the Chancellor's problem would be complicated by this fact: he would not merely have to consider whether he desired to raise or to lower the Customs duty on spirits, or the Customs duty on tea or tobacco—he would also have to consider whether he could permit the Irish taxpayer to get off paying that share of the Imperial burdens which under

this Bill Ireland is bound to pay. Every Chancellor of the Exchequer from this time forth, therefore, so long as this Bill is allowed to exist, will come to the consideration of questions of Imperial finance bound hand and foot. Every step he takes will be hampered by the consideration that he is modifying in one direction or another the contribution which Ireland is bound to pay to our general Imperial expenditure. Take one more case of the same kind. In moments of national emergency, when war is imminent or when war is going on, the first great instrument of taxation which the Chancellor of the Exchequer looks to is the income-tax. It is not the only one, but it is the great instrument in moments of national emergency. If this Bill passes we shall have no power to put a single sixpence upon the Irish income-tax. The Irish income-tax under this Bill goes to the Irish Exchequer, and if, therefore, the Imperial Government were at war, and if because they were at war they had to put a penny or twopence on the income-tax, it would mean, in order to carry out some important Imperial object in which Ireland was as much interested as England or Scotland, they would have to put a tax of which England and Scotland would have to pay not only their own share, but also the share of Ireland. Now, consider for a moment

another question connected with taxation, or rather with the levying of taxation. It is rather more technical, but, believe me, it is not less important. You keep nominally all the right to the money which you get by Customs. Now, let me ask, are you going to levy those Customs? It appears you are going to keep, under the Bill, Imperial Custom House officers along the coast of Ireland to prevent the introduction of goods on which duty should be paid. Ireland at this moment is the paradise of smugglers. What will it be, what must it be, when the only people interested in preventing smuggling are the officials who come to Ireland in a foreign garb, in a foreign uniform, absolutely unsupported by the public opinion of the country in which they are carrying out their duties, or by any force which that country has at its disposal? What chance have they of doing their duty with effect? Their duty is hard indeed now; how do you think it will be carried out under the new system? I tell you it would not be carried out at all. You trust, I suppose, to the loyalty of those men on whom you cast the duties, which under the new circumstances, will be of tremendous difficulty. Do you think they are likely to look with confidence to the support of the British Government? They have before them the example of the Irish constabulary,

They know how a loyal force in Ireland is treated by the Imperial Government. They see before them a practical example of what the honour of English statesmen is worth; and believe me they will find it more convenient and more lucrative not to trouble their heads too particularly about carrying out those onerous and unpopular duties; and the amount you will get from your Irish Customs will be a small fraction of that which ought to be paid on Irish imports. But even that is not all. I do not suppose many of you are aware, but it is nevertheless the fact, that the duty of the Custom-house does not end, and cannot end, at the mere port of entry. If such articles as coffee, cocoa, and tobacco are brought in, and full duty is paid upon them, an inspection is still necessary in order to see that when they are introduced into the country they are not adulterated and the duty is not thereby evaded. It has been found absolutely necessary in order to maintain our revenue upon such articles as tobacco—one of the most elastic sources of revenue—to arm officers of the Government with the most tremendous powers of entering at all hours into the manufactories of tobacco, and other places where adulteration can be practised in order to see that the tobacco is not dealt with in such a manner as to defraud the revenue. Will it

be believed that in this Bill, as it stands, there is not the beginning of the scintilla of a proposition for dealing with this great financial difficulty? And it cannot be dealt with unless you sow broadcast over Ireland Imperial officials, not confined to the ports of entry, not confined to the coast, but with the right to enter into every Irish manufactory and the place of every wholesale dealer to see whether those duty-paying goods might by any possibility be adulterated. I want to know, in the first place, how Ireland is going to tolerate the presence of these officials if you appoint them; and how you are going to collect your revenue if you do not appoint them? That is a practical question which for many mysterious reasons, together with several other practical questions, has never suggested itself to the ingenious and able framers of this measure, but which any man acquainted with our system of finance knows to be of first-class importance. There is one more point with regard to the collection of what is due to us, under the Bill, from Ireland. I do not know how many of you have read the Bill. But those who have must, I am sure, have been struck, and even amused, by a clause which enables the Lord Lieutenant in cases where duties are due from the Irish Exchequer to the British Exchequer, to declare that such payments

shall be made, and that until they are made no other payments shall be legal. An excellent provision. But how is it going to be enforced? The Lord Lieutenant under the new system will be, no doubt, a worthy and able nobleman, sitting in state in the Castle, but not having command of a single policeman, not being obeyed by a single official, not being able to require the services of a single instrument of which the behests of the Imperial Government are to be carried out. If he is defied, what is he going to do? There have been cases in which Lords Lieutenants have been defied. I very well recollect that under Lord Spencer's Government in 1882, at a time when Lord Spencer was still a Unionist, and still a supporter of law and order, the corporations of Limerick were required by the tribunals of the country to pay a certain sum. The corporations of Limerick firmly but politely—by the way, I am not sure about politely—refused to carry out the decrees of the Court. The Government found that their only remedy was to imprison the whole of the corporations, and they shrank from such an extremity. The result was that the debt from the corporations of Limerick, though as good a debt as ever was contracted, has never been paid from that day to this. Now, the Lord Lieutenant, under the New

Bill, will not even have the power of putting into prison the Irish Administration, and I am utterly at a loss to understand how, if the Irish Administration act like the Corporation of Limerick, this unfortunate representative of the Queen is to do anything but send piteous letters to the Home Government, saying that, though he has received their orders, he is perfectly unable to execute them. I venture to prophesy that the debts of the Irish Government to the Imperial Government are as little likely to be paid as the debts of the Irish tenants to the landlords under the new system.

One more point in connection with the subject. Hitherto in the matter of finance I have been occupied in explaining to you how even the quota which Ireland owes to England will not be paid as the Bill stands. I now want to discuss the amount of that quota, and to ask whether it is just. The principle on which the Irish members argue the amount which Ireland should pay to the Imperial exchequer is two-fold. They take as their basis the amount which Ireland now pays, and they also consider the amount which it would be convenient to Ireland to pay. I venture to say that as English and Scotch taxpayers we have nothing whatever to do with one of those considerations or the other. So long as Ireland is an integral part of the United

Kingdom, so long as one system of taxation and one system of Government are prevalent over the three kingdoms, then we need not too curiously inquire whether Ireland gains or does not gain by the transaction ; and I for my part do not hesitate to go further, and I say that the rich partner might well bring its resources to the aid of the poor partner, and that we may gladly give more than our fair share in order to assist the impoverished population in the west of Ireland. But very different principles must prevail if there is to be a dissolution of partnership. If Ireland is going her own way, with her own executive, her own Chancellor of the Exchequer, and her own system of taxation, then we shall have to consider on what principle the liabilities of the two countries are determined. For my part, having considered this question to the best of my ability, I can only see three possible plans upon which Imperial burdens can be divided between Ireland and Great Britain. The first plan is based upon the relative wealth of the two countries. The second is based upon the relative population of the two countries. The third plan is based upon the two principles together. If any one can suggest a fourth plan I shall be obliged to him. I have not heard it, because I do not admit that the amount which

Ireland actually has contributed in the past under a totally different system of Government is any guide at all. Under the plan of relative wealth Ireland would be paying in round figures somewhat more than £1,000,000 less than she ought to be paying, and if you capitalize that sum it comes to about £50,000,000 at 3 per cent., the rate always taken in Government transactions. If, on the other hand, you take population, Ireland, being somewhere about one-seventh of the population of the United Kingdom, ought to pay about one-seventh of the Imperial burdens ; and in that case, under the Bill, Ireland is paying over £6,000,000 less than she ought to be paying. If you capitalize that sum it comes to over £200,000,000. Perhaps I shall be told that it is rather hard on Ireland, the poor country, to deal with her simply by population, and I admit that. But also I think it is true that you ought not to deal with her simply by wealth, because there are many advantages which Ireland gets from the Imperial connection which have nothing whatever to do with the relative wealth of the two countries. Every Irishman will obtain, under the new system, the whole advantage of Imperial protection. He will obtain the whole advantage of being a citizen of the British Empire, of having his share in the Government of India,

and of having the English Civil Service open to him—in fact, of being able to take part in any transaction in Great Britain, not as an alien, but as a citizen of the Queen. And these advantages will belong to him, not in proportion as he is a rich man, but by the mere fact of his existence. These benefits should be estimated by population and not by wealth; and in as far as they are the whole advantages which he gets, the population basis is a sound one for the division of burdens. But I grant that there are other benefits which he obtains with regard to which the amount of wealth is a determining existence. You do not expect, for example, that the poor man shall pay as much for his insurance as the rich man pays; and it is fair enough that we, the wealthier country, should pay for the insurance of our wealth a greater sum per head than the Irish. Therefore, clearly a fair system on grounds of broad equity is that the Irish contribution to Imperial sources should be calculated partly on the population and partly on wealth, a system not unfamiliar in local government. Then, combining these two principles, Ireland will pay at least three millions too little under Mr. Gladstone's proposal. In other words, she is exacting a fine from the United Kingdom of about a hundred millions sterling, or the amount of

the debt which we contracted in consequence of the Crimean War. I do not know whether this general survey of the effects which Home Rule will have upon you, not as citizens of the British Empire, but as Englishmen and Scotchmen, is likely to recommend that measure to your approval. To me it seems the net result is this—that because the Irish, the so-called Nationalist party, partly by favouring crime and partly by favouring obstruction, have made themselves formidable in the conflict in which they have engaged with the Imperial Government, and because those who now have under their control the Imperial Government appear to be of opinion that they have been worsted in the fight—because they have now admitted themselves to be beaten, or to use our old Eton phrase, have “taken a licking,” under terms which are absolutely ruinous to the citizens of this island—we are to pay a hundred millions, not for the purpose of getting rid of the question, but for the purpose of having the Irish question perennially with us. We are called upon to pay a hundred millions, not to be master of our own house, but to give up the control of our own affairs to those who have shown conclusively that they have no love of our interests. The Irish are to tell us by what administrations we are to be

governed; the Irish are to control our taxation; the Irish are to manage our elections; and in order to remunerate them for this thankless task we are going gratuitously to hand over a hundred millions of our money to their pockets. I am perfectly certain of this, that the British elector is not swayed solely by a sordid interest in his own personal concerns. I believe he is capable of more generous emotions. I believe that he will not abandon the minority in Ireland. He will not sacrifice the supremacy of parliament; he will not sacrifice the interests of the Empire. But if there be a man so mean of soul that these great interests do not appeal to him, then I say look to your own pockets; look to your own influence over the management of your own affairs, and you will see that this Bill deals a more deadly blow at that which you in your short-sighted selfishness think are solely your own interests, than it deals at those Irish Loyalists whose interests I am convinced will never long be absent from our minds.



III

CONSIDERATIONS FOR LIMEHOUSE*

THIS is a great meeting. I have addressed before now other meetings in the East of London, but never has it been my good fortune to have the opportunity of addressing an audience like this. Nor do I believe that this part of the metropolis has ever yet in the course of its political history seen a gathering like that which is spread out before me at the present moment. But if the gathering is great, so also is the occasion of its being called together. You came here to discuss the most momentous proposals which, since our Parliamentary system was brought to perfection, have ever been submitted by a responsible Minister of the Crown to the judgment of Parliament. I was going to say the judgment of the country, but the time of the country is not yet; some day of the country, for the present and for the moment the judgment of Parliament; and it is by a coincidence, but not, I think, by an

* Limehouse, April 18, 1893.

unfortunate coincidence, that the time of our meeting is in the very centre and heat of that great Parliamentary debate going on at the present moment upon the subject of Irish Home Rule. I do not know whether many of you have followed the course of the discussion in the House of Commons that has now been going on for eight or nine days. I can quite understand its being "too long" in the opinion of my friend in the gallery, who, after all, to do him justice, only shares in this the opinion of Mr. Gladstone and the other members of the present Government. But why does he think it too long? Does he think it too long because all the arguments that can be brought in favour of the Bill have been brought? Is he by chance of opinion that the case in favour of Home Rule is finished? Does he think that we have heard the whole defence of which these proposals are susceptible? He must be very easily pleased by the case made by his friends, and he must shut his eyes—have the capacity of shutting his eyes—to the case made by his opponents.

We know that those who advocate Home Rule go about the country from place to place and platform to platform and tell the electors of Great Britain and Ireland that the cause of Home Rule is the cause of freedom, that the cause of Home Rule is the cause of nationality, that the cause of Home

Rule is the cause of equal justice, the cause of equal laws, the cause of local prosperity and of true local government. This is a very long catalogue of blessings which Home Rule is going to give to Ireland. It is to end, so we are told, the contest that has been going on between that country and Great Britain for seven hundred years. It is to heal the wounds, the secular wounds, from which Ireland has been suffering. It is to redeem and remedy the wrongs inflicted upon that country by the tyranny of this country. Well, that is a long catalogue of blessings.

How has it been received in Ireland? Ireland is not the first country nor is this Home Rule Bill the first occasion upon which the people have been emancipated. But was a measure of emancipation ever received by any country as this measure of emancipation is being received in Ireland? In the first place, we are told that it will conduce to the prosperity of Ireland. What say the men of business in Ireland? What say those on whose enterprise the prosperity of Ireland now depends, and on whose continued enterprise the prosperity of Ireland must in future depend? To a man they object to it. What says the Episcopalian Church? What say the Nonconformists of every denomination? They may be supposed to know something of

freedom ; they may be supposed to understand the blessings of religious liberty ; they may be supposed to be not wholly ignorant of the advantages which attach to the possession of political freedom in every aspect. What do they think of Home Rule ? What do they think of this measure of emancipation ? To a man they are opposed to it. I was one of those who to-day received a deputation representing the whole Presbyterian body in Ireland—a religious denomination which has played a great part in the industrial development of Ireland, a religious denomination closely allied to the great bodies of Nonconformists in this country, a religious denomination still more closely allied to the great Churches of Scotland. These men had tried to see Mr. Gladstone ; they had endeavoured to find an opportunity of putting their case before him. For reasons of his own he had refused. They came to us, and Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Henry James,* and myself had the privilege this afternoon of listening to their impassioned appeal to the Unionist party, and through the Unionist party to the people of this country, to save them from this national emancipation ; to save them from this imaginary gift of freedom ; to save them from these prospects of

* The late Lord James of Hereford.

prosperity, and to consent still to keep them under coercive and unequal and unjust laws, part of the great British community represented in a central British Parliament. The significance of that appeal, I tell you, who know Ireland, cannot be overrated. I will not say that these gentlemen were to a man Liberals or ex-Liberals, but I will say that the great mass of the Presbyterian body was, until the day of the great betrayal, in the closest attachment to the Liberal party, and in devoted adherence to Mr. Gladstone, the leader of the Liberal party. Party ties are not lightly rent asunder, ancient differences are not easily forgotten, the associations of years are not easily cast aside. But so much do these men dread the policy Mr. Gladstone is now trying to force down our throats that old party ties, old alliances, and old associations are cast, without doubt and without question, to the winds. And they express not merely their objection to Home Rule, not merely their fears of Home Rule, but their unutterable horror and detestation at the very notion of Home Rule, from which they shrink with every fibre of their being stirred to the utmost. When I heard their appeal to us to-day I could not think without feelings of shame of the attitude taken up by too many of those who in England and Scotland have shared up to the

present date all their most cherished convictions, religious and political, and I felt that Mr. Gladstone, when he appeals to the Nonconformists of England, and when he relies upon the Presbyterian vote in Scotland, is surely putting his dependence upon men who, when they know the real truth of the Irish question as it is seen by Irishmen on the spot, will show themselves to be far above these mere political connections, and will rank themselves in the great contest in which we are engaged with the Presbyterian bodies in Ireland.

But it is not the Presbyterian bodies alone ; it is not the capitalists or the men of enterprise or the merchants or the manufacturers—though they are unanimous—who alone constitute the Irish opposition to this Bill for emancipating Ireland. I see before me a great audience of working men. Let me tell them that the working classes in the north of Ireland are absolutely unanimous upon this subject. Let me tell them that, bitter as are the feelings with which the great body of whom I have spoken regard Home Rule, the feelings with which the artisans of Ulster, of Belfast, regard it, are even more bitter, and their hostility is even more determined.

And why should that be so ? I will tell you. In the first place they recognize that if Home Rule

is given to Ireland they as working men must individually, in purse and in person, suffer the most serious loss. They know as well as any men know that Ireland depends, and must depend for her commercial prosperity, upon the confidence shown in her commercial position, and they know that if Home Rule were passed to-morrow that confidence would be annihilated, and that because Home Rule is threatened to-day that confidence is grievously shaken. I could multiply proofs of this if I were to talk to you all night. But I will mention two or three. I have got particulars of many great institutions — hospitals, schools, places of education—all intimately bound up with the progress and prosperity of the working classes, and now actually collecting money to increase their buildings or otherwise to improve their position. They have resolved by resolutions which I could read to you if it were worth while, not to spend one sixpence of their collected money until they know what the fate of Home Rule is going to be. Tens of thousands have in this way been collected for great charitable and educational purposes, but are being withheld from the objects for which they were intended, are being withdrawn from the classes for whose benefit they were subscribed, until the subscribers and managers can make up their minds

whether they were to flourish under the government of the United Kingdom or languish under the government of a Parliament on College Green. What is true of charity is still more true of commerce. My friend and colleague—my late colleague—Mr. Forwood, the member for Liverpool, in the House of Commons last night, gave from his own personal experience in Liverpool a case drawn from a great insurance company, a great banking company, and a great ship-owning company, all of which went to prove that British credit will be withdrawn from Ireland if Home Rule passes, and will be suspended until we know whether Home Rule is to pass or not. Do you think that the working men of Belfast are so blind to their interests—to their own commercial interests—as not to know what the withdrawal of British credit and British custom would mean for them? Of course they know it, and therefore, even, mind you, from their own purely personal and selfish—I do not use the word “selfish” in any bad sense—from purely personal motives they regard Home Rule with horror and detestation. But that is but a small and meagre explanation of the attitude of Ulster. They are animated, as you are animated, by something much more lasting, much more worthy than mere personal considerations. They

feel themselves as you feel yourselves to be, citizens of a great Empire and they know as well as you know that that Empire will not, in all its chequered history, have received a blow so deadly from its worst enemies as it is now intended to be dealt it by those who profess themselves to be its best friends. But you have interests in this matter apart from your interests as citizens, which you cannot forget. The prosperity of Ireland is not only advantageous to you and every class in the community because it is well for us that every portion of our Empire should be prosperous, but it is especially important to you, because the destruction of the labour market in Ireland means the flooding of the labour market in England. If Home Rule passes, Irish credit disappears; if Irish credit disappears, Irish commerce and manufactures must languish; and if Irish commerce and manufactures languish, the demand for Irish labour in Ireland will vanish also. And if the demand for Irish labour vanishes in Ireland the supply of Irish labour in England will become a drug in the English labour market. And, therefore, though God forbid I should attempt to move you upon this great Imperial question by asking you to think of your own pockets, still that question cannot be absent from your minds or from

my mind when we think of the ultimate consequences of Home Rule upon the industries and the various classes in the community.

But you have another interest, not as competitors with the Irish in the English labour market, but as English tax-payers interested in the financial position of those who under the present Bill will be your debtors to a large, and perhaps to an increasing, amount. At present, as you know, Ireland has had English and Scotch money lent it in enormous sums, sums enormous I mean, compared with the population to whom they were lent. And you also know that it was proposed under perfectly adequate safeguards that even larger sums should be lent for the purpose of enabling the Irish tenants to buy their land, and for the object of thus getting rid of that agrarian difficulty which is the root and origin of the Irish difficulty, and which is very often mistaken, let me tell you, for Irish patriotism. Very well—how are you going to get that money? How are you going to get these debts that are owed to you? I confess, that having listened to the discussion on this Bill for eight or nine nights, I am as ignorant at the present moment of how the present Government propose to collect these debts as I was before the discussion began. I do not know, historically, whether the payment of just

debts is a strong point of any class in Ireland. But I do know that whenever an Irish municipality, or an Irish local authority, or an Irish district has objected to paying a debt to the Government, it has always found a very good reason for not paying it, and it has been found extremely difficult to enforce it. We have had many debts thus to collect from Irish districts or Irish communities. Some of them we have collected with the greatest difficulty and after much trouble, because we had at our command the whole police force and the whole Executive of the country. Others we have failed to collect even with the police force and the Executive at our backs, and I want to ask, What prospect is there that your debts, the debts due to you, will ever be collected by the Government in England when they have no machinery whatever with which to collect them in Ireland, except the machinery in the hands of the Irish Executive? You had better write those debts off at once. Make up your minds never to lend another farthing on Irish security and let by-gones be by-gones, and there may be some chance of your living in financial friendship with this new community whom you mean to set up. But if the relations of the British Parliament with the Irish Parliament are to be complicated by the unpleasant incidents connected with the

collection of just debts, then I tell you that if all the other questions were out of the way which will embitter the relations between these two Legislative bodies, that question will be enough to bring your proposed arrangements to a standstill.

But there is another point not connected directly with the Imperial unity of the Empire, not connected directly and immediately with the financial relations between England and Ireland—there is, I say, another point which makes the minority—this great Ulster minority, not a minority, mind you, confined to Ulster, but a minority which I will call the Ulster minority for convenience—which makes them determined to resist to the last gasp the imposition of this Bill which is to give them national freedom; and that point is the character of the men and the character of the party which will be made supreme in Ireland as soon as this Bill passes. I notice there a natural reluctance to deal either in the House of Commons or on English platforms with this aspect of the question, and that reluctance I share. I have been brought, through years of controversy, into the acutest antagonism with those gentlemen who profess to represent the Irish race, and the result of that antagonism has certainly not been to foster in me an unfriendly feeling towards them. I admire the abilities of many of them.

Ability is always admirable, and no one who is a member of the House of Commons can fail to recognize the parliamentary dexterity and the legal ingenuity of the chief of the Irish representatives. But we have to look at this question not from the point of view of the House of Commons, but from the point of view of Ireland. It matters nothing to me if I am abused in the House of Commons by these gentlemen. They cannot boycott me, they cannot ruin me in business, they cannot make speeches which induce a masked scoundrel to come and put me on my knees and fire shots at me; they cannot attack my house at midnight; they cannot maim and torture my cattle. The Plan of Campaign matters nothing to me. The Plan of Campaign cannot be put in force against me, and therefore, be their merits or demerits what they may be, so far as I am concerned they are reduced to eloquent invective, and eloquent invective is a form of misfortune which I have long learned to tolerate with equanimity. But put yourself in the position, not of a Conservative or Unionist member of Parliament, or of a man living in England under English laws; put yourself for a moment in the position either of the Ulster minority or of those scattered Protestants throughout the south and west of Ireland, or of

those unfortunate individuals who in the exercise of their undoubted rights as citizens, may have ventured to take an evicted farm or to work for an unpopular landlord; put yourselves in their place, and ask what you are to think of the gentlemen who will be placed in power by the Irish Home Rule Bill. Mr. Asquith, in his speech the other day, appeared to resent the conduct of those who extracted from the record of those gentlemen's speeches quotations showing the principle on which they thought Ireland ought to be governed. He said it was like raking up—what was his term? Yes, raking up garbage in a dust-heap. Well, I do not deny that speeches may be garbage, but, though for scientific purposes even garbage may be worth examination, I am not going to inflict upon you those well-worn extracts from Mr. Dillon, Mr. O'Brien, and other gentlemen, who will throne it in the new House of Commons. I take it as a matter of common knowledge accepted by every well-informed man that such speeches have been delivered, that such professions of political faith have been made, and that the Irish electors who returned these gentlemen to the House of Commons because they made those speeches, and because they made those professions, will hold them to the principles they have adopted when once an

Irish House of Commons gives the power to carry those principles into effect. But though I am not going to call your attention to those speeches, it may perhaps be worth while to remind you that nothing to my knowledge has ever been said by any merely British politician about those leaders of the Irish race half as bad, half as violent, as they habitually say to one another whenever some temporary difference may divide their ranks. Now, I do not mean to weary you with quotations, but here is what one Anti-Parnellite said of the Parnellite Party. This was a speech delivered before the general election, and the speaker said :—

“Every one of the Parnellites recognized that after the next general election the Parnellite candidate would cease to be a Parliamentary representative, and, having recognized that their own doom was at hand, they seemed to be resolved on proving between now and the general election that they were thirty such champion blackguards that the respectable element in English political life would ask themselves seriously whether the people which produced such a pack of scoundrels was fit for self-government.”

And the ingenious and able lawyer whose name was mentioned just now in the body of the hall announced that as for arguing with Mr. Parnell—

Mr. Parnell was then alive—or his party as reasoning beings, he would as soon argue with a cage of monkeys in a menagerie. I have quoted—perhaps it is rather unfair—I have only quoted what the Anti-Parnellites have said about the Parnellites, but if it were worth while I could find choice extracts of what Parnellites have said of Anti-Parnellites, and between the two sets of quotations I could exhaust the character of every single gentleman now representing Ireland in the national interest. And let it be recollected that, though I agree with Mr. Asquith that we ought never to take Irish oratory too seriously, though I concur with him in that view, I must point out that the accusations mutually hurled by these two sections at each other went much further than what I may call mere promiscuous blackguarding. They went the length of accusing each other in relation to the Paris funds, of being incapable of carrying out a financial trust and of betraying the interest which they professed to serve. Now, why do I, to use Mr. Asquith's unsavoury metaphor, why do I rake in the dust-heap for these fragments of garbage? I do it for this reason. I want to ask you, I want to ask the people of England, how we can complain of the minority in Ireland taking the view they do of the majority, when the members of that majority

take the very same view when they are cross-examined about themselves. Can we regard fears so supported as unjust? We cannot. And it was for that reason, among others, that when I had occasion to speak in Belfast, I declined to shut my eyes to the possibility of Ulster having to resist the tyranny of a tyrannical majority by force. For that speech I have been attacked by more than one speaker during the present debate in the House of Commons. That speech I do not mean here to defend. If it be worth while dragging in my own personal merits or demerits, if a defence be necessary at all, that defence shall be made in the place where the accusation was made, and in the face of the men who made it.

But I only allude to it now in order to put to you one question. If you, British Protestant working men, found yourselves threatened with a measure cutting you off from the country of your birth, from the Constitution under which you were born, which you had helped to work, and under which you hoped to die; if you found that you were to be handed over by the majority of the electorate of this country to a body of persons differing from you in their views of public morality, in their views of private morality, in their religion, to men who had publicly announced that they

professed principles which you and I believe to be absolutely inconsistent either with private rights or with private liberty; and if you found that this monstrous crime was going to be done in the name of liberty and in the name of patriotism, would you submit? I do not believe you ever would submit. I do not think you can ask men of your own birth and your own creed to submit, and I am quite sure that whether you ask them or not, they will not submit.

The moment is one of supreme significance and importance, not merely to every one of us as citizens of the Empire, but to every one of us as guardians in part of the liberty of every man who is a subject of the Queen. And I for one am not going to preach a morality which I should not be myself prepared to practise, of submission which I myself should not be prepared to give. But nothing but the hard and irresistible logic of fact shall ever persuade me that you and the other citizens of this country will ever consent to this atrocious political wickedness to which you are asked to give your adhesion. I will never believe until I see it that you will allow British soldiers to shoot down under the orders of an Irish Executive, men whose only crime it is that they still wish to be called your fellow-subjects and to share with you

the responsibilities of Empire ; and unless and until you do give your consent to these atrocities the Parliamentary majority may do what it likes ; the Home Rule Bill will not and cannot become an integral part of the Constitution of these realms, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland will remain united still.

IV

IRELAND—SOUTH AND WEST*

WE have met together for one purpose, and for one purpose only. It is not to look back upon the past; it is not to do honour to any individual; it is to record our emphatic protest against the measure—the Separatist measure—brought in by the present Administration, and to show that out of Ulster there is a vast concourse of citizens of the Queen living in Ireland who never will willingly submit for one instant to the proposed alteration in the constitution of their realm. One difficulty which meets every speaker who has to deal with the many-sided iniquity known as the Home Rule Bill, is that it is absolutely impossible to embrace within the compass of one speech the arguments which may be urged from every side of this question against the propositions of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. I might discuss this question—I should be justified in discussing this question—before you from the point of view of the citizens of the great

* Dublin, April 9, 1893.

Empire of which we are all members. I might show you—it would be easy to show you—that this Bill, if it be not legally and technically a Bill for separating Ireland from England, is, nevertheless, really and substantially a measure which can have no other ultimate issue. I might occupy your time, not I venture to think unprofitably, by demonstrating to you that, if this Bill were passed, that great assembly in Westminster of which we and all English-speaking people, whether they be subjects of Her Majesty or not, are proud, and to which they look back as the great parent of all free assemblies throughout the world—that that Imperial House of Commons would have its constitution fundamentally altered, and would be shorn of its ancient glories. I might dilate again upon the misery—the inevitable misery—that would be brought upon Ireland and the inevitable embarrassment that would be brought upon the Government of the Queen by the fact that a United Ulster is determined to have nothing to do with this measure. I might show you that, while it robs the British tax-payers, it makes the Irish tax-payers bankrupts, and, were it necessary, I might go in turn through every class in the community, from the highest to the lowest, and I might show how each must inevitably suffer if these proposals should once be placed upon the Statute-book

But these are topics far too large for me to deal with in the course of one speech, and in the course of one evening. I shall therefore confine myself to that which, if not absolutely the most important aspect of the question, is perhaps the aspect of it which comes most home to your own minds, and in which your own personal experience will give a most clear answer to every proposition which I shall advance—namely, the effect which this Bill will have and must have upon the whole south and west of Ireland.

I would first like to ask you whether that class by whose support presumably this Bill is to be carried, and in whose interests it is to be passed, really desires it or will really profit by it. I mean the small farmer, the small farmer in Connaught, the small farmer throughout the south and west of Ireland. His vote it is which has brought this proposition within the sphere, not within measurable distance of passing, but at all events within the sphere of practical politics. His views it is to which Mr. Gladstone affects to bow down. His interests are those which this Bill is intended and supposed to subserve. Will it subserve those interests? I think not. The small farmer in the west of Ireland depends, in the first place, upon the English markets for his stock ; and I can tell him that nothing will

imperil the agricultural interest by which he lives so much as a separate Executive in Ireland and in Westminster. I recollect last year—I think it was when the late Government were in office—it became absolutely necessary either to stamp out foot-and-mouth disease in Ireland or to threaten Ireland with the great calamity of shutting off her exports of cattle to England. A large sum was advanced from the Imperial Treasury for that purpose and that purpose was attained. What is going to happen under Home Rule? You will have no Imperial Treasury to look to, you will have no Imperial Government alike interested in the local prosperity of Irish agriculture and the prosperity of English agriculture, and the inevitable result must be that should foot-and-mouth disease or any analogous calamity attack Irish agriculture, the Irish farmer will be ruined, and ruined irretrievably, by the fact that his whole market is absolutely cut off. That is the first point I should like to bring home to those voters who voted for candidates supporting this measure. Another question I should like to ask them. Hitherto they have had behind them in their enterprise the whole wealth of the British Exchequer lent to them, from which they could draw loans on favourable terms. I do not know that the Irish Exchequer is likely to be a very economical body,

but I do know that it will not be able to borrow, and that, therefore, it will not be able to lend on the same terms as the Imperial Exchequer. And let the Irish farmer recollect that one of the bribes held out by the Prime Minister to the English electorate to induce them to adopt this iniquitous measure is that they will henceforth be free from the drains made upon their Exchequer by the impecunious Irish borrower. One more, and only one more, point I should like to bring before the Irish farmer who supports a Nationalist candidate. I should like to ask him whether there is any object which he has nearer to his heart than the purchasing of his holding. I should like to ask him whether he thinks the purchasing of his holding can be carried out except with the help of a public subscription. I should like to ask him whether any transaction of the sort is possible, or possible at least upon terms which he would accept, unless it be backed by the credit of the Imperial Government, from which in his rash enthusiasm he desires to separate himself. Believe me, that for those great benefits given by the Imperial Parliament, given by the Union to the small farmer in Ireland, for those great benefits, plunder and spoliation are but poor substitutes ; and, however he may look forward to a time when he may draw rather upon the pockets

of his landlords than upon the Exchequer of the State, nevertheless, unless the whole of history be a falsehood, such a course can only end, first, in the ruin of the plundered, but secondly, and not less surely, in the ruin of the plunderer.

I turn to a subject which is nearer my heart, and which is nearer, I believe, the hearts of those who hear me, than the special views and interests of those classes who vote for Home Rule. I turn to the position which the minority will occupy if this measure be passed—if ever it be passed. Ulster can at all events fight. That last refuge of brave men struggling for their freedom cannot be denied them. But it is not of Ulster that I would wish to speak to-night, nor is it yet of those great communities in this county, to those great constituencies whose names I see recorded opposite to me, to the St. Stephen's Green Division of this city, or to the South Dublin Division of the county. It is not to these I desire to speak—they have shown their power. Surely they will show it again. But, alas, beyond the limits of South Dublin or the St. Stephen's Green Division of Dublin there are scattered through the south and east of Ireland a minority large in its aggregate numbers, but nevertheless, under any system of representation ever likely to be given to Ireland, absolutely helpless

should Home Rule be passed. To those men, I recollect it well, was promised, when the suffrage was extended in 1884 by Mr. Gladstone—to those men was promised the support of the English and the Scottish members by Mr. Gladstone himself. That support Mr. Gladstone now desires to withdraw, and I ask you, What is the power to which they must look to preserve for them the elementary rights and privileges of citizens? I cannot describe the position of these persons better—many of them, I believe, are represented in the audience I am addressing—than in the words of one who, I suppose, if this Bill becomes law, will be asked and required to determine upon their destinies—I mean Mr. Thomas Sexton. Mr. Thomas Sexton, in a speech made upon the first, but not the last, abortive Home Rule measure brought before Parliament, thus describes them: “These three hundred thousand persons,” he said, “are in the midst of a Catholic population of three millions. They would never exercise any voting power; they would never have a single Member of Parliament; they could not form any constituency anywhere; they would be absolutely dumb in the hands of the Legislature.” Can I describe more concisely or more effectively the position of absolute helplessness to which many of you would be reduced were Home Rule to become

a fact? I think not; and it is upon the position of this minority, so placed by the confession of one who wishes to have his heel upon their necks—it is to the position of this minority that I would call your attention, and, if I am fortunate enough, the attention also of the great community across the Channel on whom your fate now depends.

Now this minority belongs in the nature of things to more than one class, and I, speaking as I do in Dublin, and having behind me as I have the recollections of four troubled years spent in the Government of this country, should think it disgraceful if I did not mention the civil servants of Ireland—the civil servants and the constabulary. In their fate, small though they may be in relative numbers, the honour of the British Parliament is interested. They were the creation of an Act of Parliament, they were induced to enter the careers which they have adopted by the promises of an Act of Parliament, and by the Acts of successive British Ministries, and shameful beyond words to express it would it be if a British Ministry now abandoned them. And yet, though we have not yet the full proposals of the Bill upon this matter before us, I cannot doubt that both the civil servants and the constabulary will be abandoned by the present Government—that is, if the Government get their way.

Now, consider for a moment what is the position of a man who enters the civil service of a country. The Government talk as if the civil servants who did their work in Ireland were Irish civil servants, and were separated by that fact from the fate of their English brethren in London. It is not so. The civil servants are not Irish civil servants, or English civil servants, or Scotch civil servants. They are Imperial civil servants. They have been asked at the bidding of the Imperial Parliament to enter a service not divided by nationalities. They have known when they entered that service that there was not before them the chance of great wealth or great fame; they knew when they entered it that compared with average pay, with the chances of many other professions, they were to be paid on a low scale, and they accepted that for the one gift and recompense of security. The civil servant of the Crown, whether he does his work in Ireland, in Dublin, in London, or in Edinburgh—the civil servant of the Crown knows, or knew until the Home Rule Bill was introduced, that so long as he does his duty fairly he will have a secure employment, and that when he can no longer serve the State he will receive an annuity. What are you going to do with those men whose misfortune it is that they served in Ireland instead

of London? You are going to destroy their hopes of promotion. You find they entered upon a career which excluded them from all other business, having taken their houses, having settled their lives in the belief, and what ought to be the well-founded belief, that the profession which they have adopted is at least a secure profession, that the State whom they served will not forget their services. For years they have been the butt and the object of attack by every whipper-snapper who thought he could show his knowledge of Ireland and his love of liberty by abusing the Castle; for years they have been the helpless victims of abuse to which they were powerless to reply; and now it appears that in the fulness of time the Imperial Government is coming forward and is going to hand these faithful servants of the Crown over to those who have made no secret of the fact that they are their deadliest and most determined enemies.

Is it better with the Irish constabulary? I saw a great deal of that force when I was Irish Secretary, and I know that a more splendid, a more faithful, and a more loyal body of men does not serve the Queen in or out of Ireland. The position of those men has been regulated by statute after statute. Ministries after Ministries have promised them fair play. They have entered the service of

the Crown, have subjected themselves to strict discipline, have thrown away every other chance of advancement in life in connection with the necessary restraints and restrictions incident to a disciplined force, because they have been foolish enough to believe in the honour of a British Administration. It appears that these men also are to be sacrificed, so far as I understand the proposals of the Government. They endeavour, indeed, to give their dismissed servants some donation at parting. But what is to make up to them for the shattered career and for legitimate expectations utterly destroyed? Is there a single man in the force whose position, if this Bill becomes law, will be worth six months' purchase? You know, those of you who have followed, I will not say the arguments of Mr. Gladstone, but the statements of Mr. Gladstone upon this subject, that when he is taxed with the obvious fact that his proposals will end in Irish bankruptcy in three years according to the more sanguine, and one year according to the less sanguine, he replies by saying that there are great economies to be made in Irish Administration. In other words, that the Irish Government is to pay salaries to all new officials, to your new Chancellor of the Exchequer, your Irish Home Secretary, your Irish Lord Chancellor—I do not attempt to construct

what is to be the first Irish Cabinet—but at all events, it is to pay the salaries of these new offices out of economies to be effected upon the existing salaries of the Civil Service; and if the constabulary are to be handed over to the local authority they are to be reduced, if Mr. Gladstone's prophecies are accurate, in numbers, and no man in the force at this moment can tell what his future will be.

If the Home Rule Bill be passed his prospects are not worth, as I said before, six months' purchase, and you would not get even an Irish financier to give that amount for them. Well, gentlemen, is that the way to treat the Irish constabulary? For sixty years, for more than fifty years at all events, they have stood between society and anarchy. For fifty years, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty, they have invariably done their duty by their Queen and by the law of the land, and it will be a shameful act if this Government, or any Government, should pass a measure by which the future of their admirable force shall not merely be imperilled, but, as I think, be absolutely destroyed.

One other class there is besides the Civil Service and besides the constabulary in whose favour, as I think, the honour of the Liberal party is pledged, but who under this Bill are to be abandoned by the

Imperial Parliament to the tyranny of their bitterest foes. I mean the landlords of Ireland. Now, I am not going to put, in the forefront of this great controversy, the interests of any single class, whether the landlord or any other class; but I pray you to think for a moment of the position which the landlords occupy and what they have a right to expect from an Imperial Parliament. The Imperial Parliament has put them there originally by the confession of their enemies, as "the English garrison," as the Loyalist minority who were to preserve the interests of England, of Britain. The Imperial Parliament has gone further and said that their rents shall be regulated—not as the rents of every other landowning class in the world, so far as I know, are regulated—namely, by the free play of bargain between man and man, but by the State; and, in exchange the State has promised that the rents so regulated shall be paid. I say that the landlords in Ireland by this legislation and by other legislation which many of you know about, but of which I shall not now speak, have a claim upon the British Legislature that they, at all events, may preserve that property which has been guaranteed to them by what used to be thought in old times the best of all titles, a Parliamentary title, but which, if the present Prime Minister has his way

much longer, will, I fear, be thought the worst and the most insecure of any title. How are the landlords going to be treated? We know perfectly the methods that will be adopted. We know—it is not worth my while recounting or quoting—we know the principles of those who will have control over the landlords' property, if not by legislature at all events by executive act. We know further that these facts were so present to the mind of Mr. Gladstone and of his colleagues in 1886 that they thought it absolutely necessary as an obligation of honour to see that the landlords suffered no wrong by the great revolution which they endeavoured then to effect. Honour has vanished. But I should have thought that if ever Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues are ill-advised enough to look over their speeches, or if in the watches of the night some ancient utterances come back to their memories, that the cheeks of even the most hardened politicians would tingle with the blush of shame when they thought of the measure they were meting out to those who certainly of all classes in Ireland are not those least deserving of Imperial support.

We have heard a great deal of safeguards—the Bill reeks with safeguards; it bristles with safeguards. But the one in which the Government appear to take the most delight is that which they

have borrowed from the American Constitution. They have introduced, as perhaps you know, a clause into their Bill in which they declare that no man shall be deprived of his life or his property except by process of law. You know that this was borrowed from the American Constitution, but perhaps you do not know that by a happy tact, by a felicitous appreciation of the circumstances of the case, this clause owes its origin to the desire of the United States Government to protect the interests of the enslaved blacks. You will all appreciate the compliment, but I fear that you will get nothing else but a compliment, and that compliment is an empty one, for the words as they stand, whatever credit they may do to the constitutional learning of Professor Bryce and his friends, are, at all events, absolutely useless for preserving any right whatever to the minority which the Government think will be circumstanced in Ireland exactly as the blacks were circumstanced in the Southern States of America. For what are you afraid of? Mr. Gladstone will not be a factor in the Government of Ireland which he desires to establish. What you have to be afraid of is not an Executive acting outside the law, but an Executive moulding the laws to suit its own purpose and refusing to execute the laws which do not suit its own purpose; and I tell you that all the

clauses in the world drawn from other Constitutions will be helpless to protect you or to protect your children.

But I ought, perhaps, not to ignore at this point the general arguments by which this Bill, which is thus going to attack your interests, is recommended to the British House of Commons. I read, or at all events, I endeavoured to read, the most recent speech of the Prime Minister. He “surveyed mankind from China to Peru.” He ransacked history for parallels to his own proceedings, and he flattered himself that he found some. He dealt with every age and every country. I except one age and one country—he never dealt with Ireland in the year 1893. From that he averted his gaze, either in ignorance, or knowing that the more you study the Irish question in Ireland and the less you study it in Austria or Hungary or Norway, the less likely you were to arrive at a conclusion favourable to his own proposals; and yet be it noticed that never yet in the history of the world have we had such materials for forming an opinion upon the *personnel*, upon the policy, upon the objects, and upon the morality of those to whom it is proposed to hand over the government of this country. Mr. Gladstone denounces prophecy. He attacked Mr. Courtney for venturing to prophesy as

to the future of Ireland. It requires no prophecy ; it requires nothing but a knowledge, easily acquired, of the notorious facts of the case. A thousand platforms in this country have rung with the doctrines of the men who will form the future Cabinet of Ireland.

A Judicial Commission, inquiring under the strictest rules of evidence—none of your Evicted Tenants' Commission — a Judicial Commission, inquiring under the strictest rules of evidence, with the freest powers of cross-examination in open Court before the whole country, has found every single one of those who now represent Nationalist opinions to be guilty of practices and a policy of which the most favourable and flattering thing to say is that it is treasonable. In Mr. Gladstone's own Cabinet, if he admits his own ignorance of the Irish question, there are several gentlemen near him who can enlighten him. In his own Cabinet there are at least three men who have held high office in this country—Lord Spencer, Sir George Trevelyan, and Mr. Bannerman—each of whom have been either Lord Lieutenant or Chief Secretary of Ireland, all of whom have publicly expressed their opinions of the aims, the characters and the methods of the gentlemen who will be called upon to govern you if Home Rule

be passed. What is the use, under such circumstances, of Mr. Gladstone's roving inquiry into every State, ancient and modern, on the Continent of Europe? What consolation is it to you if you ask what you are to do when the authors of the Plan of Campaign for the Government in this country—what comfort is it to you to be told that Austria-Hungary might be a less successful political organisation than it is? What comfort is it to you when you ask what refuge you are to obtain when the inventor of boycotting is Home Secretary of Ireland—what comfort is to be obtained from some reference to Poland or Finland? What comfort are you likely to obtain when you ask what is to be the resource of the peaceable and law-abiding under those who have trampled law underfoot for twelve years to be told that Sweden and Norway, though not altogether a successful specimen of Home Rule, may, in the Prime Minister's opinion, be expected ultimately to turn out extremely well because the Scandinavian blood is some of the best blood which many citizens of Great Britain have in their veins? When in your distress, with the practical knowledge of Ireland, which by a bitter experience you have won, you turn to the man who, of all others, should make himself responsible for the security and for the

liberty of British citizens, he mocks you by these fantastic references to an imaginary history.

If I rightly understand the apology put forward by the present Government for their action, it is that they are obeying the call and answering to the demand of Irish patriotism. I think that what is called Irish patriotism, though it has a mistaken object, is itself a noble and disinterested quality, like every other form of patriotism. I think the patriotism of Mr. O'Connell, whom Mr. Gladstone belauds, but who was, if I recollect rightly, put in prison by a Government of which Mr. Gladstone was a member—the patriotism of Mr. O'Connell was doubtless a noble and a disinterested passion. I am not here to attack either the motive or the conduct of the men of 1848, or even of the Fenians of 1867. In those days it was not absurd to say that the voice which came from Ireland was the voice of patriotism, but the voice of patriotism failed. Patriotism had not—the sort of patriotism of which I am speaking—the patriotism of separation had not, as I believe it has not now, sufficient hold upon the inhabitants of Ireland to make them desire seriously or effectively to throw off the yoke, if yoke it is to be called, imposed upon them by the Union; and Irish patriotism had to be supplemented, and it was supplemented by

the agitators of 1880. It is not to Irish patriotism that Mr. Gladstone now bows the knee. It is not the forces of Irish patriotism which compelled him and his Cabinet to repudiate the convictions of a lifetime. It is not Irish patriotism which has besmirched the honour of a great English party. They have indeed surrendered. They have not surrendered to Irish patriotism; they have surrendered to Irish crime. But though the so-called Liberal party have surrendered to Irish crime, to those who, for their own purpose, have fostered Irish crime, if they have surrendered and been captured, believe me the English people are not captured. They know, as you know, that from such a stock comes no good fruit. They know as well as you know, that on such a foundation can no stable edifice of national prosperity be built. They know, as well as you know, that personal security, personal liberty, and public credit are the first and primary duties which the British, the Imperial Government, owes to every community of citizens acknowledging the sovereignty of the Queen. And, believe me, as long as they hold those convictions, that Home Rule which you so justly dread is an absolute impossibility.



V

CUI BONO ? *

I AM far from complaining of the two preceding speakers in that they confined their remarks to one clause in this Bill, because probably there is not a man in this House who conceals from himself the fact that when this controversy is reviewed in the country before different audiences and before a final tribunal, the clause which was 9 and is now 10 will probably occupy a large amount of the attention of the orators and the audiences on those occasions. But I should like to remark that the two gentlemen have not altogether in this respect followed the example of the front bench. The third reading stage of a measure is that in which the House, looking back over its labours on the first and second readings in Committee and on report, finally pronounces whether the result of its labours be good or be bad. We are not in that position. We cannot look back to a Bill discussed in Committee and discussed in report, because, for reasons familiar to the House and on which I do

* House of Commons, September 1, 1893.

not mean to dwell at length, we have never discussed three-fourths of the Bill either in Committee or on report. And what is the result of that? The result is that this is not a third reading discussion at all. It is a second reading discussion—a first or second reading discussion, for the most part seasoned with criticisms and invectives against those who have ventured to offer reasons why this or that clause should be rejected, and why, if not rejected, it should be amended.

I do not know that the House has wasted its time wholly in venturing to criticize the Bill and engaging in these long debates. Members on the other side of the House have spent some time in explaining or endeavouring to persuade the country that if the liberties of Parliament have been interfered with—if debate has been curtailed—the fault rests with gentlemen on this side. They urge that we, and we alone, are responsible for the fate which has overtaken us; and yet, when I listened to the speech of the Attorney-General, which was devoted to this interesting and fertile theme, I arrived at the conclusion that we had not devoted enough time to clause 5 and clause 10 to satisfy the wishes of those who have charge of the Bill. For how did the learned gentleman spend most of his time? It may fairly be said that he spent most of his

time in delivering on the third reading fragments of speeches which he himself admitted would have been appropriate to the Committee stage or to the report stage, but which he had not delivered for fear of wasting the time of the House. I do not mean to follow the example which he has set, because his arguments have already been completely exposed, but the impression produced by his speech upon my mind was that members of the Government themselves had suffered more acutely by the gag than any gentleman sitting on this side of the House. The gravamen of the Government charge rested upon certain statistics which they presented with regard to the length of time taken up on this Bill. The extraordinary uniformity of example brought forward, by the Chief Secretary at Newcastle, then by the Prime Minister, then by the Home Secretary at Althorpe, then by the Attorney-General, and now by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, shows that all the statistics emanated from a common source, that they have been got up by some diligent private secretary, circulated among the members of the Government, and freely used as material and padding for the speeches which they have delivered. The favourite example of a measure which ought to have taken longer is the Reform Act of 1832. I should like to ask the Prime

Minister whether he has ever read that Act. There were literally only two principles involved in that Act, one the principle of substituting genuine constituencies for what were known as rotten boroughs, and the other the settling of the franchise upon which the new electorate were to vote. The whole mass of that long Bill was occupied solely with discussing whether this borough should have one member or two members, whether the boundaries should be settled in this manner or in that, how constituency representation was to be divided ; and there was not in that Act any question of principle which was contained in more than one or two clauses. One clause and one appendix in this Bill contained both those questions. On clause 6 of the Bill you not only had to determine the question of the constitutional relations of the Chambers but what the franchise for the electorate was to be ; and in the appendix you had questions which, though they did not apply to an area as large as Great Britain, involved questions not less important, not less vital to the interest of the populations concerned. Grattan's Parliament was mentioned by Sir Edward Grey and other speakers, who said that it was established in two days. Under what circumstances was Grattan's Parliament established ? Grattan's Parliament was established

when England was at the lowest depths of her fortune, and when the English Ministry felt that they had no choice but to surrender to the Irish demand. I can well believe that it took only two days to run away, and I think it not impossible if this Bill or any Bill like it becomes law, and if England finds herself involved in great foreign complications and warlike difficulties that it may happen that Ireland will again make demands upon the British Administration, and that the British Administration may again run away and that it will only take them two days to do it. But we are not legislating in a panic. We are not now, or do not profess at all events now, to be making a Bill the insufficiency of which is to be exposed, as was the insufficiency of the Act of 1782, in the course of a few years. We profess to be making a Bill which in its main outlines and in its fundamental provisions is to last through many generations and to be a law to us and to our descendants for ever. These are circumstances, if circumstances ever could exist, in which the full discussion by this House of every detail was required, in order that we, at all events, should be bound by the agreement to which we came with the Irish parliament, and in order that some moral obligation should rest upon us to carry out the treaty which this Bill, were

it to become law, would establish between England and Ireland, no longer one United Kingdom. Before I part from the question of comparative statistics, I should like to refer to the interesting and able speech made by the hon. member for Devonport,* to whom I listened with great pleasure and who I am sure will be an ornament in our debates. He went more than anybody else into the question of the period taken in the discussion of different measures. He gave a long list of Bills, including the North American Act, all of which he said could be pressed into the eighty-three days which were taken by an obstructive Opposition over this measure. I have two observations to make. The first is that it is wholly absurd to compare the procedure of this Democratic Parliament in 1893 with the same Parliament a hundred years ago. If we are so much a superior assembly to our forefathers, three or four generations ago, undoubtedly one result of the great changes which have taken place in the political life of England since they lived has been in the direction of an increased participation in our debates from all sides and all quarters of the House. There was a time when the whole business of debate was carried on by a number of gentlemen whom you

* Mr. Hudson E. Kearley, now Lord Devonport.

could enumerate upon the fingers of your two hands. Practically the whole business of the Government was carried on by three gentlemen, and the whole business of the Opposition by three more, with a certain admixture of independent members. That way of carrying on debate is wholly impossible under modern conditions, and therefore it is absolutely ludicrous for any one with the slightest perception of historical perspective, with the slightest power of projecting himself into the life of the past, to institute these statistical comparisons between the time it took to discuss a great question in 1793 and the time it took to discuss a similar question in 1893. That Act was wholly uncontroversial. I mean, as a matter of fact, it was uncontroversial; there was nobody who differed from it. It was a debate which took place under parliamentary conditions absolutely different from those under which we live and with which all fair comparison is impossible. Why did not the hon. gentleman deal with Bills opposed by gentlemen with whom he sits, who were elected under the same franchise to that under which we were elected, and who fought Bills under the same conditions under which we fight them? I will remind you of two Bills, one very small but very controversial, the other more or less complex and not

controversial. They were the Crimes Act of 1887 and the Land Act of 1891. I was myself in charge of both these Bills. I had to do my best to pass them, though I have a very lively recollection of the sort of opposition they encountered. The Crimes Act of 1887, which as we all know was closed, took before it was closed forty-one days. Every principle, speaking broadly, of that measure had been discussed and approved and sanctioned by Parliament on previous occasions. Most of the clauses were copied *verbatim* from the legislative efforts of the present Prime Minister. I do not wish to overstate the case, and I will not say there was nothing new in the Bill. There was. But, broadly speaking, the Bill was framed on familiar lines and copied from familiar models, and had been discussed and dealt with in this House over and over again. As for the second Bill, it was not a controversial Bill at all. It took two days on the second reading. I do not believe there was a division on the second reading, and the Irish members, who naturally and properly took a great part in discussing it, would have been bitterly disappointed had that Bill not ultimately become law. It will be observed, therefore, that these two Bills, taken together, were fought under far more favourable circumstances, so far as parliamentary time is

concerned, than the Bill we are now dealing with—a Bill new in its provisions, with unheard of details, involving every kind of principle, dealing with every sort of interest, and every class in England, Ireland, and Scotland. I do not think it can or will be denied that these two Bills together—the one, I say, brief but controversial, the other uncontroversial, although undoubtedly complex—together do not equal the sum of legitimate controversy which this Bill arouses. Who can maintain that these two Bills—and I can assuredly add many others to them—equal in the bulk, scope, and importance of the issues they raised the vast measure now being thrust through an unwilling assembly? I do not think anybody will maintain it. These Bills together took within two days of as long as the Bill we are now discussing, and I recommend the hon. member for Devonport not to go back to ancient history, not even to go back twenty-five years, but to consider the parliamentary performances of his friends and allies. I do not ask him to read the debates, I do not ask him to see which is the most revelant and most important, in which there was the least unnecessary expenditure of parliamentary time; but I ask him, merely ask him, to go to the proved evidence of figures, and I am sure he will agree that, whatever the performances

of the present Opposition, they pale before the performances of the Opposition which preceded, and that we, at all events, can feel that if the dignity of the House is to be raised by honest, relevant, and earnest discussions of the details of a Bill, we have done something to raise Opposition criticism from the slough in which it was left by gentlemen opposite. There is but one other point in connection with the conduct of the Opposition to which I wish to refer. The Chief Secretary was good enough at Newcastle on Saturday to quote a sentence of mine in regard to the attitude of the Opposition of the Bill, and to quote it as an adequate ground for the interference with the liberty of debate in which this Government has so lavishly and with so much satisfaction to themselves appeared at times to indulge. What was that sentence? I said that our intention was to improve the Bill and if possible, also to destroy it. That is the substance of what the right hon. gentleman said with perfect accuracy. Is there anybody who objects to that proceeding? Our duty in Committee is to improve all Bills, and our duty at any stage of the discussion is to destroy Bills of which we disapprove. It is mere cant to say we are to come down to this House and in Committee to discuss the details of measures which we think

destructive of the greatness of the Empire merely with a view of improving them, and to exclude from our minds, to throw away an accursed thing, the very thought and project of, if we can, destroying them in the process. If the Chief Secretary thinks that wrong, I would ask him what his views are as to the course he took upon, let us say, the Crimes Act, I presume for the purpose of improving it. Would we have thought it consistent with his duty to omit any opportunity of destroying that Bill in its passage through the House? Of course he would have destroyed it. Every Opposition dealing with a Bill of which it disapproves in its essential and immutable principles is bound by the same policy, which I have the courage openly to avow, which the right hon. gentleman apparently does not disavow, across the table of the House, which nevertheless, he apparently thought it consistent with the respect due to the intelligent electorate who send him here to use as a justification for the interference with our liberties and their liberties, which he and his friends have perpetrated. I think I have said enough now upon what I am bound to say under ordinary circumstances would hardly be relevant, but as such matter has filled the whole of the speeches of gentlemen on the front Ministerial bench, I thought I could not pass it

altogether without some comment and some reply.

I pass to the Bill. I do not mean at this time of night to review in detail the many defects, and worse than defects, which as we think, attach to the measure. The Prime Minister, in his opening address on the third reading, enumerated seven points which we had urged, and which he said, if they were true, were conclusive or almost conclusive against the Home Rule Bill of which he was in charge. I think the enumeration was an admirable enumeration. I think every man would be well advised if when he was to fight this question in his constituency he was to placard the seven deadly sins of Home Rule on the authority of the right hon. gentleman. But I shall not repeat the proofs which the Opposition have given that these deadly sins really are incident to Home Rule. I shall confine myself to a much briefer area of discussion, and I would ask this question, What exactly is the gain to Ireland which you think this Bill will introduce? Gentlemen below the gangway in their speeches always hold out to us the prospect that when they come into power with an adequate financial sum at their command, they are going to regenerate Ireland materially. The whole condition of the people is to be raised, agriculture is to be

promoted, industries are to be fostered, and if all their prophecies are to come to pass, there are few nations in this world likely to be so blest as the new Ireland under the new Irish Government. But I confess that looking back over the whole fourteen years which I have been a member in this House, and in which members below the gangway have arrogated to themselves the exclusive representation of Irish interests, I have seen a wonderful display of parliamentary ability, perseverance, tact, and eloquence; I have never seen or heard, anxiously as I have looked for it and listened for it, the slightest sign that any one of those gentlemen has at his disposal a plan of dealing with Ireland which would commend itself to any economist, to any statesman, to any man of moderately large views. I have heard attacks on landlords, I have heard attacks on Castle officials, I have heard much destructive criticism against every action of the Irish Government; but never yet have I heard from them a single proposal likely to be of permanent ameliorative effect upon the long-standing ills and troubles of the country which they aspire to rule. Now that is a challenge I throw down, and I hope it will be taken up by the Chief Secretary opposite. I do not count such expedients as the Evicted Tenants' Restitution Bill; I say that, outside of the facile policy of

spoliating landlords, I have not ever seen or heard from any one of those gentlemen any large or well-conceived plan by which the great mass of their countrymen might be elevated in the social sphere. If such a plan had ever been propounded by them, if any such plan had come from gentlemen below the gangway, I say without a moment's hesitation, that whatever party had been in office, that plan would have been eagerly grasped at by every British statesman.

I shall modify the statement I have made. Over and over again attempts have been made, crude and impossible, upon the purse of the British taxpayer, and in that sense gentlemen have always been ready to bring English money into Irish pockets. But I am talking of a well-considered scheme, and I say boldly that, no such well-considered scheme, so far as I am aware, has ever been propounded by gentlemen below the gangway, while such schemes as have been propounded could never have been carried out by Irish resources and Irish resources alone.

Before I pass from that let me say a word with regard to the attacks on what is called the Centralization of Castle Government by the hon. baronet the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, much as I believe he knows of Irish questions, knows very little of Irish Government, and the

attacks of the Attorney-General who ought to know something—attacks unworthy of gentlemen of their position, and which should have been left to third-rate politicians who perambulate Ireland and who take at secondhand old wives' fables which, in my opinion, ought not to be used in this House by responsible politicians. Well, what is the Centralization of Castle Government? Do the gentlemen who appeared to approve of the remarks about the Centralization of Castle Government know anything about it? The police in Ireland are centralized, and in my opinion ought to be centralized. But, apart from the police, what is called Castle Government answers, department for department, to the various offices which you preside over in Whitehall. Local Government is not more centralized in Ireland than in England. The Board of Works is not more centralized. It is quite true that as yet there is not any county government in Ireland on a representative basis. Yes: but that does not make the Government of Ireland centralized, because although the county government which does exist in Ireland is not popular, it does not depend upon the Castle. That is familiar to everybody who knows anything about Ireland. At this moment this Castle Government, which you choose to denounce, is carried on by members of your own Civil Service elected in

the same way as every member to the Civil Service is elected, and is modelled upon the same principles as the Civil Service of England and Scotland. I do not say that there are not differences, but this I do say, that to describe government in Ireland as centralized and in England as not shows great ignorance of the facts. I think even gentlemen opposite will be disposed to grant that we cannot expect from Home Rule the material advantages to Ireland which were so lavishly promised by members below the gangway. Still, they will say that Ireland is governed as much by ideas as by material facts, and that it is better that Ireland should be governed by her own ideas and live in poverty than that she should be governed by us and live in wealth. I am the last man in this House to underrate the value of ideas. I agree with those who think that these are things which cannot be ignored, but I do not agree with the hon. baronet, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when he says that experience and history have shown that it is impossible for us under the Union to govern Ireland in a manner which will meet all the aspirations of the nation. The hon. baronet underrates the magnitude of the task he has undertaken. He himself belongs to the school of politicians who talk of seven centuries of

misgovernment by England. I take it from them that for the six centuries before the Union, Ireland was brutally tyrannized over by England. If so, how can you cure in ninety-three years woes of long standing? I do not talk of our intentions. Everybody admits they are good. I ask not whether the intentions are good, but whether they have borne fruit, and I think any man who chooses to examine with impartial eyes any contemporary account of the condition of the peasantry of Ireland in the beginning, middle, and end of the last century will see that an incomparable improvement in their lot has been effected during the ninety-three years of the Union as contrasted with the corresponding class in England and Scotland. I believe the improvement in the condition of the working class in England has been immense, but I do not believe that it is to be compared with the progress made by the Irish working class, politically, socially, and materially, since the Union. They have been endowed with Civil and political rights, their condition has been greatly improved, and in spite of the famine by which Ireland was overwhelmed, and for which we were not responsible, I say that the improvement in Ireland, the contentment in Ireland, and the diminution in the causes of agrarian discontent in Ireland are such as, in my judgment, to

clearly show that England and Ireland may be left to settle their own affairs without the meddling and muddling of politicians. One further question remains. If you are not by this Bill, as you cannot hope to be, placed in a position to improve the material condition of Ireland, whom, at all events, are you going to satisfy by passing it? That is a very simple question. If you improve Ireland in a material form by it, you may say that you will satisfy sentimental opinion. But whom are you going to satisfy? I will begin with the smallest class—a class who are not dependent on this House. You will not satisfy the Civil Servants at any rate. Henceforth every Civil Servant in Ireland will know that Home Rule means to him the absolute destruction of every prospect in life. He may have been in doubt, he was in doubt before the Bill was brought forward as to that fact, but he knows now that he is not likely to have a Chief Secretary more devoted to his interests than the present Chief Secretary, and that he is not likely to have any statesman over him as his protector more anxious to see justice done than the right hon. gentleman, and yet he knows that a Home Rule Bill formed under the auspices of that very Minister is one which puts an end absolutely to that career to which he had a right to look forward when he

entered the service of this Imperial Parliament. Do you think you will satisfy the Loyalists? Whatever else has come out in these debates, this at least has come out plainly, that not one single man who has been returned to this House by the Loyalist minority in Ireland has been reconciled to the measure by any change suggested or promised in it. Their hostility is as embittered as it ever was, and they know now, on the authority of the hon. member for Govan,* that they must rely for justice in future not upon the paper guarantees of the Bill, but on the strength of their own right arm. The Loyalists of Ireland, whether in Ulster or in the south-west, must rely upon that for the protection of their dearest interests. You may say that, though you do not satisfy the Civil Servants, or constabulary, or the Loyalists, you have satisfied the Nationalists. ✓

I have heard speeches delivered in this debate by gentlemen below the gangway who represent Nationalist opinion, in which they have expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this Bill as a final settlement to the question. But there was one exception to this. The hon. member for Waterford,† speaking for an important section of Nationalists, has told us that it is absolutely

* (Sir) John Wilson.

† Mr. Redmond.

impossible that the Bill could be regarded as a final settlement of the question by the Irish nation. His view is that though we give to Ireland by this Bill more money than she has a right to, though we hand over the lives and property of the minority who depend on us, and though we even hand our own local affairs to be managed by an Irish delegation, we still have not done sufficient, and that when the Nationalists reach the height of their demands, this Bill will be found insufficient, and they will ask for more. I am disposed to believe that the member for Waterford is pretty correct in this. You have established in Ireland by this measure all the ponderous machinery of national government, and it is perfect folly for you to suppose that you can prevent that machinery having full play. You have imposed restriction upon restriction by the Bill, but Ireland looks upon itself as a nation, and you have encouraged it to do so, and having given it the machinery for national government you may be certain that not one of these restrictions is worth the paper it is written on. I am perfectly aware that other gentlemen take a different view, and the member for North Longford* and the member for East Mayo† have pledged themselves with a splendid recklessness not only for Ireland, but for the whole of the

* Mr. Justin McCarthy.

† Mr. John Dillon.

Irish race across the seas. I do not attack the credibility of those gentlemen, but we have to compare their utterances now with their utterances in the past. They are sincere now; they were sincere then; and the question is which of those two forms of sincerity is likely to be the more permanent, which represents the real opinion destined to last. I willingly say that whilst they have acted consistently year after year upon their old opinions, their new opinions are the growth of a few hours and may perish in a similar period. Well, if you have not satisfied Nationalist opinion, have you satisfied British opinion? The Chief Secretary for Ireland at Newcastle was very angry with us for talking about British opinion, and his indignation, real or assumed, has been copied by many gentlemen on the Treasury Bench. Surely it does not lie in the mouths of gentlemen to talk about a Welsh majority, a Scotch majority, and an Irish majority, and then to condemn us for talking about a British majority. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has said, "You talk of your British majority, and you have it, but what right have you to suppose that that majority is not in process of being still further converted to Home Rule? In 1886 there was a majority against Home Rule in Great Britain; there is a majority against

it still, but it is a largely reduced majority. There is evidently, therefore, a growth of opinion, and in the long run the British elector will come round to the opinions already held by the Irish elector." That argument is ingenious, but it will not hold water. What were the circumstances in 1886? The whole Liberal party were asked to execute a *volte-face* at a moment's notice. A capacity for that particular evolution differs with different individuals. It is immensely developed in some quarters, in others it shows but a slight development, and when the election of 1886 took place there were still some members of the Liberal party who were stupid enough to hold the opinions in which they had been brought up, stupid enough to believe that what every British statesman, the Prime Minister included, had said up to 1886 represented a fairly reasonable policy, and who were not prepared to follow their leader in all things. The process of conversion in their case was slower than in the case of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example ; but it has taken place, and party discipline has shown itself stronger than ancient convictions or even reasonable arguments. But why are we to suppose that that process is going on? Surely it is coming to an end now. As far as I can judge from the signs of the times—I do not go by

bye-elections only, not wishing to overrate them—the feeling of Great Britain, which is, after all, one of the parties to the Treaty of Union, is becoming more and more adverse to the plan by which the people think that their dearest interests will be sacrificed. And, if you do not please the Loyalists or the Nationalists or the British public, have you pleased the House of Commons? I am not sure that there is a single man who feels the force of parliamentary tradition who does not look back upon this session with regret as the period in our parliamentary life in which we can distinctly trace the beginning of our decadence, and in which it became clear for the first time that this House is not in the future to be what it has been in the past. The House of Commons, at all events, will not look back upon our proceedings with pleasure, whatever view may be taken of the particular measure before us. As far as I can judge, there is but one body of men in the whole country who have reason to congratulate themselves upon the part you are compelling them to play—I mean the House of Lords.

The Attorney-General indulged in a certain amount of criticism of the Tory party as being the party that had invariably resisted reforms desired by the people. I think that is a shallow view of history, but I will not dispute it now.

However, it must be a gratification to the learned gentleman to feel that at last the Tory party have the people on their side, and that there is not an elector in the whole of England and Scotland who will not feel, after the proceedings in which the House of Commons is now engaged, that if he has to look anywhere for the discussion of matters nearest to his heart, and for the protection of interests which he holds to be vital, it is not to the Chamber which he has done something to elect. These are facts which do not depend upon opinions. They depend upon statistics, and it is a mere question of arithmetic as to whether the House of Lords, in the action they will take, will or will not back up the majority of the representatives of Great Britain. That is not a question of opinion ; it is a question of fact. I say that by your insane action you have done more than a hundred Tory Governments to demonstrate the necessity for the House of Lords and the part it may play as the bulwark of the interests and greatness of the Empire.

I have detained the House far longer than I intended, and considering how often I have addressed it during the last seven months I have been ashamed of this fresh draught upon its patience. I will only say in conclusion that the right hon. gentleman the Chief Secretary reproached

me with expressing a desire to destroy the Bill. Well, Sir, I have desired it, and I feel that we have accomplished it. You may pass this night, by what proportion of the 670 members of this House I know not, the third reading of this measure. Every man who votes for this measure to-night knows that he is endeavouring to put life into that which is dead. Never again can you come before the constituencies of the country and with all the mist of ingenious rhetoric declare to them that you can give to Ireland everything she wants and to subtract from Great Britain nothing that she cherishes. This Bill has brought you into the open. Every elector will now know what the grant of Home Rule involves to him—a diminution in the authority of this House, a diminution in the security and unity of the Empire, a diminution in the safety of those Irishmen to whom his honour is so deeply pledged. Every elector must know, now knows, and will know, that in the management of his affairs will mingle the voices of eighty irresponsible members from Ireland, of eighty gentlemen not belonging in any full sense to our political system, not bound by our traditions, not looking forward to the same object, and every elector will know that in order that he may obtain a questionable privilege he must give up everything that his fathers cherished,

everything he was taught to revere, and that he must throw upon himself a perfectly unnecessary burden of taxation. Do not tell me that if this Bill be Home Rule—we know it to be Home Rule now—that Home Rule will ever commend itself to the views of the majority of the British people. I have reason to coincide in the opinion expressed by a subordinate member of the Cabinet, who stated in 1892, only two years ago, that a measure like that of Home Rule ought to be carried by a large majority, that it was a constitutional change which ought to have in its favour a large majority of all the representatives of all the four countries; and who stated that he would never be satisfied unless they had that majority in England, and in Scotland, and in Wales, and in Ireland, which would justify them in saying that the majority of the people of all parts of the United Kingdom were in favour of this great Constitutional alteration. It has been my misfortune to differ from that gentleman on many different occasions. Allow me to express on this occasion my heartiest agreement with him, and let me indulge in the prophecy that until that comes about, and until England and Scotland, the great contracting parties with Ireland in the Act of Union, are satisfied that the dissolution of that Union is for their best interests, that dissolution will never take place.

VI

LIBERALISM IN CHAINS *

THE toast of the evening has been proposed by one who, of all persons here present, has probably the best right to speak for that loyal minority in Ireland to whose interests we are bound by every tie, both of honour and of policy. I am proud to reflect that I have been asked to respond on the present occasion, and that you have been good enough to choose me as the representative here to-night of that cause which lies nearest to our hearts at the present moment. What are the present prospects of the Union? We have had to fight for that great cause on many different fields of battle. We have fought for it in Ireland against crime and disorder. We have fought for it in Great Britain upon public platforms; we are now engaged in fighting for it in the House of Commons night after night through many a long and weary week, and the question is, what are the present lessons and what the future prospects

* United Club Banquet, July 19, 1893.

of that great and unique Parliamentary conflict? The lessons are many, and the morals to be drawn are many. The first lesson that I would point to is this—that those among our opponents who counted upon the love of ease or the want of energy of the Unionist Party must have found themselves sorely disappointed by the results of the two months of Parliamentary battle. I do not believe—indeed, I speak with absolute assurance on the point—I know that in the whole history of Parliament there never has been a strain put on the members of the House of Commons at all comparable to the strain which has been put upon them in the course of the present Session. I recollect a friend of mine, a member of the late Government, pointing out to me that as far back as the middle of the seventeenth century the then representatives of a Conservative Party had lost a great cause by their slackness of attendance in the House of Commons; and he reminded me of a passage in Clarendon's history, in which the great historian points out that while the Cavaliers were dining the Church was destroyed. We have shown ourselves in this respect worthier upholders of Constitutional tradition than these our political progenitors. At the present moment night after night our party comes round, and with a devotion to the cause never equalled, in houses in which the numbers

who take part in a division have never been approached, even on the greatest occasions when the fate of ministries hung in the balance, they have supported the great cause committed to their charge, and have shown themselves worthy soldiers in the greatest Constitutional battle which has ever been fought within the walls of Westminster.

What are the morals and lessons we can draw from recent parliamentary history? We may study Mr. Gladstone's speeches, which have been numerous. Some of them have been devoted to the Home Rule Bill. Many of them have been devoted to the strangest explanations, the most far-fetched interpretations of previous statements of that eminent politician. Others have been devoted to a most unhistorical history of Ireland before the Union, and of the transactions connected with the Union. The remainder have been occupied with an exposition of those roseate visions which he entertains of the future conduct of an Irish Parliament. Inebriated by the constant reflections upon his own pet scheme, and oblivious of history, oblivious of even the recent past, blinding himself and endeavouring to blind his followers to facts that were within their ken and came within their own observation, he has the prophetic courage to tell us that we rated at too low a value the political instincts of a Nationalist

party in Ireland, and that the authors of the Plan of Campaign, and boycotting, and other ingenious political devices are, of all men, the most fitted to make Ireland henceforth a peaceable, orderly, prosperous, and wealthy country.

I reflect on other results of the debates. One result is that, I have no doubt, the Solicitor-General for England has been led to make excursions into regions of Constitutional law hitherto strange to him, with which he is, even as yet, perhaps, only imperfectly acquainted, but which will prove of invaluable service when some years hence, it may be, we are called upon to discuss another Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons. The only other consequence which, so far as the Government are concerned, I foresee from this Bill is that the excellent work which has supplied us with so much admirable material for dealing with the Constitutional proposals of the Government—you anticipate me when I name Mr. Bryce's work on the American Commonwealth—I am quite sure that our discussion, if it may lead to nothing else, must undoubtedly lead to the sale of a new edition of that work. But I should be sorry to think that the debates which have now gone on for more than two months on the Home Rule Bill have been wholly barren of more important results than those I have

enumerated. One such important result, I think, probably has been driven home to those debates. Never again will any British Minister—if any British Minister is found so audacious as to bring in a Home Rule Bill at all—suppose that anything less than a whole year of Parliamentary time is required adequately to discuss such a measure of so far-reaching importance. There is no pretence, and there can be no pretence, of obstruction in this matter. The argument may, for anything I know to the contrary—I do not speak with knowledge on this subject—have been advanced in the provincial Press devoted to the cause of the Gladstonian party ; but any human being who has been present in the House of Commons and is seriously of opinion that too much time has been devoted to the questions before us speaks either in ignorance or in bad faith. I will give you one conclusive proof of it if it is required. The usual week, that is to say, a Friday from about three o'clock to about quarter to seven, a Monday from half-past four to twelve, a Tuesday from half-past four to twelve, a Wednesday from half-past twelve till half-past five, a Thursday from half-past four to ten—has been devoted to each compartment of this Bill. We are now engaged on a compartment which embraces all the clauses between Clause 27 and

Clause 40—thirteen or fourteen clauses. Two days out of four have been entirely spent on one of these clauses, on which there was no heat of party feeling elicited, on which the greater part of the members of the House of Commons were debarred from want of technical knowledge from engaging, which, though each raised issues very near to the honour of this country because they were issues concerning the future fate of the Civil servants in Ireland—are yet, after all, but an episode in this gigantic revolution. That single clause, without obstruction, with very brief speeches, with those speeches, such as they were, largely from members belonging to the Nationalist party, has taken two days out of that compartment, and now we find ourselves with eight or nine more clauses to discuss in that compartment and with four hours to do it in. Can there be a more conclusive proof of what I say? I have not chosen a great question upon which we, the Unionist Party, have occupied the time of the House, and is it not ludicrous to suppose for a moment that a Bill like this can be passed sandwiched between other items of the Newcastle programme? I do not dwell upon any other illustration of this fact. If I wanted one I should find it in Clause 9. Clause 9 destroyed the Cabinet system in Great Britain; it destroyed the parliamentary system of

Great Britain, and it put Great Britain under the heel for all time of the Irish Nationalist Party. But Clause 9 was disposed of in five hours and a half. Comment is needless, and even the most bigoted follower of Mr. Gladstone would, I believe, if you asked him, be found to admit that if this Bill were intended to pass, if any human being supposed it was going to pass, if the members who voted for it themselves thought that there was the slightest chance of its passing, questions such as those involved in Clause 9 would themselves be adequate for at least a week's debate in Committee. The inadequacy of the time allowed is, perhaps, the most patent and obvious lesson of the last few weeks; but I hope and believe that it is not the only lesson that we, for our part, have been able to teach the British public. I should feel that our labours, which have not been inconsiderable, were indeed thrown away unless we had succeeded in successfully proving to all who care to read that the Bill as it stands is not a Bill that will hold water. We talk of water-tight compartments; the phrase is too complimentary. There is not a compartment, nor a clause, nor a section, nor a sub-section which, as far as I can see, will hold water. But you will perhaps say, "How can you profess to have proved this when, by your own confession, you have only been permitted to

discuss a small fraction of the enormous number of important questions raised by the measure of the Government?" Of course, I admit that there is some force in that observation. We are forced, and the public is forced to judge by samples. We cannot deal with the product in bulk, but we can take out of it, and we have been permitted to take out of it, here and there, an occasional clause, an occasional proposal, and wherever we have been so permitted we have shown, to the satisfaction, I believe, of every reasonable man that that proposal is one which is absolutely inadmissible in any scheme for the modification of our Constitution. I am reminded by the process pursued by the Government of the method adopted in the Mutiny when regiments proved themselves disloyal. They were, in the old phrase, decimated. A selection was made, more or less at random, and the guilty individuals were blown from the guns. We have decimated this Bill, and we have blown from the guns of controversy every one of the clauses we have been permitted to deal with. If anybody desires to argue, and I believe most of you will desire to argue the case against Home Rule in the country, he need not trouble himself with the clauses we have not been allowed to touch, for I promise him he will find ample material for any number of speeches in the

clauses we have been able to refute word by word and line by line.

You will say perhaps to me, "What is the use of all this triumphant dialectic and this conclusive argument of which you boast yourselves to have been the masters if you have not been able to destroy the not very enormous Government majority by which this Bill has been carried?" I admit at once, that not only has the Government majority never been reduced below the humble figure of fourteen, but that, so far as I am able to cast the horoscope of the remainder of the Session, there is no great probability that we shall ever induce the House of Commons to reject one of the Government proposals. What do you think is the lesson to be drawn from that? Do you think that you can infer from that that the Government is strong or that the Government is weak? For my own part I draw from it, and from the action of the Government in applying the Irish gag, the inference, not that the Government is strong, or stable, but that the Government is essentially weak and that it knows it is weak. I believe there are persons, but I think that they are diminishing in number, who have drawn from the unprecedented action of the Government in applying the closure by compartments the conclusion that it was a vigorous Government which

gave proof of its strength by its vigorous coercion of the minority. I do not take that view : I take myself precisely the opposite view. There are convulsions which prove disease and debility in their patients. There are frantic efforts which show, not the vigour of the person who makes them, but the despairing effort to escape from an impossible situation, and such was the action of the Government in applying the gag to the House of Commons. They were in an impossible situation, and they knew it, and, as a man behaves who feels himself sinking in a quicksand or throttled in a bog, they made frantic and futile efforts to escape from the difficulty by one violent plunge.

They have failed and they are bound to fail. The only effect on the future of Home Rule—I am not talking of the future debates in the House of Commons, which I regard as seriously imperilled—by the action of the Government is that the country has had its attention directed and concentrated upon some of the weakest portions of the Bill, and that we have been relieved of the labour of proving that every other portion of the Bill is as bad as that small fraction which we were permitted to discuss. That, you will say, does not account for the fact that they have maintained their majorities, and I admit it. I have watched with the keenest enjoyment the

behaviour of the House during the last few critical weeks, and I think I cannot give you a better illustration of the kind of pressure under which members supporting the Government are put at the present time to support that Government, whether they agree with it or not, than by recalling to your memory an episode that occurred on this same famous Clause 9. Early in the discussion on that clause there was an amendment moved by the Parnellite members, who objected to a certain sub-section which contains the main plan of the Government. The Unionist Party, who also objected to the plan of the Government, of course announced that they would vote also for the omission of this sub-section. This appeared for a moment to threaten the Government with defeat, and the searchings of conscience of the gentlemen who agreed with the Parnellites, who desired to keep 103 Irish members for all purposes, were all most amusing to witness. There is a gentleman, I will not name him, the member for the Border Burghs, who upon that amendment said that his convictions were pinned to the retaining of 103 members for all purposes. This gentleman loved slavery, you will observe, for its own sake. He was not content with 80 masters ; he panted for more. Nothing less than the assistance of 103 Irishmen in helping him to

legislate for the Border Burghs would content his soul. He hugged his chains. "If the Government will declare to me that this same question can be raised on the clause as a whole, and that by voting against the clause as a whole I can gain the object desired in my heart, and can still have opposite to me 103 gentlemen representing Ireland, I will refrain from voting on this amendment, and when the proper time comes I will vote against the clause." A heroic statement! The time did come, and the clause was put from the Chair, but I did not notice that the member for the Border Burghs thought it necessary to go into the lobby against the Government. There cannot be a better illustration of the ludicrous straits to which the Gladstonians are reduced by the laudable desire to keep in office the Government of their hearts. The gentleman to whom I have alluded—I will put him as a concrete case—not merely represents the attitude of the Radicals but of the Irish as well. It is very interesting to watch Mr. Sexton. I do it daily with ever increased enjoyment. There are various amendments proposed in the interests of Ireland as against England, amendments which naturally engage the sympathies of Mr. Sexton and of Mr. Sexton's friends. He waits anxiously with his eye upon us to see whether we are going to vote for

them. If we are going to vote for them he votes against them for fear the Government should be defeated. If, on the other hand, we vote, as I think we always have done, against them, he feels the Government are safe, and he gets up to take credit for himself for a little cheap patriotism and votes in a division in which he knows he will be defeated. I cannot conceive that there could be a greater *reductio ad absurdum* of parliamentary institutions than only to vote for what you believe in when you are quite sure you are going to be unsuccessful. But that is the precise position.

Nobody who has seen what has been going on will deny that it is the precise but not dignified position occupied at present by the two sections of the Nationalist party. If the proposition I am supporting requires any further proof—I offer that proof in the shape of the speeches delivered upon the critical amendment on Clause 9, which deals with the question whether the Irish members should be at Westminster for all purposes. Almost all the English members who spoke on the Ministerial side, Mr. Labouchere among the number, plainly avowed their preference for total exclusion, and the only reason they had for voting against their convictions—and I will add, against their electioneering interests—was not that they believed the Government

scheme would help them when it came to the pinch, but because they knew that if they did not vote as they did that pinch might come sooner than they desired. What is the explanation of this curious fact? How is it, though the Government have not any homogeneous majority, though notoriously there are the deepest divisions among their own followers, that up to this time they have never been reduced to anything very much less than half their proper majority? I will tell you why it is. They are like a financial company who trade upon much too small a capital, and have to borrow almost all the money with which they do their business. They have to borrow on various kinds of security. They borrow Welsh votes from the Welsh members on the security of passing the Bill for disestablishing the Welsh Church. They borrow votes from the Irish, let us say, their Parish Councils Bill, on the security of promising the Irish Home Rule, and they borrow from Sir W. Lawson and his friends the votes of the total abstainers on the security of passing Sir W. Harcourt's Local Veto Bill. But such financial transactions are very dangerous. They borrow on security which they cannot realize. They have made promises which they cannot fulfil; and if those from whom they borrow were to call in their loans, and were to require

their security, it is evident that the Government would be bankrupt. Why is it that they do not call in their loans? Why is it that they do not require either that their money should be returned or that they should obtain the fulfilment of the promises made to them when the money was given? I will tell you. They are in the position of other creditors of shaky concerns, and they know perfectly well that if they were all at one time to apply for repayment, the whole concern would go into liquidation, and they would not be paid sixpence on the pound. Therefore it is that those who hate Home Rule vote for Home Rule, that those who are indifferent to Welsh Disestablishment vote for Welsh Disestablishment, that those who certainly regard with very little favour the extreme projects of the total abstainers are ready to promise their support to the popular measure of Sir W. Harcourt. But that system cannot go on. However ingenious your methods of finance, if you start these gigantic operations on capital so insufficient, the end of your proceedings must necessarily be ruin. It may come sooner or later. It may come this year, it may come next year, or the year after; but one thing is certain—that those who cannot meet their liabilities must ultimately go into bankruptcy, and this Government, sooner or later, will find that payment

is demanded of it, and that payment cannot be made, and that it will have to submit its affairs to a tribunal which I think, when the time comes, it will find is not prejudiced in its favour. For my own part, I take but a very small interest in the small tactical triumphs or the still smaller tactical defeats which from day to day and from hour to hour may occur. I look, not at the tactics of the situation, but at the strategy of the situation. I look at the broad lines of attack and defence, and I think I see with absolute certitude, that we are in the position of a great army which, though it be outnumbered, occupies all the points of advantage, and which has only to wait to see its opponents struggling, first by this method, then by that, now by one desperate manœuvre and now by another, to escape the toils which are surely closing round it. Such contests have but one end. Whether it come soon or whether it come late the end is the same, and I for my part look forward to the issue of this great contest, for the reasons I have stated, with a confidence which I have never felt before, in any great conflict in which I have been engaged.

The toast to which I am responding is that of the "Union," and I am indulging in no rhetorical phraseology when I say that in my judgment the union never in the history of this country

has been more secure than at the time when we look forward with absolute certainty to the passage of the Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons.



VII

PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT *

MR. WHITELEY, who has just had the kindness, on your behalf, to present me with a book containing the names of those who have given the magnificent present which you have all seen, expressed what he was pleased to call his sense of my kindness in coming down here to address you. I have come, not to give, but to receive. I am your debtor and not your creditor; I came here not to teach, but to thank you, and to give expression to a heartfelt sense of gratitude with which I have received this splendid tribute of your affection and your regard. Such an indication of your approval is one which I must and shall value through the whole of my life, and marks this day from among all those gatherings I have addressed, even as magnificent as this one, as deserving of special memory and special gratitude. I know that this mark of your approval has been given to me as a politician representing

* Stockport, July 3, 1893.

your views and carrying out your views ; and it is a coincidence of no small interest, at all events to myself, that the present occasion, falling as it does on a day fixed long since, comes at a time when we have reached a crisis in the party conflict in which we are engaged, and on which I can give you my views on the present situation, and I can derive from you the support and approval which I am sure that the party to which I belong has deserved at your hands. It appears that Mr. Gladstone and his Ministry, who for six long years have practised a policy of concealment, being driven from that, have taken to the policy of gag. The policy of concealment has failed him. Believe me when I say that the policy of gag will succeed no better.

Lord Bury has described to you the subjects represented upon the shield of which you are the munificent donors. These subjects refer to the period when I was responsible for the government of Ireland, and they therefore deal with the years that elapsed between 1887 and 1891. We live fast at the present time ; at all events, things pass rapidly from view. Even the actors in scenes which, at the moment, absorbed public attention five years ago, or even three years ago, might be puzzled if they were asked, without notice, to give

a full account of all that had occurred. You may perhaps think, or, at all events, some of you may be disposed to think, that because we have forgotten the details of the savage controversies which took place over the administration of Ireland between the passing of the Crimes Act and the last general election, therefore there are many forgotten things of the past without importance and without reference to the controversies of the Press. If the events which absorbed public attention had no significance beyond the moment in which they were born and the moment in which they perished—if all that mattered was a good parliamentary division or a brilliant piece of parliamentary sword-play, then indeed there would be no continuity of interest in political life, and I, at all events, so far as I am concerned, should not think it worth while to spend the time and the labour which political life, in these modern days, demands with no stinting hands. But the facts are very different. There is a continuity of affairs, and, believe me, the events and controversies which marked the time of the Irish Government between 1887 and 1892 are only a part of the great controversy upon which we are at this moment engaged—a part of the great fight in which we find ourselves locked at the present moment. They are, after all, two sides

of the same shield, to use the old metaphor. The events which happened five years ago and the parliamentary events which are happening now, are only two aspects of the same great question. How is that? I will tell you. The Irish party, the Nationalist party, the party on whom I have made, and shall have to make, many severe criticisms, many bitter attacks—at all events, they show themselves tacticians of a very high order. They have placed before themselves, for the last fifteen years, an ideal, I will not say of Irish independence—I will not express an opinion upon that; I leave that out of account—at all events, if not of Irish independence, of a separate Irish legislature. And how have they set to work? They have set to work by the means of two entirely separate instruments. They have used, in the first place, crime in Ireland, and in the second place, parliamentary agitation in England. The shield which you have just seen represents one aspect, at all events, of the first of the contests in which we have been engaged—the contest dealing with crime in Ireland. The second contest, dealing with parliamentary forces in England, is still in progress, is not yet concluded, is still in the heat and dust of battle. I have my own prophecies as to how that second contest will end.

I am not going to trouble you with them now. But with regard to the first contest, relating to crime in Ireland, it has, at all events, for the moment ended, and we have come out the victors. What was the method and what was the procedure of the leaders of the Nationalist party? They said to themselves in the first place, "If we can use the ancient force of disaffection in Ireland; if we can employ for our purpose those disintegrating factors of social life which have done so much harm in Ireland's past: if we can enlist agrarian discontent and Irish disloyalty behind our cause, if we can make English government impossible in the eyes of Englishmen themselves, the cause of Home Rule is more than half won." And they set themselves gallantly to work, with admirable dexterity which did credit to them as practical and unprincipled politicians. They gathered into focus every element in Irish life of discontent, of disaffection, of ancient hatred, of class animosity, of political feeling, and they used it remorselessly, at the cost of many lives, and to carry out their own political end. We fought them on the battlefield and we beat them. But our resources were not and are not yet exhausted. They still had the resource of capturing an English party, and they have captured one. They still had at their command the enormous bribe which any

party, which any section in the House of Commons, has which can lend its votes to any particular administration—"Carry out our will or you perish." That weapon also they have remorselessly used, and it is against that at this moment that we are occupied in carrying on the great parliamentary battle in which my friends on the right and on the left of me bear so valiant a part.

I notice, indeed, that Mr. Gladstone, who is the leader of this captured party, resents bitterly the suggestion that he has been captured, and that he is now, like other captives, carrying out the behests of his captors. I do not know whether many of you have seen in this morning's paper a most amusing and most characteristic correspondence that has taken place between Mr. Gladstone and the present Duke of Devonshire. The Duke of Devonshire, it appears, was unkind enough to call attention some time back to a speech Mr. Gladstone made in 1885 when the election of that year hung in the balance, while he was still an anti-Home-Ruler, at the time that Sir W. Harcourt was talking about Parnellite juice. Mr. Gladstone at that time made a speech in which he exhorted every section of the Liberal party to vote solid, to give him not merely a majority, but a majority independent of the Irish. And he gave as his reason—in my

opinion an excellent reason—that if the Liberal party came into power dependent upon the Irish vote, and with all their well-known virtues, and with all that noted public spirit for which they are distinguished—the Liberal party would, nevertheless, in all probability yield to the temptation. They would be tempted, and they would fall. They would be told by the Irish, “ You may have office, you may have power, you may enjoy all the sweets and all the luxuries, if such there be, which consist of sitting on the right of the Speaker rather than on the left, but recollect you have it at our good pleasure. At any moment we could turn you out, and if you do not do what we wish, turn you out we will.” I have not read Mr. Gladstone’s words, but I do not think anybody who has read them will deny that I have quoted them with substantial accuracy, as indeed, did the Duke of Devonshire. Well, what happened? Mr. Gladstone’s attention was called to these words by one of those busy correspondents whose favours we all enjoy, and he took occasion to write to the correspondent to explain that the Duke of Devonshire had been guilty of inaccuracy. The Duke of Devonshire, having gone to the trouble of consulting Mr. Gladstone’s public speeches—a considerable exertion—not unnaturally resented the imputation, and he took the simple, and as I should

have thought the conclusive method of putting his own speech in one column, and Mr. Gladstone's speech in another column, and asking an enlightened public where was the discrepancy between the two. We must all rejoice that he did so, because he has succeeded in eliciting from Mr. Gladstone one of the most extraordinary and one of the most characteristic letters which have proceeded from the pen of that prolific rhetorician. And Mr. Gladstone sticks to his point. He still thinks that the Duke of Devonshire misrepresented him. But why does he think so? "Oh," he says, "that statement of mine was not a general statement. It was a particular statement referring to an occurrence of the day, to the history of the day. It had no general reference." And what were the occurrences of the day? Why at that time there was a wicked Tory party who were making Home Rule proposals to the Irish, and therefore if we had come in there is no knowing but that the wicked Tory party and the wicked Home Rule party would among them have made demands upon us, which we, being in a minority, would have been obliged to grant. And he went on to say, "Now things are entirely different, because the wicked Tory which wanted to give Home Rule in 1885 is now kept in order by the virtuous Liberal Unionists, while the Irish party

in the meanwhile have accepted our terms, and we have nothing more to fear from them." Well, much in Mr. Gladstone's career moves my astonishment—some of it moves my admiration. But I do not think that anything astonishes me more than his versions of ancient history except it be his versions of modern history. I should have thought that inaccuracy could not have gone further than Mr. Gladstone goes when he is dealing with Irish history before the Union if I had not before heard the inaccuracies of the same great authority. I have been led a little way away from my main argument, but I must interpolate one parenthesis, if only to explain to you in what this history is totally and absolutely false. There never was a period, there never has been a period in the history of the Tory party, and I believe there never will be such a period—when they have consented to entertain under any disguise any form of proposal of Home Rule for Ireland. The sole conceivable justification—and it is not justification if we think of the facts—the sole conceivable justification or occasion for Mr. Gladstone's statement must be this, that undoubtedly there was an interview between Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Parnell in 1885 on which Lord Carnarvon founded the views from which not only I, but every one of his colleagues dissented. Lord

Carnarvon has explained—he being no longer with us cannot defend himself—explained over and over again in the House of Lords and elsewhere, in letter and in speech, that he acted on his own initiative alone, and not only did he act on his own initiative alone, but he acted without the knowledge of any single one of his colleagues. Well, was it not a scandal in the face of that fact to attempt to throw on the Tory party in 1885 the responsibilities of all the wickednesses which the Liberal party are prepared to commit in 1893? But that is not all. I had myself an interview—private at the time, but one which has since been made public, and to which, therefore, there is no reason why I should not allude—with Mr. Gladstone towards the end of that very year, in which he suggested that the Tory party should bring in a measure of Home Rule, and promising his support to them if they did so. That was what it came to. That offer was refused, and, therefore, the man who says that we were prepared, by the help of the Irish, to pass Home Rule in 1885 not only errs but errs doubly, for we not only refused to do it with the help of the Irish alone, but even with the help of Mr. Gladstone also. But though the history which Mr. Gladstone gives us, in the letter of the Duke of Devonshire, of the events of 1885 is totally

inaccurate, the fact remains that at the present moment, he and his party are fulfilling to the bitter dregs the forecast which he himself made, and which the Duke of Devonshire has quoted, in 1885. What Mr. Gladstone foresaw is coming to pass. The tyranny under which he was unwilling to serve he is serving under at the present time, and it would be tragic, were it not comic, to see the Treasury benches, where Mr. Gladstone and his allies sit watching their task-masters, on whose favour they hold their present places, with an anxious eye, fearing the descent of the threatened lash and ready to yield when they think that lash whistles through the air. The Liberal party are enslaved: they serve out a servitude worse than that of the Israelites in Egypt, and they are at the present moment erecting an edifice which, made of untempered bricks, certainly will not stand the wind and the rain.

But if the Liberal party are enslaved it is their own affair. Why are we, the House of Commons as a whole, to be enslaved? Because they serve the Irish, why are we to serve the Irish; and because it suits the Irish party that Home Rule should be passed without discussion, why are we to have our mouths shut, and not to be allowed to utter, in the name of the people of Great Britain, the views

which we hold upon the change in our Constitution to which, for their part, the people of Great Britain have never for one moment assented? I cannot give a good reason for this, but I can give you Mr. Gladstone's reason. His reason, as far as I have been able to collect it from a two days' debate in the House of Commons, is this—that the Tory party really must not be allowed to move so many amendments upon the Home Rule Bill. I suppose that the Irish party are not possessed of all the virtues which Mr. Gladstone sees in them. He appears to think we show the most cruel suspicion of these gentlemen; that by restricting the powers of the new Irish Parliament we indicate our own disbelief in the power of the mistake, that we are not to be allowed to discuss in our own way, at our own time the extreme proposals he has put forth, but we must, forsooth, allow them their power of the parliamentary gag imposed upon them. Now, I do not deny for my own part, the least in the world, that I have the very gravest suspicions of the way the Irish House of Commons would use their power. I pretend to no belief whatever in these gentlemen. I will not, either here or in the House of Commons, ascribe to them political virtues of which I have seen no symptom in the past, and which I see no ground for crediting them in the future. For

who are they? They are men of great ability, some of them; men of great eloquence, at least some of them; but they are men of whom I have told you already, they are men who have deliberately and of malice aforethought employed crime and criminal methods for the furtherance of political ends. I do not accuse them individually or personally either of having committed crime or of having sympathized with crime. I cannot believe it. But I do accuse them of having employed crime as a political agent, and of having used, as I said before, the ancient difficulties and the ancient divisions in Irish society as a means for furthering the objects which, I doubt not honestly, they hold to be for the benefit of Ireland. But are these the men to be trusted in the future? Can we give to them not merely the making of the laws, but the administration of the laws? Is it not absurd on the face of it? Mr. Gladstone assumes that because they have made a certain number of smooth speeches, in the House of Commons and elsewhere, in which they have said that they accept his scheme of Home Rule, all will be well. But is that a ground for believing either that his Home Rule will be final, or that, even if it were final, it will be administered, as we desire to see it administered? The hypothesis is absurd. Credit these men—and I am ready to credit them

with every personal virtue I can conceive, they have called into being forces which they cannot master. They have raised powers which they cannot lay. If they attempted to reverse the policy to which they are committed, they would be the first to be hurled down and trampled under foot by the multitudes whom they have hoped to lead. Therefore, it is that I, for my part, say that it is absolutely ludicrous to trust the future of Ireland to these men, simply because these men have uttered certain words which Mr. Gladstone takes as a satisfactory pledge of their adhesion to his Home Rule scheme. And let me add this one parenthetical remark—that if the Irish members had one-tenth of Mr. Gladstone's ingenuity for explaining away their past utterances, it is quite obvious they will not be in the least bound, or feel themselves in the least bound by anything that they have ever said in the House of Commons. But to resume the thread of my argument. If the British members had all the virtues Mr. Gladstone attributes to them, would it not be our duty, as your representatives, to canvass every clause and every sub-section, every sentence, and every syllable of the new Constitution which is of vital importance in our interests? It is our right, and much more than our right; it is our bounden duty. We are in the habit of considering ourselves a political nation

endowed with great political instincts. We are in the habit of somewhat looking down upon our Continental brethren because they are younger and less experienced in the ways of popular self-government. Yet we might learn a lesson from the Continent and from America as to the way in which the Constitution of a free people should be considered, for every one of the self-governing countries, or almost every one—France certainly, Switzerland certainly, Germany certainly, United States of America certainly, regard their Constitutions—young as they are compared with ours, poor as they are compared with ours in historical glories—as a sacred deposit not to be rashly touched, not to be changed at the bidding of this or that election agent, this or that wire-puller. In France, for instance—in all these countries—they distinguish between ordinary legislation, legislation with regard to County Councils, or railways or anything else—they distinguish in the broadest manner between that species of legislation and the legislation which touches the sacred ark of the Constitution. In France you cannot make a Constitutional change without special machinery, special and wholly exceptional machinery provided by the Constitution. In Switzerland there must be a popular vote taken, not like the last election upon the Newcastle Programme

with Home Rule tossed in at the end of it, but a popular vote upon a change in the Constitution itself, before that change takes effect. In America, so hedged round is the Constitution from every rash alteration that, in my judgment, at all events, it has become almost too immovable, too impossible to change with the circumstances which the lapse of time must necessarily carry with it. And, if our brothers across the Atlantic are too conservative in this matter of Constitutional change, are we not too radical? Is it not too grotesque and absurd in a higher degree that a majority of 25 out of a House of Commons of 670 should be able to wreck the greatest Constitutional Government and to alter fundamentally not for our grandchildren, but for ever, the Constitution under which we were born? And yet that is what Mr. Gladstone intends to do. He not merely means to alter, he not only is resolved to shatter the Constitution, but is resolved to prevent us from discussing the manner in which to shatter it and the Constitution he is resolved to substitute for it. I have discussed this question recently in the House of Commons and I have there given my reasons for thinking that Mr. Gladstone's gagging resolution is a blow, not merely at the Constitution of the Empire, but at the liberties of Parliament.

I will not now again traverse the ground that I then went over, but I want to put this question to you, and I think it will bring the whole matter home to you. Put yourselves severally in the position of the Ulstermen. Let each man who now listens to me suppose that he is one of the Protestant minority in the North of Ireland who finds that the Home Rule Bill is not merely going to be introduced, but is going to be passed without adequate discussion. What would you think? You would say, and you would say most truly, to the people of Great Britain, "We have lived under the shelter of your laws and under the security of your Government for generations; we have seen in Parliament after Parliament, our representative sitting in your great council at Westminster; we are content to be British citizens, we are content to form part of the United Kingdom, we wish for no change in our laws, we are happy as we are; but, if you are resolved that that state of things shall no longer continue, at all events give to those representatives whom we sent up the power of giving our views to the impartial vote of the British House of Commons, and of asking for the opinion of the House of Commons on the views which they, on our behalf, are ready to express." What answer does Mr. Gladstone give?

The answer he gives is this: "It may be very good procedure, but it is very inconvenient to the Liberal party." And your Ulsterman might, perhaps, go on to say, "Do you intend to hand me over to a majority differing from me in race, differing from me for the most part in religion, whose ways are not my ways, who have not shown my power of enterprise, my forethought, my endurance; who have left the South and West of Ireland a bye-word among agricultural countries, while the corner of the North-west which I inhabit, though it be the poorest soil in the whole island, blossoms like a garden? Are you going to hand me over to this majority, who have shown that they cannot govern themselves, and who assuredly are incapable of governing me? And, if you are going to hand me over, are you going to do it without discussion?" The answer is, "Yes; we are going to do it, and we are going to do it without discussion; because it suits the interests of the Liberal party." The wrong that it is proposed to inflict upon Ulster and the minority of Ulster can never be overcome by them, and will remain an indelible stain upon our honour. But to inflict that injury, to strike that blow, and not even allow the victim to utter a cry of complaint—not to allow him to argue his own case, to gag

him as it were in court, to silence him before a hostile jury, surely that is the height of political infamy. And no less a crime than that is it which Mr. Gladstone and his friends propose to perform at the present moment. I cannot well express to you the feelings of burning shame and indignation which animate me when I think of this last outrage upon our liberty; I feel for England, the voice of whose majority is rendered dumb by his procedure; I feel for you and the great majority of our countrymen who cannot make their voice heard even in the council of the nation; I feel for the honour and the future of those parliamentary institutions which are our greatest title to the gratitude of mankind, which are our proudest boast, which have been our heritage for the past, and which are our hope for the future. But I confess that I feel even more for that minority in Ireland, already so sorely tried, already so iniquitously used, who are now as I say to be driven to the slaughter without the right of uttering one word on some of the great questions which affect them, and to bear in silence what powers it may choose to please the wire-pullers of the Irish party to bestow upon those who have been, I will not say their hereditary enemies, but their enemies for many generations.

If this is to be the outcome of a great struggle about Home Rule, if we can look forward to nothing better than the gagging of Parliament and the dismembered empire, then, indeed, the fruits of Mr. Gladstone's policy, the results of his servitude to the Irish, are bitter indeed. But I hope better things. I never will believe until I see it coming to pass that that House of Commons, which has been the greatest engine of freedom ever known in the history of the world, which has done more for human liberty and for human rights than any other assembly known to man, is to be made itself the engine of the grossest tyranny; I never can credit it until it is brought home to me by the irresistible force of fact. And why do I not credit it? I do not credit it because I do not think it can ever happen unless the people of this country lend themselves to the machinations of Mr. Gladstone and his allies and taskmasters; and I have seen no signs of that degradation of my country. I do not believe now, and I think I never shall be forced to believe, that a majority of Englishmen and Scotchmen are ready without discussion, in the absence of criticism, and by the mere force of a dumb, and I will add an unthinking, majority, to enslave those in Ireland who have the greatest title to their gratitude and support.

VIII

A LEGISLATIVE FARCE *

IT would in any case be with no common emotions that I should address a great gathering like the present, but these emotions are greatly increased in intensity by the fact that I am speaking in the constituency and that this meeting is called under the auspices of my noble friend Lord Randolph Churchill. I should have been glad at any time to say what I have to say upon the great crisis through which we are passing to an audience of this character; but to speak in the presence and with the concurrence of one who has shown such brilliant ability and such untiring energy in maintaining the great cause of the Union, adds additional interest even to this meeting, and certainly increases the satisfaction with which I address it. It is a matter of chance, and also, I think, matter of congratulation, that we meet here to discuss the question of the Union on the very day before the Home Rule Bill comes into Committee. We are approaching

* Paddington, London, May 7, 1893.

the second act of the great legislative comedy ("Farce")—this great legislative farce if you prefer it ("Tragedy"); no, not a tragedy—the great legislative farce which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have provided for the entertainment of the country, and with which it has pleased them to occupy parliamentary time that surely might have been better expended upon measures likely to pass, and which, if passed, would have been for the benefit of some class, at all events, of this great community.

However, we are not masters of the legislative programme of the Government. It is our business to criticize it and to examine it. Unfortunately, for the country, we cannot regulate it. Now, I do not know whether any of you have considered the multitude of problems which will necessarily come up for discussion on the Committee stage of this Bill. There have been in the history of this country measures which have excited, perhaps, even greater public feeling than Home Rule, even greater feelings of hostility—because I do not admit that there is any feeling in favour of the Bill—than this measure, though not many; but no Bill that has ever been brought forward before the House of Commons by any Ministry at any time has, from the very nature of the case, required us to consider so many problems, required us to discuss so many great

issues, required us to deal with such a variety of questions touching the interests of every man and woman, not in Ireland alone, but in England and Scotland also, as the Home Rule Bill, the Committee stage of which we shall begin on Monday. How long that stage will last no man can say ; but if full justice be done, as it ought to be done, to the constitutional, to the financial, and to the political considerations—generally political considerations—raised by the Bill, then I do not believe that any Committee stage that has ever been dealt with in the House of Commons will require more energetic labours on the part of the members of that hard-worked assembly. Compare the Bill with other questions ; compare this Bill with the great Reform Bill, one of the most hardly contested measures which ever got through the Legislature. I am not denying that that was a great and important legislative proposal ; but, after all, though it brought within the pale of the Constitution a vast new electorate, the Constitution itself remained in its great outlines absolutely unchanged. Now, look at this Bill. We know that it is going to destroy the ancient Constitution of this country. But nobody—and least of all the Ministry responsible for the Bill—has the slightest idea what the Constitution is which they propose to establish. They are

hewing and cutting and quarrying in the immemorial fabric of this great Constitution, but what the new building is they propose to raise upon the site which they are thus in their madness attempting to acquire, these architects of disorder have not the slightest conception. Now, ladies and gentlemen, it has been my fate to have daily a gigantic correspondence upon the proper methods of dealing with this Bill in Committee. The number of gentlemen who have kindly favoured me through the post with their views upon this interesting and important question is almost past belief. Some of these letters are wise; some are, I think, unwise; all I gladly acknowledge to be extremely well meant. I do not, I need hardly say, propose to occupy your time with discussing in detail the various suggestions that have been offered. But one particular suggestion has come from so many independent quarters, has been pressed upon me by so many gentlemen who have evidently considered the subject, and who from their position and otherwise have opinions which deserve consideration, that I should like to say one word respecting it.

The critics of whom I speak advise us, the Unionist party, not to touch the Bill in Committee at all. Their argument is this. They say, "By all means vote against the first reading; by all means vote

against the second reading ; by all means vote against the third reading ; but if in Committee you attempt to amend the Bill, you by that very action lead the country to assume that the Bill is worth amending ; you commit yourself *pro tanto* to the principle of the Bill ; and that is a procedure which we and other members of the Unionist party venture strongly to deprecate." Now, that argument, I think, will seem forcible only to those who are little acquainted with our methods of parliamentary procedure, and who do not know precisely what is and what is not implied by the action of a party upon the Committee stage of a Bill. If I thought that by moving amendments or voting for amendments I should endorse the principle of a Bill, that doing so in any shape committed me to the principle, I should not go near the House of Commons until the Committee stage was finished. But when a policy is pressed upon you, the first question you have to ask yourself is, " Who will benefit most if this policy be carried out ? " And what I should like to know is the sum that, if you could estimate these things by a pecuniary standard—what is the bribe which the Government would not be prepared to give to the Opposition if they were to be induced to carry out this suicidal policy ? They know perfectly well that, while the dangers of the first and

second reading have been surmounted, these dangers are absolutely as nothing compared with the difficulties and perils which await them in the Committee stage. If it passed the Committee stage, upon the latter stages of the Bill as modified in the Committee stage, they know something more. They know that while the country, by signs which cannot be mistaken, shows it is awakening to the full dangers of this monstrous proposal, the full education of public opinion can only be carried out by discussing in detail one absurdity after another as they arise and showing how absolutely impossible it is to frame any Bill on any lines which shall at once give Home Rule to Ireland, and will maintain the very elements and foundation of the British Constitution. Now, I should like to describe very shortly what I think our policy should be in Committee. I do not hope so to alter the Bill. I do not think that it is possible that the Unionist party should contrive so to alter the Bill as to make it tolerable. I not only have no such hope, but I am certain that such a task is impossible. I am certain that until you have torn every clause to tatters—until you have excluded every operative proposal in it—you cannot make it anything which we should under any circumstances be content to accept.

But, though that is true, it is our duty, at all

events as members of the House of Commons, to vote for everything which would improve the Bill, and above all to vote for everything which would destroy the Bill. And that is the course that I individually, as a member of the House of Commons, mean to pursue. I know and I admit that if we cannot destroy it no improvements that we can introduce into it will make it tolerable. I know that if we amended it, if we had a free hand in amending it, we should only be applying a feeble palliative to the disease which if it were at once introduced into the Constitution, would inevitably kill that Constitution. But it is our duty to apply palliatives, even if we know that they be only palliatives, and therefore it is that I shall give my support to every amendment which is proposed which shall mitigate in however feeble and unsatisfactory a manner the proposal which the Government desire to pass through the House. But I have to admit that our task is not made easier by the course which it has pleased the Government to pursue. I do not suppose any of you follow our proceedings in the House of Commons sufficiently closely to know that yesterday Mr. Gladstone announced that he proposed to postpone the financial clauses of the Bill until all the other clauses had been disposed of. I thought it then,

and I think it now, a most ingenious proceeding. Mr. Gladstone, recollect, has got to deal with two parties—the English Radicals and the Irish Nationalists. Now, the English Radicals do not love Home Rule, and whether they love it or not they do not probably think it a commodity worth paying any very large sum of money to obtain; and as we can certainly demonstrate when the financial proposals come on—if they ever come on—for final discussion that under them the constituents of the English Radicals are asked to pay more than their proper proportion in order to obtain the inestimable blessings of Home Rule, naturally Mr. Gladstone desires that, from the Radical point of view, this part of the Bill should not come on until he has been able to pass all the other portions of the measure through the Committee stage. But the case in regard to the Irish is even stronger. For while the English cherish a very well-grounded confidence that the financial parts of the Bill, if passed in their present state, will end in Irish bankruptcy within a very brief period, therefore from Mr. Gladstone's point of view, it is just as well that the financial clauses should be placed at the end of the Bill, and that it should remain in doubt how much Ireland is to get in money out of this measure. You have perhaps heard of an expedient which has been much

discussed in connection with Army matters—the expedient of deferred pay. Mr. Gladstone prefers paying his auxiliaries—mercenaries, I believe, is not a word which is approved of by the Irish representatives in the House of Commons, though I never could quite see what their objection was to it, for certainly mercenaries in history have by no means invariably, or even usually played an ignoble or mean part—but I will call them auxiliaries; Mr. Gladstone prefers giving payment to these auxiliaries by means of deferred pay; and I think it should be clear by now what are the tactical advantages which the Government will undoubtedly get by their proposed time-table. The English Radicals will be kept in ignorance of how much they will be called upon to pay, and the Irish Nationalists will be kept in ignorance of how little they may expect to receive. Members are not to know the financial proposals which the Government mean ultimately to accept until those members have voted for each one of the proposals of the rest of the Bill.

But the financial proposals, however vital to the interests of Ireland, however important to the interests of England, are not, after all, the most important or vital elements in this Bill. There are other matters in it upon which the

Unionist party will have to take up a distinct line, and the most important of these, perhaps, in some ways, is the question of Ulster. Now, the action of Mr. Gladstone with regard to Ulster appears to me to be even more ambiguous than it is in regard even to the other portions of the Bill. He has indicated vaguely, on more than one occasion, that he would be prepared to consider, or that the Government would be prepared to consider, proposals for excluding Ulster. He has made none himself. He has not suggested what it is that he desires, and the idea that the Government are going to wait for suggestions from outside as to a matter so vitally affecting not this or that clause but every clause of the Bill—a question which, if settled in one way, would probably make the Bill an absurdity from the first clause to the last—that they are going to wait for suggestions from people before dealing with that question shows an astounding ignorance of the duties which properly devolve on a responsible Government. What is our view about Ulster? When we are discussing the wrongs of the minority in Ireland we do not distinguish the wrongs of the minority of the Irish people in Ulster from the wrongs of the minority of the Irish people dwelling in the other three provinces. We speak and we think of the minority as a whole, and it is of that

minority as a whole that we declare that we never will desert them, and that they may rest with confidence upon the honour of the British people.

What we do say about Ulster is this. We say to the Government—What is the ground upon which you bring forward this Bill? You bring it forward avowedly upon this ground, that the majority in any part of the United Kingdom has a right to say to the British Parliament, “We will no longer be under you; we wish to manage our own affairs; give us, in the name of nationality and in the name of liberty, a separate Parliament of our own.” That is the principle upon which the Government have proceeded. If they honestly urge that principle, if it is not a mere hypocritical device of using fine language to justify an infamous Bill, then they are bound upon their principles to exclude Ulster. It is not our business, it is not our desire, to separate the minority in one part of Ireland from the minority in another; but on the principles of the Government themselves, if those principles be indeed their convictions, then they should come forward and say, “We admit that in the north-east of Ireland the majority of the population is against Home Rule, and therefore in accordance with our own views we feel ourselves compelled to divide these six northern and Protestant counties from the

rest of Ireland." They will make no such proposal, nor do I encourage them to make such a proposal. Our view is that we are bound to every subject of the Crown in Ireland who desires to remain under British supremacy, and we know that every pound weight of the intolerable burden imposed by this Home Rule Bill which we take off the back of Ulster would be put on the back of the loyal minority in the rest of Ireland if the fortunes of the two were separated. We know that feeble and vanishing as are the apparent safeguards provided in this Bill for the minority, helpless as that minority must be under the tyranny of an Irish Parliament, their helplessness would be increased ten thousand times if the minority in the south of Ireland were deprived of the aid and support of the Protestants and the Loyalists in the north. Therefore I wait to see what the Government are going to do about Ulster as a test of their own honesty, not as a means of attempting to improve this most unimprovable Bill.

There remains yet one more important and vital point that will be raised in Committee on which, I think, I ought to say a word. It has to do with the famous clause dealing with the position of the Irish members in the House of Commons.

Now we do not know how that question stands. We know what is in the Bill, but we do not know what is in the minds of the Government, except in so far as we may make a conjecture from the very ambiguous utterances which the members of the Government have made upon the first and second reading of the Bill. We know that Mr. Gladstone, in describing on the first reading of the Bill the grotesque and farcical arrangement by which the majority in the House of Commons was to depend at four o'clock on a Monday upon a House in which the Irish took part, and at four o'clock on Tuesday upon a House of which the Irish formed no part; we know that Mr. Gladstone, in describing this farcical procedure, seemed more occupied in stating the unanswerable objections to it than in attempting to frame any defence of it; and we know that the Home Secretary, in his speech on the second reading, seemed as little enamoured with this portion of the measure for which he is responsible, as he is for the portion of the measure which consists of the establishment of a Second Chamber in Ireland. We can only guess that upon this, as upon every important question, the Government have not made up their minds, and we must know what their minds are. They will at all events have to make the pretence of a mind—they will have to

produce the imitation of a mind, and they will have to produce it soon, because this question of the future Constitution of the Imperial Parliament affects vitally every clause in the Bill, and it is clearly impossible for us while in doubt upon this question seriously to deal with the various proposals contained in the first eight clauses of the measure.

I dare say some of you have been unfortunate enough to suffer during your lives from some serious illness. If so you will know the unfortunate sensations of a man who always thinks that the attitude in which he lies in bed is the most miserable and uncomfortable which he can possibly assume. He turns over wearily to a new attitude, and in a few minutes he finds the new one worse than the old. Then he tries a third with no better result. The Government are like that sick man. First they try one impossible proposal. The more they think of it the less they like it. They throw it aside and they take in its place another still more impossible proposal. It is subjected to criticism. It is attacked—openly among their opponents, secretly among their friends. They begin to think this worse than the old plan, and then they try a third move—and so the weary circle will be repeated. In 1886 we were told by the members of the present Government that to keep the Irish members at

Westminster was an impossibility and an absurdity. Why, then, try in 1893 a plan by which, accepting this absurdity, the Irish members were to be kept at Westminster, but were not to be allowed to vote upon English matters? That has been criticized; that they begin to find intolerable, and now they are turning to another plan by which Irish members are to be kept at Westminster and are to be allowed to vote on English measures. I venture to prophesy that when this last proposal is discussed in the House of Commons and the country it will be found the worst of the three, and they will go back to their original alternative of 1886. For just observe what this proposal, if it is to be the proposal of the Government, of keeping the Irish members at Westminster and allowing them to vote on your affairs really means. We have had two examples recently in the House of Commons which will serve for as good illustrations as any you will find. There was a small local Bill brought in the other day for dealing with certain churches in Liverpool in a manner which by no possibility could injure private rights—which no man could contend was against public policy—but which was a great advantage to Church interests in Liverpool. Because it was an advantage to Church interests, it was opposed by that religious society which masquerades under the

name of religion—I mean the Liberationists ; and the Liberationists got as their allies the whole strength of the Irish party in the House of Commons, and by their aid, and their aid alone, this purely English Church question at Liverpool was settled in a manner hostile to the Established Church in this country. Now, that we can bear with so long as there is a United Parliament. We take the good with the bad, and if we are in the right and they interfere with the Church of England in Liverpool, we have a right to interfere with them. Take another case, no later than last night. We then had under discussion one of the oldest and most popular and most successful pieces of English local administration—I mean the county magistracy in this country. I am not going to discuss the question now or to defend the magistracy ; but I am going to point out to you that this is a purely English question. Last night, against the voice of the English people, by the help of the Irish Nationalists, and their help alone, this immemorial part of our Constitution was rudely shaken, if not entirely destroyed. That, again, we must tolerate so long as we have a United Kingdom and a United Parliament. But recollect what will happen with a disunited Parliament if you allow the Irish members to remain at Westminster

and to deal with all questions. Then we shall be in the monstrous position, that while they can disestablish our Church, while they can destroy our magistracy, while they can in every way go counter to our wishes, we shall not be able in any material respect to modify the course of legislation in Ireland. I venture to say that this proposition has only to be stated, it has only to be understood in the country, and the Government will find that of the three solutions which they have attempted to apply to this question, the last solution will be worse than the first.

I have perhaps detained you too long upon matters which, though they are of the greatest public interest, do, perhaps, touch more nearly the details of the House of Commons management than is fitting upon an occasion like this. But my belief is that the result of the discussions that we are about to commence can only be in the long run to demonstrate to the world at large what has long been clear to the Unionist Party, what I suspect is clear to the Government, what is perhaps beginning even to dawn upon the Radical Party—namely, that neither this nor any possible modification of this scheme can ever obtain acceptance from the British constituencies. The mere statement of the general objections to Home Rule has

already raised a feeling in the country which would hurl the present Government to destruction were they again to consult the constituencies. That feeling must increase, and is bound to increase as clause after clause and sentence after sentence of the constituent elements of this monstrous Bill begin to be understood by the people at large. The meeting that I have now addressed, I know, is called under the auspices of the Primrose League, and it is to organizations like the Primrose League, and above all to the Primrose League itself, that I should be disposed to confide that education in detail which is all that is required to complete the knowledge of the country on the subject of Home Rule. I know what admirable work has been done by this association in times past, I know what admirable work it is doing at the present moment. But, believe me, I look forward in the immediate future to a great augmentation, I will not say in the volume of its work, but in its utility. I look forward to its providing missionaries in every street, and court, and alley of the country. I look to it to bring home to every voter how his personal interests are affected as a man, how his national interests are affected as a citizen. I am convinced that if the process of proselytism be carried out, as I know you can and will carry it out, the hatred and the loathing and

the contempt for the whole scheme and cry of Home Rule will sink so deep into the heart of the British elector that no Government and no Ministry, however audacious and however unpatriotic, will ever dare to bring the proposal again before the House of Commons.

IX

“WHAT HAS BECOME OF HONOUR ? ” *

THIS debate has now reached its twelfth night, a period as long, I believe, as has ever been occupied by a second-reading discussion ; but I nevertheless cannot doubt that even those who at one time had anticipated that it might be brought to a conclusion earlier must be by this time convinced that the subject which we are now to be called upon to vote is a subject of transcendent importance, and that the interest and magnitude of the question that has come up for discussion have justified the amount of time which this House has given to it.

It is my hard fate to endeavour to focus and concentrate as far as I can the discussion as it appears to us who sit upon this side of the House, to see what are the arguments, to touch upon the arguments that have been advanced in favour of the Bill, and to see how those far more numerous and far more important arguments advanced against the Bill have hitherto and up to the

* House of Commons, April 22, 1893.

present moment, received no answer whatever. There is one subject which has been hinted at rather than discussed which I will dismiss in a word. It is the subject of Federation. The Home Secretary and other gentlemen on the other side of the House, glad probably to be able to lay the flattering unction to their souls that in passing this Bill they were only making the first step towards some vast scheme of political reform, have suggested that, however difficult it may be to defend this scheme on its merits, it may be fairly voted for by those who look forward to the time when the British Isles may be divided and cut up into a set of confederated provinces. I said that had been hinted at rather than defended. In the meantime I do not know that it is to be proposed, and I willingly put it aside as not relevant to our present discussion. Our discussion relates to a Bill contrived to meet Irish necessities, and undoubtedly brought on for discussion by Irish agitation, and, indeed, for the matter of that, by Irish crime. It must be agreed by those who have been attentive auditors of this debate that never was there a gigantic change proposed to an assembly with so small an array of arguments in its favour. I do not as yet say that the arguments are bad. I say that they are few. I think that will be

admitted. They might be classed, so far as my observation and judgment are concerned, into those which are both bad and sentimental and those which are bad *simpliciter*. As specimens of those which are bad *simpliciter*, I will take two which have borne a prominent place in all the discussions of those whose lengthy speeches in defence of this Bill have not been entirely occupied by the *tu quoque* argument. The first is the failure of coercion, and the second of these arguments is the failure of the Union. I deny that what is called coercion—I deny in other words, that the exceptional criminal law which the agrarian condition of Ireland has required—has been proved to be a failure. Agrarian crime in Ireland is unfortunately a disease of very ancient growth. It began before the Union, and it has lasted after the Union, and both before and after the Union it has had to be met by the same methods. It was worse before the Union than it has been since the Union, and the exceptional laws passed since the Union to meet it have been far milder in character than the exceptional laws passed before the Union. Ireland is, for reasons I will not enter into, free from this chronic malady—a malady liable to incessant variations in intensity, a malady not refractory to treatment and which has shown a

progressive tendency to diminish in violence, and I say that even the dreadful outbreak of 1880 to 1882 may be paralleled and far more than paralleled both before and subsequently to the Union. Although I think it would be madness to look forward to the immediate future as the period when agrarian crime will be altogether stamped out of the Irish community, I think that it is fair to say that the disease has been diminishing in virulence, and that the treatment, when it has been fairly and courageously applied, has not proved ineffective, and that we may look forward to a time when no further remedy may be necessary.

So much for the failure of coercion. What about the failure of the Union? We are told that the Union has failed to produce material prosperity, and in the able speech so often referred to in the course of these debates, which was made by the member for North-east Cork, he gave an account—as it turned out a perfectly inaccurate account—of the position of the Irish small farmers and labourers at the present time. He said, “This is the fruit of the Union. By its fruit let the Union be judged.” But he was not, I frankly admit, inaccurate in his principal contention that at this moment there is a great deal that requires remedying in the condition of the Irish farmer and labourer.

No man who knows anything of Ireland can doubt that much remains to be done. But that is not the point. The point is whether the evils that I admit are due to the Union or not, and in order that we might form a judgment upon the point we should have been provided not only with statistics—accurate or inaccurate—as to the present condition of Ireland, but should have had some account of the condition of Ireland in the last century, before the Act of Union was passed. Any one who is a student of Irish history, as I have humbly endeavoured to be, must know that the one thing upon which all Irish contemporary observers of the last century were agreed was this: that the position of the Irish tenant and labourer was one of oppression, of misery, almost of barbarism. I am not going to say who was responsible—I will come to that directly—but the Irish tenant, the Irish labourer, was half clothed, he was less than half fed; he was not educated at all, and bad undoubtedly as is the condition of the worst parts of Ireland at the present moment, I will venture to say that no man who knows the history of Ireland will deny that its condition has improved enormously in the last century, and that the improvement in the position of Irishmen in 1890 as compared with

their position in 1750 is greater than the improvement that has taken place in the position of Englishmen between the years 1750 and 1890. If that be true, and surely it is true, what use is it to quote statistics about mud hovels and lunatics? Lunatics have increased because they are now looked after; our register of lunatics shows now a larger number because in the century to which speakers have looked back as the golden age of Ireland lunatics were tied to posts, or were allowed to stray unattended through the fields, and nobody counted them because nobody cared for them.

I now come to two arguments which are not only bad, but which, as I said before, are sentimental and bad. The first of them is drawn from the fact, or alleged fact, that England is responsible for Ireland's woes, and that this Bill is some set-off against the wrongs formerly inflicted upon Ireland by this country. I have not been slow to admit that in the history of Ireland England has often played a sorry part, but I do not admit that in the great tragedy extending over all those centuries England has been the villain of the piece. It is not true, and I feel disgusted at the creeping hypocrisy—when it is not ignorance—which throws upon this country,

and upon this country alone, all the responsibility, or more than one-half of the responsibility, for Irish ills. The Prime Minister is fond of quoting the opinion of the civilized world. The civilized world forms its opinion largely from the speeches made by English politicians, and if English politicians go about abusing England no wonder that foreign countries, unaccustomed to our peculiar methods of political controversy, take English politicians at their word. But what is the fact? The fact is that before the English power went to Ireland, Ireland was a collection of tribes, waging constant and internecine warfare, without law, without civilization. Although the law is imperfectly obeyed, and although civilization may be imperfectly apprehended, all the law and all the civilization in Ireland are the work of England. The unity, the imperfect unity, which Ireland enjoys—that also is the work of England; and the Parliament which Ireland desires to have restored to her, what was that but the work of Englishmen? The mention of that Parliament brings me to the last of the arguments, of the bad and sentimental arguments which have been adduced in favour of this Bill and which I need notice. Almost every member of this House who has spoken from below the gangway has claimed

this Bill as—I was going to say an instalment—but at all events, a contribution towards what they regard as their national right. But how do they define the Irish nation? In a speech delivered recently from that quarter of the House, a nation was described as consisting of those who were united by race, by creed, and by common interests.

Now, who are they in Ireland who demand a Parliament? What nation is this judged by those marks? It is a nation for which I have a very high respect, but it is not a nation which ever had a Parliament. Those who had a Parliament in Ireland desired one no longer. But that section of the community, united, as has been said here, by race, by religion, and by common interest, they have never had a Parliament. If you in your madness now give them a Parliament you will not be restoring an ancient privilege to which they claim a right; you will be giving them something for the first time—something which in the whole course of their history they have never yet enjoyed. I think it will be admitted by those who have endeavoured to follow this debate as I have done, that the greater bulk of the speeches have not been occupied in developing the arguments which I have just briefly sketched, and to which I have indicated the reply. They have been occupied either in discussing the

antecedents of the various politicians of eminence—they have omitted me from their category ; I do not recollect any quotation from my speeches—or they have been occupied in attempting to answer the arguments against the Bill. And I must admit that the answers have been extraordinarily inadequate. This is a debate remarkable for many of the speeches which have been delivered ; but surely more remarkable for the speeches which have not been delivered. Surely the number of powerful arguments—arguments which every one must admit are powerful and relevant—which have been simply passed by, either with no notice at all or with the most perfunctory notice, has never been equalled. It would be impossible within the limits of the time at my disposal to go over all these arguments and discuss them ; but what answer has ever been given to the argument which we have brought forward that by this Bill—and I am now discussing the objections from the English point of view—England loses all freedom of treatment of its finance ? If this precious measure passes, you will have two Committees of Supply and two Appropriation Bills. For anything I know to the contrary you will require to have two Chancellors of the Exchequer. But above and beyond all these difficulties, you will not be able to touch either the customs or the excise

without altering all your relations to Ireland in a manner which may be, and probably will be, most unjust to the British tax-payer. In other words, you will not be able to touch them at all. What is the answer? The Prime Minister admits the inconvenience, but he does not explain how it is to be got over. In this and in other cases, especially in one great case to which I will allude later, it appears to be thought by the Government that, if they themselves produce an argument against their proposals, it is sufficient to absolve themselves from the trouble of replying to it. As far as I know, not a single word has been dropped from the Government Bench or from the Government side of the House on what I may call the military or geographical aspect of the question. It is not unimportant, though I will not go into it now. But I will say that when a responsible Government comes down to this House and proposes to establish an independent Executive in an island placed strategically in relation to Great Britain as Ireland is placed, and does not justify that course by showing that it cannot bear the evil fruits which most of us fear from it, that Government shows at all events a very great indifference in meeting argument with argument and discussion with discussion.

But I pass from that unanswered argument. I

ask what answer has been given to another argument which deals not with the security of the Empire, but with the pockets of the tax-payer, and which surely ought to have received a little more attention from the promoters of this Bill? I refer to the security for the British creditor. I am aware that the Chief Secretary has dealt with this question, but not by answering it. He was good enough to say that the securities for the Land Purchase Bill were illusory securities, and that his own were much better. He appears to think that it is much better for a man to be able to present a cheque to a gentleman who will not honour it than for a man to have in his pocket the money by which his own debts if necessary may be paid. That is precisely and exactly the distinction between the securities which were established for land purchase last year, and the so-called securities proposed by this Government for the same kind of debts, and for any future one which may be contracted.

But there are more important questions, I admit, than questions of mere cash. What, then, are we to say to the reply of the Government made to us when we deal with the question of the so-called supremacy of the British Parliament? That subject was fully worked out by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.

It was just touched upon again in the most

eloquent and able speech of the Home Secretary. But though that speech was able and eloquent, it was, at all events on this point, far from conclusive. I have spent much of my public life in endeavouring to understand the legal mind, and I admit that I have but imperfectly succeeded. The Home Secretary only occasionally lapses into the legal mind; but when he had to discuss the question of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, I do not think he can be exonerated from that charge. He explained, not at undue length, but at considerable length, that the Imperial Parliament would be still supreme. Legally, of course, it would be supreme; no one has doubted it. But what layman takes the slightest interest in these paper supremacies? For my part I take no more interest in the question of whether the Imperial Parliament is on paper superior to the Irish Parliament than I do as to the order of precedence at a London dinner party. The thing is of no public interest or moment whatever. What we want to know is where the power lies. Who is going to exercise supremacy? Who is going to be the *de facto* ruler of Ireland? Is it to be this Parliament or that Parliament (pointing to the Nationalist members)? I noticed that there is some divergence of opinion on this point. It

was the business presumably of the hon. member for Waterford to reassure his friends in Ireland; and so he gave it as his opinion that the supremacy of this Parliament, though it existed on paper, never would be exercised. It was the business of the Home Secretary to reassure the trembling flock behind him, and he therefore told us that the supremacy of this Parliament was a very real thing, extending to person, property, and goodness knows what; and that it had to be supported—so far did the fancy and imagination of the right hon. gentleman carry him—by a body of Imperial officials not yet in existence, for which no provision is made in the Bill, and for which, as I understand, the Government do not mean to make any provision. I hope hon. members opposite will recognize that if the Bill remains unamended in committee, it will be a Bill in which the supremacy of this Assembly is an illusory supremacy, and that if they mean to retain the right the Home Secretary thinks they ought to possess, they ought to vote for amendments which will make the supremacy a reality.

But there is another question which from your point of view appears to me to be even more important than the supremacy of the British Parliament. I refer to the “in and out” clause.

Against that clause very powerful arguments have been used in this debate, but by no member with such effect and force as by the Prime Minister himself. What answer does the Prime Minister on the second reading make to the Prime Minister on the first reading? The answer of the Prime Minister on the second reading is that he hopes the Irish members will not attend. The right hon. gentleman said something very like it. He said they would not very often attend. I qualify my statement of what he said by saying that he hoped they would not very often attend.* He thought they would not very often attend. I am always pleased when, even after repeated efforts, I succeed in getting a quotation from the Prime Minister according to his mind. But we want some more reassuring argument than, I will not say, the hope, but the expectation of the Prime Minister. My own belief is, and the course of this debate has shown that my conviction is shared by other members who have spoken, that our procedure in this House will be shattered, and must be shattered, under this clause if it remains unaltered. I will only point out in addition that something more important than the procedure of this House will be shattered by that clause.

* Mr. Gladstone dissented.

The Constitution will be shattered. What is the Constitution of this country? No written Constitution embodies the reality of our Government. That reality has been the slow growth of time, the slow consequence of the political sagacity of Anglo-Saxon race, and no greater triumph of that political sagacity exists than the creation of our system of a Government responsible to the majority in this House. You will, and you must, shatter that Constitution if you introduce into it two majorities—an Imperial majority and a British majority; two Governments—an Imperial Government and a British Government. Take the present Cabinet, whom I see ranged before me opposite, formed into a phalanx. There is the Home Secretary, the Secretary for Scotland, the President of the Local Government Board, the right hon. gentleman who presides over the Board of Works; I had almost said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but he has a little something to do with Irish affairs—all the gentlemen I have mentioned have nothing to do with Ireland at all. Are they going to be made dependent on an Irish majority? Under your Bill are those particular ministers going to be dependent on an Irish majority? Most Britons would never stand it for a day, and it is clear enough that, whatever else Clause 9 will do, it will destroy our constitutional

Government as that Government now exists. What will come out of the system I do not pretend to say. I do not think the Government ever reflected upon that. It may be that the power of the Crown will be greatly augmented ; but of this, at all events, I am sure—that I cannot prophesy the outcome of it, though I am sure that your existing system, with all its merits, will be absolutely destroyed by this Bill as it stands. What answer has been given on the question of finality ? Most of us have listened attentively to the course of the debate on this issue, and I hope that the prospect held out on the question of finality has been noted. It is likely that for the next three years this House will be occupied with the Irish land question. Is that too much ? No. I think it is no injustice to deduce from these statements that the prospect held out is that we shall be discussing the Irish land question for a considerable portion of three years, and that at the end of that time another Home Rule Bill will have to be brought in to settle the exact proportion in which the Irish members are to be represented here.

And what about the argument of finality brought before us by the Home Secretary ? The Home Secretary is said to be perfectly content with all the declarations on the other side on the question

of finality. "Surely it is true," he is told, "almost to the verge of commonplace, that no arrangement you could make would be permanent or eternal." I quite agree, and no house you build can be permanent or eternal, but when you build a house you do not expect it to tumble about your ears the next month. And our objection to this scheme is that from the very nature of the case it embodies what is truly called a compromise, which, from its very nature, cannot last. If hon. members below the gangway had never varied the statement of their views, they would say our rights and claims are far in excess of this Bill. But they now say we have given up all our old opinions, and we are prepared to take this Bill as a compromise and do our best. I want to know what right they have to say that even for themselves, still more what right they have to say it for Ireland, and, more than all, what chance there is of that compromise being kept. We can all consent to compromise our rights, when the rights which we give up do not touch our daily life and our deepest interests. What are the rights which the Irish members give up? By this Bill they give up their rights to deal with religion, with education, and with trade. These are three things that touch their lives every moment, and is it not ludicrous to tell us that holding them to be debts

due by this country to an oppressed nationality, they are going to give their permanent and final consent to abandoning those attributes of nationality?

In this matter we are not left to our own deductions from our knowledge of human nature. We have History to go by. It is not the first time that a subordinate Parliament has existed in Ireland. A subordinate Parliament existed—differing, it is true, in many respects, but still similar to that now proposed to this extent, in being subordinate—in 1782. Everything which then called itself Irish patriotism in those days rose up and said, “Our rights cannot be satisfied without an independent Parliament, and an independent Parliament we shall have.” These hon. gentlemen, the unworthy successors of the Grattans of the Parliament are prepared to come forward and to barter away those rights for all time. These hon. gentlemen come forward and say, “We will barter away for all time those hereditary rights, even although those hereditary rights touch all the most important points of our national life.” The only other argument to which I will allude from the English point of view is the threat—well, I will not say the threat, but the prophecy—which has been made with regard to what will happen if this Bill does not

pass. Mr. Sexton and other speakers have endeavoured—and quite sincerely, I believe—to alarm this House with the prospect of the consequences which will ensue should this country refuse to ratify the present measure. What are those consequences? I suppose we shall have a renewal of crime and that the mutilation of cattle will increase, and I suppose that a few more defenceless people will be shot in their homesteads. I do not suggest that these were the words used by Mr. Sexton. I am endeavouring, I admit, only to fill in the picture which he left in obscure outline.

So much for the argument from the English point of view which has been advanced. Now, what is the point of view of Ireland? And in saying that I do not mean from the point of view of hon. members for Ireland, but from the point of view of Ireland herself. The first argument, from the Irish point of view, which I shall touch upon is the money argument. I am not going to survey the active controversy which has been going on about 15 per cent. and 25 per cent. and all the rest of it, which will have to be threshed out thoroughly in committee, but this, at all events, is clear—that even in the judgment of the Prime Minister the treatment of Ireland is generous, and that, by the universal consensus of every single Irish Member who has

spoken, the treatment of Ireland is not only ungenerous, but will lead Ireland, within a brief and very measurable interval, to absolute bankruptcy. Nothing could be really more amusing than to compare the principles of the Treasury Bench on this subject with the principles of Irishmen. The Irish Secretary said—I think I have got his exact words—that “he disapproved of this system of bribes and doles and fat sops.” But Mr. Sexton does not disapprove of them. The point is what the hon. member calls fair play, and his view of fair play is this—that all “the bribes and doles and fat sops” of the past should be capitalized and should be given to Ireland as a permanent grant. He is not content with that. Ireland, if fruitful in nothing else, has been fruitful in the last century in bad debts—fruitful in bad debts to the British Exchequer. These, also, the member for Kerry, in his desire for fair play, wishes to capitalize, and wishes to take into account, and desires to increase the annual stipend to Ireland by the amount of the debts which Ireland has failed to pay. He is like a tenant—I should not be thought ungenerous perhaps if I said an Irish tenant—who regards the fact that he has not paid his rent in the past as an adequate reason for omitting it in the future.

It is quite clear, and it must be quite clear to the Government themselves, that the difficulties of arranging this account between England and Ireland are enormous. You are deliberately destroying, to the extent of throwing it into the sea, the whole of that available wealth which consists in British credit. You have got somehow to make up the deficiency. You have got to make up the further deficiency which will arise in Ireland from the withdrawal of English or British generosity—from the withdrawal of “bribes, doles, and fat sops.” How are you going to arrange these discordant claims? I have not the slightest conception; but I know that the British public, at all events, are not so enamoured of this Bill that they are anxious to pay heavily for the privilege of passing it, and that if you propose to get over the difficulties by further mulcting the British taxpayer, your difficulties in the House may diminish, but your difficulties out of the House will be very largely increased.

The next point I must raise is one which has hardly been touched upon in this debate, and which I, at all events, could not reconcile it with my duty to leave undealt with, or at all events not alluded to—I mean the position of the Civil servants and of the Constabulary. The Chief Secretary for Ireland

reproached me in his speech with having in Dublin used words about the Constabulary calculated to diminish the loyalty of that force. If my words had any effect of that kind I regret it, but not one word that I uttered can I withdraw, nor can I express the slightest regret that I took up what I believe to be the just cause of these greatly oppressed servants. I understand that gentlemen below the gangway laugh at that, but is it not evident that, whoever else may be sacrificed in the revolution which you are endeavouring to accomplish, at all events the Civil servants will be sacrificed; at all events the Constabulary will be sacrificed? The terms—I am not going to discuss them in detail—but I say distinctly in my judgment the terms proposed in the schedules are utterly inadequate to meet the justice of the case; and it is inconsistent with the elementary principles of honour that something more should not be done than is proposed in this Bill. I am aware that the Chief Secretary not only expressed the hope that the Irish would retain the present Civil Service, but that he went the length of saying they would be mad if they did not retain it. I will read him an extract which will enable him to judge of the sanity of the Irish members from his own point of view. It is not raked up from the dust-bin, it is, on the contrary,

an article in a very serious review by a very serious politician—it is an article by the member for Cork City in the “Fortnightly.” It was published as late as November, 1892, two months after the present Government came into office. The hon. member is discussing “Mr. Morley’s task in Ireland,” and what does he say:—“Mr. Morley came to Ireland with the powers of a Cromwell, but he is a Cromwell with a Royalist army.” He goes on: “Why not purge the public service, then, of such servants?”—servants whom the Irish members would be mad if they did not retain. “Is not the work of ‘clearing out the Castle’ the very job Mr. Morley has come to Ireland to perform? There would be no difficulty in picking out Nationalists competent to administer the Castle departments as uprightly as well as they have on the whole administered the affairs of the City Corporations and Poor Law Boards. Even with a Home Rule Chief Secretary at the helm the place is in quarantine. The Irish public have the same sort of sympathy for Mr. Morley as for a gallant surgeon who embarks in a plague-stricken hulk all alone.” Those are the deliberate views written in a serious journal by a serious politician as to the methods that would be adopted by an Irish Executive when an Irish Executive comes into office, and yet the Chief

Secretary thinks that the schedule he has appended to the Bill is adequate compensation for the claims of that great department of which he is the head.

It is not necessary for me to ask, I think, after the debate to-night, what is the value of the safeguards with which we are told the Bill bristles. The old arguments of the American Constitution served up to the Irish loyalists by the Chancellor of the Duchy have, I think, received adequate treatment from previous speeches. I pass from that, and from the unanswered statement of my noble friend the member for Paddington* which I think deserves more attention than it has received. This, again, the Chief Secretary endeavoured to answer, but he had no effective reply to it. He said it was a mare's nest. It is quite allowable to call an argument a mare's nest if you have previously shown it to be a mare's nest, but the mere naked statement that it is a mare's nest is not an adequate method of treating a serious proposition advanced from such a quarter. My noble friend said you have constituted a special court in Ireland which is to deal with all the questions on which an Irish Parliament cannot touch—questions some of which are satisfied and some of which are not satisfied in the Bill, and any suit connected with any of those questions which you bring

* Lord Randolph Churchill.

before the Exchequer Judges and the Privy Council. My noble friend went on to say that some of those trials would be before the jury. Clearly there could not be a jury before the Exchequer Judges or before the Privy Council. If there was the Exchequer Judges would totally lose the character they were intended to possess of being judges appointed by the Imperial Government, wholly independent of anything that goes on in Ireland. What chance any British case or any Imperial case will have before an Irish judge, if with the Irish Judge is associated an Irish jury, nobody is better able to estimate than the Chief Secretary himself. To that contention no answer has been given, any more than to the further contention on the part of my noble friend that Trinity College is safeguarded under this Bill to a very small extent. The position of that great corporation, the one bright spot in Irish history, is not merely imperilled but rendered absolutely insecure if the Bill remain unamended. The feelings expressed in the north-east of Ireland have been conveniently described and dismissed as a mere factitious demonstration got up by the landlords. Is there any man of more sober judgment who concurs in that view? Is there a single man who does not know that the 1,500,000 Protestants, the larger number of whom are in

Ulster, hate and loathe any violent resistance to the Bill which you desire to pass? I confess that I augur the worst for the future Governors of Ireland who know so little of the country which they propose to govern. But I am aware that I can hardly pass from this subject without noticing the attacks that have been made upon me with reference to this matter. In the earlier part of the debate they were made rather by insinuation than by direct notice. Few of the speakers quoted from the speech they attacked. Others avoided mentioning it by name. Nevertheless, the attack was rather vehement, and the member for Devonport, whose vocabulary does not, so far as my observation goes, suffer from undue poverty, was quite unable to find within his vocabulary any terms sufficiently strong to describe the atrocities of which I was guilty. The only person with whom I mean to deal at the present time is the Home Secretary, who made, as I thought, a most able speech. In one of his most brilliant passages he made a vehement attack on my conduct at Belfast. He did not, however, quote the whole of my speech—I should say, he did not quote the whole passage which embodied the advice I gave. If he had done so, perhaps he would have discovered that I had done as much as anybody else to help the Chief Secretary in a very difficult task. But

I did not interrupt the Home Secretary in the interests of art. I thought he ought to be allowed to make his rhetorical point without disturbance, and as I recognize in him one of the greatest of parliamentary artists, I was quite rewarded for my discretion. But what was it that I actually said at Belfast? I am going to deal purely with the part that he quoted. In the first place, I said that parliamentary majorities might be tyrannical. Is that denied? I said in the second place, that parliamentary majorities might be stupid. Is that denied? In the third place, I said that if the tyranny and stupidity reached a certain point, I had not come here to preach a doctrine of non-resistance, which I should not preach if the incriminated power had been a monarch instead of a Parliament. Now, I take that to be a very good doctrine. I frankly admit that a doctrine of that kind, if preached in a wrong place, at a wrong time, and to a wrong audience, would entail a very heavy responsibility on its author. Now, let us take the parallel worked out by the Home Secretary. He said, Take the case of the Chief Secretary for Ireland going down to Cork and making that speech in the time of the late Government; he would, he added, have found himself before a couple of magistrates. But

unless the right hon. gentleman had gone down to Cork to preach some doctrine of outrage and intimidation, he would have had no fear of suffering imprisonment. That is, however, not the point I am driving at. The point is this—that whereas the men whom the Chief Secretary would preach to at Cork have no grievances, the men to whom I was speaking at Belfast would, if this Bill were passed, be under the greatest grievances ever inflicted upon citizens. The Chief Secretary, if he preached to the citizens of Cork, would have been preaching to men who have got as citizens not merely their share, but far more than their fair share, in the government of this country. He would have preached to men who, as Catholics, possess a system of education more liberal than is afforded in any Catholic country in Europe; and he would have preached to men who live under laws never dreamt of by the people of any other country in the world. I spoke to men who knew, if from nothing else from the speeches of members below the gangway, that Ireland was divided, fissured, rent into two sections, and that to give Ireland a parliamentary system would be to give one section absolute control over the other. I spoke to men who knew that a Parliamentary system for Ireland is only possible if Ireland be merged in the higher unity of the United Kingdom.

I spoke to men who knew that all that is most educated, most intelligent, and most enterprising in Ireland belongs to the minority, who would be placed under the feet of the majority. I spoke to men who knew that by the teaching of Irish politicians patriotism had been confounded for years with plunder, and that principles have been preached by one patriot and accepted by another which would make any civilized government absolutely impossible. I spoke to men devoted to the present Constitution of these realms, to men who were loyal subjects of the Queen, who were anxious to obey the Imperial Parliament, and who could see no reason why they should be handed over to the protection of those who they knew would have absolute control over their destinies. Was it under these circumstances my business to preach the doctrine of non-resistance? Would you, if placed in the position of the men of the North-east of Ireland, practise the doctrine of non-resistance? I do not believe that you would. I refuse either outside or inside this House to make myself responsible for a recommendation which I do not believe I should carry out in practice were I placed in the position of those whom I addressed. I admit that these views depend, and must depend, upon the estimate formed of the character of the

politicians who will control the affairs of Ireland if you pass this Bill. The Home Secretary described every effort to discover from their previous speaking the character of these men as scavenging in the dustbin for the garbage of old speeches. I do not wish to attach too much value or importance to old speeches. But this argument of the Home Secretary proves a great deal too much. If the speeches of these gentlemen in the past, reiterated month after month and year after year, mean nothing, what value are we to put on their speeches now, in which they declare their adhesion to this compromise? If the very able gentlemen with whom we have to deal never speak their minds, what is the use of listening to them? I admit that the Irish race is, as the member for North Kerry said, quick-witted and hasty, and I admit they appear with great equanimity to give and receive epithets from each other ten thousand times stronger than they ever permit to be used against them by anybody else opposed to them; and I must say I look forward with the utmost commiseration and sympathy to the gentleman who will occupy the position of Mr. Speaker in the Irish Parliament.

But I make even a further concession. I quite agree that it would be absurd to press too hardly

upon treasonable or semi-treasonable utterances made ten or twenty years ago. I do not wish to do it. I dare say hon. gentlemen think there can be no more loyal subject of the Queen, no better Governor of Ireland under Imperial auspices than the ex-Fenian—on the same principle, I suppose, that the reformed rake makes the best husband. I tie no man down to the errors of his youth or the rash declarations he may have made as a boy of five-and-twenty, but I think, making every allowance, hon. and right hon. gentlemen opposite miss the real point of our objection. They forget that the Irish politicians have been occupied in a steady and persistent propaganda of doctrines with regard to property, to land, and to government which are absolutely inconsistent, as I think, and as I am sure the House thinks, with any government at all. They have preached spoliation undefiled. They may have been converted, as the Chief Secretary says, from “prairie value.” They may think that perhaps a landlord may get one-third or even one-fourth of his rent. I do not know the fraction which they now allow. These men—they will not deny it—have preached and still preach doctrines with regard to the tenure of land, to evictions, to the taking of empty farms, to resistance to the sheriff, and the execution of writs of the Courts

for rent and other matters—doctrines, in other words, connected with the agrarian question in Ireland, which, if they are applied in Ireland under this Home Rule Bill, will simply mean that 1894 will see a confiscation more absolutely monstrous and unjustifiable than any which stain the history of Ireland. What answer is made to that? These facts were known and are known to gentlemen opposite. Seven years ago almost every man whom I see on that bench, either explicitly or by implication, stated that it was a question of honour to settle the land question when you gave Home Rule. I asked on the first reading, “What has become of honour?” I ask on the second reading, What has become of honour? I hope the right hon. gentleman who replies to me in concluding this debate will tell us how it comes about that, after these seven years of reflection, having seen these gentlemen at work during those seven years, he is now prepared to attempt to settle the Irish Government Bill without settling the land question. They are converted upon many questions—so they tell us, and so I believe—but they can never be converted upon this question. This is the question which has brought them power and place in this House; this is the doctrine by which they have

succeeded in bringing Home Rule to the front; this is the question by which they mean to gain the liberties of their country; and do you mean to tell me it will be possible for these gentlemen, whatever their intention, if you gave them tomorrow an Irish Legislature, not to attempt to carry out, either by executive or legislative means, doctrines which, without ceasing, without inconsistency, and without variation, they have preached to the peasantry of Ireland for the last twelve years? And, yet, though I think that this Bill is calculated to inflict injury upon all minorities in Ireland, injury upon the Constabulary and upon the Civil Service, injury upon the men of business and the men of education, injury upon the landlords and the tenants who disobey the rule of the Land League, after all, it may be possible that, of all the sufferers from this Bill, those whom you expect most to benefit by it will be the greatest. I plead here not merely for the minority, but for the majority. It is true that claims are made for that majority which I cannot allow. It is true that many of the great names in Irish literature and history, the Swifts, the Goldsmiths, the Wellingtons, many of the great names that have administered Ireland, have belonged by race, by religion and by class, not to those who

claim to be the Irish nation and who want Home Rule, but to those Irishmen, that minority of Irishmen, who repudiate Home Rule with all their strength. I believe that in the long run, the representatives of the Celtic race will lose more than any other class in the kingdom. I do not wish to lose them. You may laugh, but I am speaking simply the truth. I think they are a most valuable and important element in the great nation to which we belong, and if you pass this Bill Great Britain loses these men for ever. I do not mean that separation would necessarily ensue. I think it will. My argument is, if in the name of nationality you concede this boon to the Celtic portion of the population, it is to the assembly you create that every member of that Celtic majority will look. It is round that centre that his affections and hopes will concentrate. It will embody the traditions of his race. It will be the centre of all his associations. They will look at us—the great Imperial Parliament, which was to be the Parliament for all these islands—as a foreign and a defeated body. They will look at us as an assembly which only exists for the purpose of wringing from us, by means legitimate or illegitimate, the terms they propose—concessions even greater than this Bill proposes. You will

compel them to drink from the narrow, bitter, and polluted streams of purely Irish history—that unhappy history—and you will forbid them practically and effectively to touch that broader stream, and purer stream of national life which I think they may partake of if only you will permit them. Recollect when this century began—when the Union was tried—you had as opponents the Protestant minority. They are converted. Ninety years of Union have proved to them that happiness consists, and must consist in their consolidation and union with this country. Why should not another generation see the same blessed process carried out with regard to the Catholics of Ireland? Nothing shall make me believe that it is impossible. Nothing shall make me believe that it is beyond the power of this assembly, but if you choose in your madness to commit this crime, and make yourselves responsible for this irreparable national loss, then all hope of a peaceful and united Ireland will vanish, and vanish for ever.

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APPENDIX I

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL

(Ordered to be printed September 1, 1893).

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES.

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2. Powers of Irish Legislature.
3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature.
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SCHEDULES.

A
B I L L

INTITULED

An Act to amend the provision for the Government of
Ireland.

WHEREAS it is expedient that without impairing or restricting the supreme authority of Parliament, an Irish Legislature should be created for such purposes in Ireland as in this Act mentioned :

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

Establishment of Irish Legislature.

1. On and after the appointed day there shall be in Ireland a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and of two Houses, the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly.

Powers of Irish Legislature.

2. With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Act mentioned, there shall be granted to the Irish Legislature power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof. Provided that, notwithstanding anything in this Act contained, the supreme power and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things within the Queen's dominions.

Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature.

3. The Irish Legislature shall not have power to make laws in respect of the following matters or any of them :—

- (1.) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency ; or the Lord Lieutenant as representative of the Crown ; or
- (2.) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state of war ; or the regulation of the conduct of any portion of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign states with which Her Majesty is at peace, in respect of such hostilities ; or
- (3.) Navy, army, militia, volunteers, and any other military forces, or the defence of the realm, or forts, permanent military camps, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, or any places purchased for the erection thereof ; or
- (4.) Authorising either the carrying or using of arms for military purposes, or the formation of associations for drill or practice in the use of arms for military purposes ; or

- (5.) Treaties or any relations with foreign States, or the relations between different parts of Her Majesty's dominions, or offences connected with such treaties or relations, or procedure connected with the extradition of criminals under any treaty ; or
- (6.) Dignities or titles of honour ; or
- (7.) Treason, treason-felony, alienage, aliens as such, or naturalization ; or
- (8.) Trade with any place out of Ireland ; or quarantine, or navigation, including merchant shipping (except as respects inland waters and local health or harbour regulations) ; or
- (9.) Lighthouses, buoys, or beacons within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and the Acts amending the same (except so far as they can consistently with any general Act of Parliament be constructed or maintained by a local harbour authority) ; or
- (10.) Coinage ; legal tender ; or any change in the standard of weights and measures ; or
- (11.) Trade marks, designs, merchandise marks, copy-right, or patent rights.

Provided always, that nothing in this section shall prevent the passing of any Irish Act to provide for any charges imposed by Act of Parliament, or to prescribe conditions regulating importation from any place outside Ireland for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of any contagious disease.

It is hereby declared that the exceptions from the powers of the Irish Legislature contained in this section are set forth and enumerated for greater certainty, and not so as to restrict the generality of the limitation imposed in the previous section on the powers of the Irish Legislature.

Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void.

Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature.

4. The powers of the Irish Legislature shall not extend to the making of any law—

- (1.) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, whether directly or indirectly, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
- (2.) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, advantage, or benefit, on account of religious belief, or raising or appropriating directly or indirectly, save as heretofore, any public revenue for any religious purpose, or for the benefit of the holder of any religious office as such; or
- (3.) Diverting the property or without its consent altering the constitution of any religious body; or
- (4.) Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity; or
- (5.) Whereby there may be established and endowed out of public funds any theological professorship or any university or college in which the conditions set out in the University of Dublin Tests Act, 1873, are not observed; or
- (6.) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money, without attending the religious instruction at that school; or
- (7.) Directly or indirectly imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, benefit, or advantage upon any subject of the Crown on account of his parentage, or place of birth, or of the place where any part of his business is carried on, or upon any corporation or

institution constituted or existing by virtue of the law of some part of the Queen's dominions, and carrying on operations in Ireland, on account of the persons by whom or in whose favour or the place in which any of its operations are carried on ; or

- (8.) Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation ; or
- (9.) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by Royal Charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, and so far as respects property without just compensation. Provided nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Irish Legislature from dealing with any public department, municipal corporation, or local authority, or with any corporation administering for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, so far as concerns the same.

Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.

Executive power in Ireland.

5.—(1.) The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen, and the Lord Lieutenant,

or other chief executive officer or officers for the time being appointed in his place, on behalf of Her Majesty, shall exercise any prerogatives or other executive power of the Queen the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty, and shall, in Her Majesty's name, summon, at least once in every year, prorogue, and dissolve the Irish Legislature; and every instrument conveying any such delegation of any prerogative or other executive power shall be presented to the two Houses of Parliament as soon as conveniently may be. Provided always that the lieutenants of counties shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland as representing Her Majesty.

(2.) There shall be an Executive Committee of the Privy Council of Ireland to aid and advise in the government of Ireland, being of such numbers, and comprising persons holding such offices under the Crown as Her Majesty or, if so authorised, the Lord Lieutenant may think fit, save as may be otherwise directed by the Irish Act.

(3.) The Lord Lieutenant shall, on the advice of the said Executive Committee, give or withhold the assent of Her Majesty to Bills passed by the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, subject nevertheless to any instructions given by Her Majesty in respect of any such Bill.

Transfer of certain powers and jurisdiction to the Lord Lieutenant.

6. All the powers and jurisdiction to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, and the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, by the Lord Lieutenant or Lord Justices, or other Chief Governor or Governors of Ireland, or the Chief Secretary of the Lord Lieutenant, shall be exercised by the Lord Lieutenant in pursuance of instructions given by Her Majesty.

CONSTITUTION OF LEGISLATURE.

Composition of Irish Legislative Council.

7.—(1.) The Irish Legislative Council shall consist of forty-eight councillors.

(2.) Each of the constituencies mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act shall return the number of councillors named opposite thereto in that schedule.

(3.) Every man shall be entitled to be registered as an elector, and when registered to vote at an election, of a councillor for a constituency, who owns or occupies any land or tenement in the constituency of a rateable value of more than twenty pounds, subject to the like conditions as a man is entitled at the passing of this Act to be registered and vote as a parliamentary elector in respect of an ownership qualification or of the qualification specified in section five of the Representation of the People Act, 1884, as the case may be: Provided that a man shall not be entitled to be registered, nor if registered to vote, at an election of a councillor in more than one constituency in the same year.

(4.) The term of office of every councillor shall be eight years, and shall not be affected by a dissolution; and one-half of the councillors shall retire in every fourth year, and their seats shall be filled by a new election.

Composition of Irish Legislative Assembly.

8.—(1.) The Irish Legislative Assembly shall consist of one hundred and three members, returned by the existing parliamentary constituencies in Ireland, or the existing divisions thereof, and elected by the parliamentary electors for the time being in those constituencies or divisions.

(2.) The Irish Legislative Assembly when summoned

may, unless sooner dissolved, have continuance for five years from the day on which the summons directs it to meet and no longer.

(3.) After six years from the passing of this Act, the Irish Legislature may alter the qualification of the electors, and the constituencies, and the distribution of the members among the constituencies, provided that in such distribution due regard is had to the population of the constituencies.

Disagreement between two Houses, how settled.

9. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill adopted by the Legislative Assembly is lost by the disagreement of the Legislative Council, and after a dissolution, or the period of two years from such disagreement, such Bill, or a Bill for enacting the said provision, is again adopted by the Legislative Assembly and fails within three months afterwards to be adopted by the Legislative Council, the same shall forthwith be submitted to the members of the two Houses deliberating and voting together thereon, and shall be adopted or rejected according to the decision of the majority of those members present and voting on the question.

IRISH REPRESENTATION IN HOUSE OF COMMONS.

10. Unless and until Parliament otherwise determines, the following provisions shall have effect—

- (1.) After the appointed day each of the constituencies named in the Second Schedule to this Act shall return to serve in Parliament the number of members named opposite thereto in that schedule, and no more, and Dublin University shall cease to return any member.
- (2.) The existing divisions of the constituencies shall, save as provided in that schedule, be abolished.

(3.) The election laws and the laws relating to the qualification of parliamentary electors shall not, so far as they relate to parliamentary elections, be altered by the Irish Legislature, but this enactment shall not prevent the Irish Legislature from dealing with any officers concerned with the issue of writs of election, and if any officers are so dealt with, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty by Order in Council to arrange for the issue of such writs, and the writs issued in pursuance of such Order shall be of the same effect as if issued in manner heretofore accustomed.

FINANCE.

Financial arrangements as between United Kingdom and Ireland.

11.—(1.) Until the transfer herein-after mentioned the existing taxes in Ireland shall be imposed by Act of Parliament, and all matters relating to those taxes or to the hereditary revenues of the Crown in Ireland, or to the collection or management thereof, shall be regulated by Act of Parliament.

(2.) For the purposes of this Act the public revenue of Ireland shall be divided into general revenue and special revenue, and the general revenue shall consist of—

- (a) the gross revenue collected in Ireland from the said taxes ;
- (b) the portion due to Ireland of the hereditary revenues of the Crown which are managed by the Commissioners of Woods ; and
- (c) an annual sum for the customs and excise duties (if any) collected in Great Britain on articles consumed in Ireland ;

Provided that an annual sum for the customs and excise

duties (if any) collected in Ireland on articles consumed in Great Britain shall be deducted from the revenue collected in Ireland, and treated as revenue collected in Great Britain.

(3.) The above-mentioned annual sums shall be determined by the order of a committee appointed jointly by the Treasury and the Irish Government in equal proportions, with power to choose a chairman, or in default the chairman shall be appointed by Her Majesty, and the chairman shall have a second or casting vote, and such order shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

(4.) One-third part of the general revenue of Ireland, and also that portion of any Imperial miscellaneous revenue to which Ireland may claim to be entitled, whether specified in the Third Schedule to this Act or arising hereafter, shall be paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as the contribution of Ireland to Imperial liabilities and expenditure as defined in that schedule.

(5.) The residue of the general revenue of Ireland shall, without being paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, form part of the special revenue of Ireland.

(6.) The civil charges of government in Ireland shall, subject as in this Act mentioned, be borne after the appointed day by Ireland and regulated by Irish Act.

(7.) Where Parliament imposes any taxes expressly for the purpose of war, or of any special expenditure which Parliament declares to be war expenditure, or to be extraordinary expenditure for the defence of the realm, the revenue from those taxes which is collected in Ireland, or on articles consumed in Ireland, shall be paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and subject to the like deduction as above mentioned in respect of articles consumed in Great Britain, shall be treated as the contribution of Ireland for the said purpose.

(8.) After six years from the appointed day the imposition of the existing taxes in Ireland other than duties of customs or excise, and the regulation of all matters relating to the existing taxes in Ireland other than the duties of customs, and to the collection and management thereof, shall, save as respects duties on articles consumed in Great Britain, be transferred to the Irish Legislature, and the arrangements made by this Act for the contribution of Ireland to Imperial liabilities and expenditure shall be revised.

As to Irish Consolidated Fund and special revenue.

12.—(1.) On and after the appointed day there shall be an Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund separate from those of the United Kingdom.

(2.) The Irish Legislature, in order to provide for the public service of Ireland, may impose any taxes other than the existing taxes in Ireland, and all matters relating to the taxes so imposed, or to the miscellaneous public revenue of Ireland connected with the civil charges of government in Ireland, or to the collection and management of such taxes or revenue, shall be regulated by Irish Act, and the proceeds shall form part of the special revenue of Ireland.

(3.) The special revenue, and, save as in this Act mentioned, all the public revenue of Ireland, shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer, and all sums paid into the Irish Exchequer shall form a Consolidated Fund, and be appropriated to the public service of Ireland by Irish Act, and shall not be applied for any purpose for which they cannot be so appropriated.

Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund.

13.—(1.) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund in favour of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as a first charge on that fund all sums which—

- (a) are payable to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer ; or
- (b) are required to repay to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom sums issued to meet the dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed land stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891 ; or
- (c) otherwise have been or are required to be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom in consequence of the non-payment thereof out of the Exchequer of Ireland or otherwise by the Irish Government.

(2.) If at any time the Controller and Auditor General of the United Kingdom is satisfied that any such charge is due, he shall certify the amount of it, and the Treasury shall cause the amount so certified to be deducted out of any revenue payable to the Irish Exchequer, and if from any cause the amount is not so deducted, the Treasury shall send such certificate to the Lord Lieutenant, who shall thereupon by order without any counter-signature, direct the payment of the amount from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and such order shall be duly obeyed by all persons, and until the amount is wholly paid no other payment shall be made out of the Irish Exchequer for any purpose whatever.

(3.) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund next after the foregoing charge—

- (a) All sums, for dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed land stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, which the Land Purchase Account and the

Guaranteed Fund under that Act are insufficient to pay ;

- (b) all sums due in respect of any debt incurred by the Government of Ireland, whether for interest, management, or sinking fund ;
- (c) an annual sum of five thousand pounds for the expenses of the household and establishment of the Lord Lieutenant ;
- (d) all existing charges on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of Irish services other than the salary of the Lord Lieutenant ; and
- (e) the salaries and pensions of all judges of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland or of any county or other like court, who are appointed after the passing of this Act, and are not the Exchequer judges hereafter mentioned.

(4.) Until all charges created by this Act upon the Irish Consolidated Fund and for the time being due are paid, no money shall be issued from the Irish Exchequer for any other purpose whatever.

Irish Exchequer to indemnify British Exchequer for wrongful acts of Irish Government.

14. Whenever, by reason of any Act unlawfully done or omitted to be done by the Irish Government or by any member or officer of that Government, any Foreign Power or the subject of any Foreign Power suffers loss or injury, and any sum of money becomes payable out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom by way of indemnity or compensation for such loss or injury, such sum shall thereupon be payable to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom from the Irish Exchequer, and shall be recoverable according to the provisions of this Act.

Irish Church Fund.

15.—(1.) All existing charges on the Church property in Ireland,—that is to say, all property accruing under the Irish Church Act, 1869, and transferred to the Irish Land Commission by the Irish Church Amendment Act, 1881—shall so far as not paid out of the said property be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund, and any of those charges guaranteed by the Treasury, if and so far as not paid, shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(2.) Subject to the existing charges thereon, the said Church property shall belong to the Irish Government, and be managed, administered, and disposed of as directed by Irish Act.

Local Loans.

16.—(1.) All sums paid or applicable in or towards the discharge of the interest or principal of any local loan advanced before the appointed day on security in Ireland, or otherwise in respect of such loan, which but for this Act would be paid to the National Debt Commissioners, and carried to the Local Loans Fund shall, after the appointed day, be paid, until otherwise provided by Irish Act, to the Irish Exchequer.

(2.) For the payment to the Local Loans Fund of the principal and interest of such loans, the Irish Government shall after the appointed day pay by half-yearly payments an annuity for forty-nine years, at the rate of four per cent. on the principal of the said loans, exclusive of any sums written off before the appointed day from the account of assets of the Local Loans Fund, and such annuity shall be paid from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the

United Kingdom, and when so paid shall be forthwith paid to the National Debt Commissioners for the credit of the Local Loans Fund.

(3.) After the appointed day, money for loans in Ireland shall cease to be advanced either by the Public Works Loan Commissioners or out of the Local Loans Fund.

Supplemental as to Local Taxation Accounts and other matters.

17.—(1.) So much of any Act as directs payment to the Local Taxation (Ireland) Account of any share of probate excise or customs duties shall, together with any enactment amending the same, be repealed as from the appointed day without prejudice to the adjustment of balances after that day; but until otherwise provided by Irish Act, the like amounts shall be paid out of the Irish Exchequer to the Guarantee Fund or Local Taxation (Ireland) Account as would have been paid out of the said duties if this Act had not passed.

(2.) The like amounts shall continue to be paid out of the aggregate of the said duties to the Local Taxation Accounts in England and Scotland as would have been paid if this Act had not passed, and any residue of the said duties which forms part of the revenue of Great Britain shall be paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(3.) Notwithstanding anything in the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, the advances made by the issue of guaranteed land stock under that Act shall not, save as in section nine of that Act provided, exceed twenty-five times the share of each county in the guarantee fund, which shall be ascertained on the basis of the financial year in which this Act is passed.

(4.) The general revenue of Ireland and the sums payable thereout shall be paid to and from such account and in such manner as the Treasury direct.

(5.) Where any sum payable by virtue of this Act to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom is required by law to be forthwith paid to the National Debt Commissioners or to any other person, that sum may be so paid without being paid into the Exchequer.

(6.) All sums by this Act made payable from the Exchequer of the United Kingdom shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Money bills and votes.

18.—(1.) Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue or for imposing any tax shall originate in the Legislative Assembly.

(2.) It shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the appropriation for any purpose of any part of the public revenue of Ireland, or of any tax, except in pursuance of a recommendation from the Lord Lieutenant in the session in which such vote, resolution, address, or Bill is proposed.

Exchequer judges for revenue actions, election petitions, etc.

19.—(1.) Two of the judges of the Supreme Court in Ireland shall be Exchequer judges, and shall be appointed under the great seal of the United Kingdom; and their salaries and pensions shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

(2.) The Exchequer judges shall be removable only by Her Majesty on address from the two Houses of Parliament, and each such judge shall, save as otherwise provided

by Parliament, receive the same salary and be entitled to the same pension as is at the time of his appointment fixed for the puisne judges of the Supreme Court, and during his continuance in office his salary shall not be diminished, nor his right to pension altered, without his consent.

(3.) An alteration of any rules relating to such legal proceedings as are mentioned in this section shall not be made except with the approval of Her Majesty the Queen in Council ; and the sittings of the Exchequer judges shall be regulated with the like approval.

(4.) The Queen in Council may make rules respecting all legal proceedings in Ireland, which are instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs, or any of their officers, or relate to the election of members to serve in Parliament, or touch any matter not within the powers of the Irish Legislature, or touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish Legislature have not power to repeal or alter, and subject to such rules all such proceedings shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard and determined before the Exchequer judges, or (except where the case requires to be determined by two judges) before one of them, and in any such legal proceeding an appeal shall, if any party so requires, lie from any court of first instance in Ireland to the Exchequer judges, and the decision of the Exchequer judges shall be subject to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen in Council and not to any other tribunal.

(5.) If it is made to appear to an Exchequer judge that any decree or judgment in any such proceeding as aforesaid has not been duly enforced by the sheriff or other officer whose duty it is to enforce the same, such judge shall appoint some officer whose duty it shall be to enforce that judgment or decree ; and for that purpose such officer and

all persons employed by him shall be entitled to the same privileges, immunities, and powers as are by law conferred on a sheriff and his officers.

(6.) The Exchequer judges, when not engaged in hearing and determining such legal proceedings as above in this section mentioned, shall perform such of the duties ordinarily performed by other judges of the Supreme Court in Ireland as may be assigned by Her Majesty the Queen in Council.

(7.) All sums recovered by the Treasury or the Commissioners of Customs or any of their officers, or recovered under any Act relating to duties of customs, shall, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, be paid to such public account as the Treasury or the Commissioners direct.

(8.) This section shall apply, in the case of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the Postmaster General, and their and his officers, as if Commissioners of Customs included the said Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Postmaster General.

As to Irish Post Office revenue and expenditure.

20.—(1.) Until the arrangements for the contribution of Ireland to Imperial liabilities and expenditure are revised as in this Act mentioned, the duties on postage in Ireland shall be imposed, and all matters relating to those duties or to the Post Office shall be regulated by Act of Parliament.

(2.) If the Irish Post Office revenue is less than the Irish Post Office expenditure, the deficiency shall be paid to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom out of the Irish Exchequer, but if it is more, the excess shall be paid as part of the expenses attending the execution of the Post Office Acts, and shall form part of the special revenue of

Ireland ; the amount of such revenue and expenditure shall be determined by an order of the committee appointed as provided by this Act jointly by the Treasury and the Irish Government in relation to the general revenue of Ireland, and such order shall be laid before the House of Commons.

IRISH APPEALS AND DECISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

21.—(1.) The appeal from the courts in Ireland to the House of Lords shall cease ; and where any person would, but for this Act, have a right to appeal from any court in Ireland to the House of Lords, such person shall have the like right to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen in Council ; and the right so to appeal shall not be affected by any Irish Act ; and all enactments relating to appeals to Her Majesty the Queen in Council, and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, shall apply accordingly.

(2.) When the Judicial Committee sit for hearing appeals from a court in Ireland, there shall be present not less than four Lords of Appeal, within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at least one member who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court in Ireland.

(3.) A rota of privy councillors to sit for hearing appeals from courts in Ireland shall be made annually by Her Majesty in Council, and the privy councillors, or some of them, on that rota shall sit to hear the said appeals. A casual vacancy in such rota during the year may be filled by Order in Council.

(4.) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of the House of Lords to determine the claims to Irish peerages.

Special provision for decision of constitutional questions.

22.—(1.) If it appears to the Lord Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that steps shall be taken for the speedy determination of the question whether any Irish Act or any provision thereof is beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, he may represent the same to Her Majesty in Council, and thereupon the said question shall be forthwith referred to and heard and determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, constituted as if hearing an appeal from a court in Ireland.

(2.) Upon the hearing of the question such persons as seem to the Judicial Committee to be interested may be allowed to appear and be heard as parties to the case, and the decision of the Judicial Committee shall be given in like manner as if it were the decision of an appeal, the nature of the report or recommendation to Her Majesty being stated in open court.

(3.) Nothing in this Act shall prejudice any other power of Her Majesty in Council to refer any question to the Judicial Committee or the right of any person to petition Her Majesty for such reference.

LORD LIEUTENANT AND CROWN LANDS.

Office of Lord Lieutenant.

23.—(1.) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act, every subject of the Queen shall be qualified to hold the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, without reference to his religious belief.

(2.) The term of office of the Lord Lieutenant shall be six years, without prejudice to the power of Her Majesty the Queen at any time to revoke the appointment.

Use of Crown lands by Irish Government.

24. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may place under the control of the Irish Government, for the purposes of that government, such of the lands and buildings in Ireland vested in or held in trust for Her Majesty, and subject to such conditions or restrictions (if any), as may seem expedient.

JUDGES AND CIVIL SERVANTS.

Tenure of future judges.

25. A judge of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland, or of any county court or other court with a like jurisdiction in Ireland, appointed after the passing of this Act, shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant, and shall not be removed from his office except in pursuance of an address from the two Houses of the Legislature of Ireland, nor during his continuance in office shall his salary be diminished or right to pension altered without his consent.

As to existing judges and other persons having salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund.

26.—(1.) All existing judges of the Supreme Court, county court judges, and Land Commissioners in Ireland, and the existing bankruptcy judges, and all existing officers serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crown and receiving salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, shall, if they are removable at present on address from both Houses of Parliament, continue to be removable only upon such address, and if removable in any other manner shall continue to be

removable only in the same manner as heretofore; and shall continue to receive the same salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and to be liable to perform the same duties as heretofore, or such duties as Her Majesty may declare to be analogous, and their salaries and pensions shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and all sums so paid shall be repaid to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer: Provided that this section shall be subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the Exchequer judges.

(2.) If any of the said judges, commissioners, or officers retires from office with the Queen's approbation before completion of the period of service entitling him to a pension, Her Majesty may, if she thinks fit, after considering any representation that may be made by the Irish Government, grant to him such pension, not exceeding the pension to which he would on that completion have been entitled, as to Her Majesty seems meet.

(3.) Sub-section one of this section shall apply to existing officers serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crown, who, although receiving salaries out of money provided by Parliament, are removable only for misconduct or incapacity.

As to persons holding civil service appointments.

27.—(1.) All existing officers in the permanent civil service of the Crown, who are not above provided for, and are at the appointed day serving in Ireland, shall after that day continue to hold their offices by the same tenure and to receive the same salaries, gratuities, and pensions according to the scale of the class to which they belong and to be liable to perform the same duties as heretofore or such

duties as the Treasury in communication with the Irish Government may declare to be analogous ; and during the period of five years after the passing of this Act (in this section and the Fourth Schedule referred to as the transitional period), the said gratuities and pensions shall be awarded by the Treasury after communicating with the Irish Government, and the gratuities and pensions so awarded and the said salaries shall be paid to the payees by the Treasury out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(2.) Any such officer shall during the transitional period hold office unless he—

- (a) leaves the service on a medical certificate, or under the existing rules as to age, or is dismissed for misconduct or incapacity ; or
- (b) is removed upon an abolition of office or re-organisation of department which does not involve the appointment of any new officer ; or
- (c) resigns under this section ; or
- (d) is required by the Irish Government to retire.

Provided that—

- (i) six months' written notice of resignation under this section or of required retirement shall, unless it is otherwise agreed, be given either by the said officer or by the Irish Government as the case requires ; and
- (ii) before the end of the transitional period such number of officers only shall resign under this section, or be required to retire at one time and at such intervals of time as the Treasury, after communication with the Irish Government, sanction, so, however, that a notice to resign under this section given by an officer shall, unless withdrawn, operate at the end of the transitional period if he has not sooner left the service ; and
- (iii) an officer resigning under this section shall show

that he is not incapacitated by mental or bodily infirmity for the performance of his duties, and that he will not be required under the existing rules as to age to retire before the end of the transitional period, and otherwise he shall not be entitled to any further gratuity or pension that he would have been entitled to if he had left the service on a medical certificate.

(3.) Upon any such removal, or resignation under this section, or required retirement, there may be awarded to the officer by the Treasury, after communication with the Irish Government, a gratuity or pension in accordance with the Fourth Schedule to this Act, and for that purpose his service shall be reckoned as if it had continued to the end of the transitional period, or to any earlier date at which under the existing rules as to age he will be required to retire.

(4.) If any such officer is serving in a capacity which qualifies him for a pension under the Superannuation Act, 1859, and continues to hold office after the end of the transitional period the Treasury may, within three months after the end of that period, award him a pension in accordance with the Fourth Schedule to this Act which shall become payable to him on his ultimate retirement from the services of the Crown.

(5.) The gratuities and pensions awarded in pursuance of this section shall be paid by the Treasury to the payees out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(6.) All sums paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom in pursuance of this section shall be repaid to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer.

(7.) This section shall apply to the clerical staff of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police, with the substitution of the period ending with the cesser of

the existence of each force for the transitional period, and of the Treasury for the Irish Government except as regards the Treasury communicating with the Irish Government, but save as aforesaid this section shall not apply to officers retained in the service of the United Kingdom.

(8.) Where an officer, though not in the permanent civil service, is in the public service of the Crown, then—

(a) if he devotes his whole time to the duties of his office, this section shall apply to him in like manner as if he were in the permanent civil service ; and

(b) if he does not so devote his whole time, and is removed from his office for any cause other than incapacity or misconduct, he may apply to the Treasury, who may award him compensation for loss of office in accordance with the Fourth Schedule to this Act.

(9.) This section shall apply to the official assignees of the Court of Bankruptcy in like manner as to officers in the public service of the Crown.

(10.) This section shall apply to petty sessions clerks and to officers in the registry of petty sessions clerks in like manner as to officers in the public service of the Crown, with the exceptions, that any payment in pursuance of this section to any such clerk or officer shall be made out of the fund out of which the pension of such clerk or officer is payable instead of out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and that in considering the amount of gratuity or pension regard shall be had to the amount of the fund : Provided that—

(a) If, by reason of anything done after the appointed day, the fund becomes insufficient to meet the full amount of the said gratuities and pensions, the deficiency shall be charged on and paid out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, but such charge shall be repaid, if

and when the state of the fund allows to the Irish Consolidated Fund; and

- (b) The existing accumulated fund shall not be applied for any new purpose until every such gratuity and pension is satisfied.

(11.) For the purpose of determining finally the facts on all questions which may arise during the transitional period as to the rights of the officers or any of them under this section there shall be appointed a committee, consisting of A. B., the chairman, and C. D., and one other person to be nominated after the appointed day by the Executive Committee of the Irish Privy Council. Any vacancy which may arise among the persons named in this section may be filled by Her Majesty under Her Royal Sign Manual, and any vacancy which may arise from the death or resignation of the person nominated by the executive Committee may be filled by that Committee.

As to existing pensions and superannuation allowances.

28. Any existing pension granted on account of service in Ireland as a judge of the Supreme Court or of any court consolidated into that court, or as a county court judge, or in any other judicial position, or as an officer in the permanent civil service of the Crown other than in an office the holder of which is after the appointed day retained in the service of the Government of the United Kingdom, shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and shall be repaid to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer.

POLICE.

29.—(1.) The forces of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police shall, when and as local

police forces are from time to time established in Ireland in accordance with the Fifth Schedule to this Act, be gradually reduced and ultimately cease to exist as mentioned in that Schedule ; and thereupon the Acts relating to such forces shall be repealed, and no forces organised and armed in like manner, or otherwise than according to the accustomed manner of a civil police, shall be created under any Irish Act ; and after the passing of this Act, no officer or man shall be appointed to either of those forces ;

Provided that until the expiration of six years from the appointed day, nothing in this Act shall require the Lord Lieutenant to cause either of the said forces to cease to exist, if as representing Her Majesty the Queen he considers it inexpedient.

(2.) The said two forces shall, while they continue, be subject to the control of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty, and the members thereof shall continue to receive the same salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and hold their appointments on the same tenure as heretofore, and those salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and all the expenditure incidental to either force, shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(3.) When any existing member of either force retires under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule to this Act, the Treasury may award to him a gratuity or pension in accordance with that Schedule.

(4.) Those gratuities and pensions and all existing pensions payable in respect of service in either force, shall be paid by the Treasury to the payees out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(5.) Two-thirds of the net amount payable in pursuance of this section out of the Exchequer of the United

Kingdom shall be repaid to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Irish Exchequer Consolidated Fund and Audit.

30. Save as may be otherwise provided by Irish Act,—
- (a.) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply with the necessary modifications to the Exchequer and Consolidated Fund of Ireland, and an officer shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant to be the Irish Comptroller and Auditor General ; and
 - (b.) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated Fund shall be audited as appropriation accounts in manner provided by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or under the direction of such officer.

Law applicable to both Houses of Irish Legislature.

31.—(1.) Subject as in this Act mentioned and particularly to the Sixth Schedule to this Act (which Schedule shall have full effect) all existing election laws relating to the House of Commons and the members thereof shall, so far as applicable, extend to each of the two Houses of the Irish Legislature and the members thereof, but such election laws so far as hereby extended may, except as respects the oath, qualification, and disqualification of members, and the vacating of seats, be altered by Irish Act.

(2.) The privileges, rights, and immunities to be held and enjoyed by each House and the members thereof shall be such as may be defined by Irish Act, but so that the same

shall never exceed those for the time being held and enjoyed by the House of Commons, and the members thereof.

(3.) In the making of laws, and in all other matters ordinarily appertaining to a legislative body, both Houses of the Irish Legislature shall, except as regards a Bill, vote, resolution or address relating to any tax or public revenue, or as otherwise in this Act provided, have equal rights, powers, and privileges.

Supplemental provisions as to powers of Irish Legislature.

32.—(1.) The Irish Legislature may repeal or alter any provision of this Act which is by this Act expressly made alterable by that Legislature, and also any enactments in force in Ireland, except such as either relate to matters beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, or being enacted by Parliament after the passing of this Act may be expressly extended to Ireland. An Irish Act, notwithstanding it is in any respect repugnant to any enactment excepted as aforesaid, shall, though read subject to that enactment, be, except to the extent of that repugnancy, valid.

(2.) An order, rule, or regulation, made in pursuance of, or having the force of, an Act of Parliament, shall be deemed to be an enactment within the meaning of this section.

(3.) Nothing in this Act shall affect Bills relating to the divorce or marriage of individuals, and any such Bill shall be introduced and proceed in Parliament in like manner as if this Act had not passed.

Limitation on borrowing by local authorities.

33. The local authority for any county or borough or other area shall not borrow money without either—

(a) special authority from the Irish Legislature, or
 (b) the sanction of the proper department of the Irish Government ;

and shall not, without such special authority, borrow :

- (i) in the case of a municipal borough or town or area less than a county, any loan which together with the then outstanding debt of the local authority, will exceed twice the annual rateable value of the property in the municipal borough, town or area ; or
- (ii) in the case of a county or larger area, any loan which together with the then outstanding debt of the local authority, will exceed one-tenth of the annual rateable value of the property in the county or area ; or
- (iii) in any case a loan exceeding one-half of the above limits without a local inquiry held in the county, borough, or area by a person appointed for the purpose by the said department.

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS.

Temporary restriction on powers of Irish Legislature and Executive.

34.—(1.) During three years from the passing of this Act, and if Parliament is then sitting until the end of that session of Parliament, the Irish Legislature shall not pass an Act respecting the relations of landlord and tenant, or the sale, purchase, or letting of land generally : Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the passing of any Irish Act with a view to the purchase of land for railways, harbours, waterworks, town improvements, or other local undertakings.

(2.) During six years from the passing of this Act, the

appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland (other than one of the Exchequer judges) shall be made in pursuance of a warrant from Her Majesty countersigned as heretofore.

Transitory provisions.

35.—(1.) Subject to the provisions of this Act Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make or direct such arrangements as seem necessary or proper for setting in motion the Irish Legislature and Government and for otherwise bringing this Act into operation.

(2.) The Irish Legislature shall be summoned to meet on the first Tuesday in September, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and the first election of members of the two Houses of the Irish Legislature shall be held at such time before that day, as may be fixed by Her Majesty in Council.

(3.) Upon the first meeting of the Irish Legislature the members of the House of Commons then sitting for Irish constituencies, including the members for Dublin University, shall vacate their seats, and writs shall, as soon as conveniently may be, be issued by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland for the purpose of holding an election of members to serve in Parliament for the constituencies named in the Second Schedule of this Act.

(4.) The existing Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and the senior of the existing puisne judges of the Exchequer Division of the Supreme Court, or if they or either of them are or is dead or unable or unwilling to act, such other of the judges of the Supreme Court as Her Majesty may appoint, shall be the first Exchequer judges.

(5.) Where it appears to Her Majesty the Queen in

Council, before the expiration of one year after the appointed day, that any existing enactment respecting matters within the powers of the Irish Legislature requires adaptation to Ireland, whether—

- (a) by the substitution of the Lord Lieutenant in Council, or of any department or officer of the executive Government in Ireland, for Her Majesty in Council, a Secretary of State, the Treasury, or other public department or officer in Great Britain ; or
- (b) by the substitution of the Irish Consolidated Fund or moneys provided by the Irish Legislature for the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, or moneys provided by Parliament ; or
- (c) by the substitution of confirmation by, or other act to be done by or to, the Irish Legislature for confirmation by or other act to be done by or to Parliament ; or
- (d) by any other adaptation ;

Her Majesty, by Order in Council, may make that adaptation.

(6.) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may provide for the transfer of such property, rights, and liabilities, and the doing of such other things as may appear to Her Majesty necessary or proper for carrying into effect this Act or any Order in Council under this Act.

(7.) An Order in Council under this section may make an adaptation or provide for a transfer either unconditionally or subject to such exceptions, conditions, and restrictions as may seem expedient.

(8.) The draft of every Order in Council under this section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament for not less than two months before it is made, and such Order when made shall, subject as respects Ireland to the provisions of an Irish Act, have full effect, but shall not interfere with the continued application to any place,

authority, person, or thing, not in Ireland, of the enactment to which the Order relates.

Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, etc.

36. Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing laws, institutions, authorities, and officers in Ireland, whether judicial, administrative, or ministerial, and all existing taxes in Ireland shall continue as if this Act had not passed, but with the modifications necessary for adapting the same to this Act, and subject to be repealed, abolished, altered, and adapted in the manner and to the extent authorised by this Act.

Appointed day.

37. Subject as in this Act mentioned the appointed day for the purposes of this Act shall be the day of the first meeting of the Irish Legislature, or such other day not more than seven months earlier or later as may be fixed by order of Her Majesty in Council either generally or with reference to any particular provision of this Act, and different days may be appointed for different purposes and different provisions of this Act, whether contained in the same section or in different sections.

38. From and after the appointed day the powers conferred in the sixteenth section of the Act passed by the Irish Parliament in the session held, in the twenty-first and twenty-second years of the reign of George the Third, intituled "An Act for the better securing the liberty of the subject," shall not be exercised, and the said section shall be and is hereby repealed as and from the said appointed day.

Definitions.

39. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
The expression “existing” means existing at the passing of this Act.

The expression “constituency” means a parliamentary constituency or a county or borough returning a member or members to serve in either House of the Irish Legislature, as the case requires, and the expression “parliamentary constituency” means any county, borough, or university returning a member or members to serve in Parliament.

The expression “parliamentary elector” means a person entitled to be registered as a voter at a parliamentary election.

The expression “parliamentary election” means the election of a member to serve in Parliament.

The expression “tax” includes duties and fees, but does not include duties on postage.

The expression “duties of excise” does not include licence duties.

The expression “stamps” does not include stamps for collection of fees, or of other sums payable for services rendered.

The expression “existing taxes in Ireland” means the duties of customs, excise, and income tax, and the duties raised by existing stamps and licences in Ireland, whether the amount of such duties is or is not varied.

The expression “duties on postage” includes all rates and sums chargeable for or in respect of postal packets, money orders, or telegrams, or otherwise under the Post Office Acts or the Telegraph Act, 1892, or under the Acts relating to Savings Banks.

Expressions referring to the Post Office, and to the

revenue and expenditure of the Irish Post Office, shall include a reference to telegraphs, savings banks, and all business transacted under the authority or control of the Postmaster General.

The expression "Irish Act" means a law made by the Irish Legislature.

The expression "election laws" means the laws relating to the election of members to serve in Parliament, other than those relating to the qualification of electors, and includes all the laws respecting the registration of electors, the issue and execution of writs, the creation of polling districts, the taking of the poll, the questioning of election, corrupt and illegal practices, the oath, qualification, and disqualification of members and the vacating of seats.

The expression "rateable value" means the annual rateable value under the Irish Valuation Acts.

The expression "salary" includes remuneration, allowances, and emoluments.

The expression "pension" includes superannuation allowance.

The expression "office" includes employment, and the expression "officer" includes the holder of any employment.

Where by this Act provision is made for anything being done by "Her Majesty," or by the "Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty," then, unless the context otherwise requires, the provision shall be construed to refer to Her Majesty acting in Council or through a Secretary of State.

40. This Act may be cited as the Irish Government Act, 1893.

SCHEDULES.

FIRST SCHEDULE.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

CONSTITUENCIES AND NUMBER OF COUNCILLORS.

Constituencies.	Councillors.
Antrim county	Three.
Armagh county	One.
Belfast borough	Two.
Carlow county	One.
Cavan county	One.
Clare county	One.
Cork county	
East Riding	Three.
West Riding	One.
Cork borough	One.
Donegal county	One.
Down county	Three.
Dublin county	Three.
Dublin borough	Two.
Fermanagh county	One.
Galway county	Two.
Kerry county	One.
Kildare county	One.
Kilkenny county	One.
King's county	One.
Leitrim and Sligo counties	One.
Limerick county	Two.
Londonderry county	One.
Longford county	One.
Louth county	One.
Mayo county	One.
Meath county	One.
Monaghan county	One.
Queen's county	One.
Roscommon county	One.
Tipperary county	Two.
Tyrone county	One.
Waterford county	One.
Westmeath county	One.
Wexford county	One.
Wicklow county	One.
	Forty-eight.

The expression "borough" in this Schedule means an existing parliamentary borough.

Counties of cities and towns not named in this Schedule shall be combined with the county at large in which they are included for parliamentary elections, and if not so included, then with the county at large bearing the same name.

A borough named in this Schedule shall not for the purposes of this Schedule form part of any other constituency.

SECOND SCHEDULE.

IRISH MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Constituency.	Number of Members for House of Commons.
Antrim county	Three.
Armagh county	Two.
Belfast borough (in divisions as mentioned below)	} Four.
Carlow county	
Cavan county	Two.
Clare county	Two.
Cork county (in divisions as mentioned below)	} Five.
Cork borough	
Donegal county	Three.
Down county	Three.
Dublin county	Two.
Dublin borough (in divisions as mentioned below)	} Four.
Fermanagh county	
Galway county	Three.
Galway borough	One.
Kerry county	Three.
Kildare county	One.
Kilkenny county	One.
Kilkenny borough	One.
King's county	One.
Leitrim county	Two.
Limerick county	Two.
Limerick borough	One.
	Fifty.

IRISH MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS—*continued.*

Constituency.	Number of Members for House of Commons.
<i>Brought forward</i> . . . Londonderry county . . . Londonderry borough . . . Longford county Louth county Mayo county Meath county Monaghan county Newry borough Queen's county Roscommon county Sligo county Tipperary county Tyrone county Waterford county Waterford borough Westmeath county Wexford county Wicklow county	Fifty. Two. One. One. One. Three. Two. Two. One. One. Two. Two. Three. Three. One. One. One. Two. One.
	Eighty.

(1.) In this Schedule the expression "borough" means an existing parliamentary borough.

(2.) In the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Dublin, one member shall be returned by each of the existing parliamentary divisions of those boroughs, and the law relating to the divisions of boroughs shall apply accordingly.

(3.) The County of Cork shall be divided into two divisions, consisting of the East Riding and the West Riding, and three members shall be elected by the East Riding, and two members shall be elected by the West Riding; and the law relating to divisions of counties shall apply to those divisions.

THIRD SCHEDULE.

FINANCE.

IMPERIAL LIABILITIES, EXPENDITURE AND MISCELLANEOUS
REVENUE.*Liabilities.*

For the purposes of this Act, "Imperial liabilities" consist of—

(1.) The funded and unfunded debt of the United Kingdom, inclusive of terminable annuities paid out of the permanent annual charge for the National Debt, and inclusive of the cost of the management of the said funded and unfunded debt, but exclusive of the Local Loans stock and Guaranteed Land stock and the cost of the management thereof; and

(2.) All other charges on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom for the repayment of borrowed money, or to fulfil a guarantee.

Expenditure.

For the purpose of this Act Imperial expenditure consists of expenditure for the following services:—

I. Naval and military expenditure (including Greenwich Hospital).

II. Civil expenditure, that is to say,—

(a.) Civil list and Royal family.

(b.) Salaries, pensions, allowances, and incidental expenses of—

(i.) Lord Lieutenant of Ireland ;

(ii.) Exchequer judges in Ireland.

(c.) Buildings, work, salaries, pensions, printing, stationery, allowances, and incidental expenses of—

(i.) Parliament ;

(ii.) National Debt Commissioners ;

(iii.) Foreign Office and diplomatic and consular service, including secret service, special services, and telegraph subsidies ;

- (iv.) Colonial Office, including special services and telegraph subsidies ;
- (v.) Privy Council ;
- (vi.) Board of Trade including the Mercantile Marine Fund, Patent Office, Railway Commission, and Wreck Commission but excluding Bankruptcy ;
- (vii.) Mint ;
- (viii.) Meteorological Council ;
- (ix.) Slave trade service ;
- (x.) Customs ;
- (xi.) Inland revenue ;
- (xii.) Savings banks ;
- (xiii.) Friendly Societies ;

Imperial miscellaneous Revenue.

For the purposes of this Act the Imperial miscellaneous revenue to a portion of which Ireland may claim to be entitled consists of revenue from the following sources :—

1. Suez Canal shares or payments on account thereof.
2. Loans and advances to foreign countries.
3. Annual payments by British possessions.
4. Fees, stamps, and extra receipts received by departments, the expenses of which are part of the Imperial expenditure.
5. Small branches of the hereditary revenues of the Crown.
6. Foreshores.

FOURTH SCHEDULE.

PROVISIONS AS TO PENSIONS AND GRATUITIES TO PERSONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

(1.) The gratuity or pension which may be awarded under this Act to any existing officer who is, on the appointed day, serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crown, and has not a salary charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and is removable for reasons other than misconduct or incapacity, or to an officer who, though not in the

permanent civil service, is in the public service, and devotes his whole time to the duties of his office, shall be as follows, namely :—

(A.) If the officer was serving in a capacity which qualifies him for a pension under the Superannuation Act, 1859, and leaves the service during the transitional period on abolition of office or on re-organization of department, or on resignation under this Act, or on requirement from the Irish Government—a pension may be awarded, calculated in like manner as has heretofore been the custom under section seven of the Superannuation Act, 1859, and the enactments amending the same, in the case of an officer retiring on abolition of office, that is to say, at the rate of one-sixtieth of his salary for every completed year of service reckoned as follows :—

(i.) His years of service shall be reckoned as if he had served up to the end of the transitional period, or any earlier date at which he will be required under the existing rules as to age to retire, and his salary shall, where there are periodical increments, be taken at the amount which it would have reached if he had continued to serve in the same office up to the said end or date ;

(ii.) There shall be added to the years of service so reckoned (in this Schedule referred to as actual years), any additional years he might independently of this Schedule reckon under section four of the Superannuation Act, 1859, and also the following years (in this Schedule referred to as abolition years), namely :—

if he has completed less than ten actual years of service, three years ;

if he has completed ten and less than fifteen actual years of service, five years ;

if he has completed fifteen and less than twenty actual years of service, seven years ;

if he has completed more than twenty actual years of service, ten years ;

but no pension shall exceed two-thirds of his salary ; and no abolition years shall be reckoned in excess of the

difference between the age of the officer at the time of his retirement and the age at which he will be required under the existing rules as to age to retire.

(B.) If the officer was serving in a capacity which qualifies him on retirement for a gratuity under section four of the Superannuation Act, 1887, the same gratuity may be awarded as might have been awarded if he had retired on the abolition of his office.

(C.) If the officer was on the register of copyists—the same gratuity may be awarded as might have been awarded if his name had been removed from the register on a medical certificate.

(D.) If the foregoing provisions do not apply to any officer—the gratuity or pension awarded may be such as to the Treasury appears just having regard to all the circumstances of the case, but less than the amount which might have been awarded to such officer if he had been in the permanent civil service.

(2.) This Schedule shall apply to an officer in the registry of petty sessions clerks in like manner as if he was serving in a capacity which qualifies him for a pension under the Superannuation Act, 1859, and to a petty sessions clerk in like manner as if he was an officer in the public service, and as if the fund applicable were money provided by Parliament.

(3.) The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871, shall apply to any officer who is awarded a pension under the foregoing provisions of this Schedule, in like manner as if he had retired on the abolition of his office, and any terminable annuity payable in respect of the commutation of a pension shall be payable out of the same funds as the pension.

(4.) The pension which may be awarded under this Act to any existing officer, who is serving in a capacity which qualifies him for a pension under the Superannuation Act, 1859, and continues to hold office under the Irish Government after the end of the transitional period, shall be the like pension as might be awarded to such officer under the Superannuation Act, 1859, if he had at the end of that period retired from service on the abolition of office, but without the addition of any abolition years.

(5.) Where an existing officer in the public service who does not devote his whole time to the duties of his office, and is not provided for by any other provision of this Act, applies to the Treasury, such gratuity or pension may be awarded to him by way of compensation for loss of office as appears to the Treasury just, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and especially to the amount of his remuneration out of moneys provided by Parliament.

Provided that the compensation shall in no case exceed three-fourths of the amount which might have been granted, if section seven of the Superannuation Act, 1859, had applied to him, and if the total remuneration of his office had not exceeded the amount received by him out of moneys provided by Parliament.

FIFTH SCHEDULE.

PART ONE.

REGULATIONS AS TO ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICE FORCES AND AS TO THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY AND DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE CEASING TO EXIST.

(1.) Such local police forces shall be established under such local authorities and for such counties, municipal boroughs, or other larger areas as may be provided by Irish Act.

(2.) Whenever the Executive Committee of the Privy Council in Ireland certify to the Lord Lieutenant that a police force adequate for local purposes has been established in any area, he shall within six months thereafter direct the Royal Irish Constabulary to be withdrawn from the performance of regular police duties in such area, and such order shall be forthwith carried into effect.

(3.) Upon any such withdrawal the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty shall within six months thereafter order measures to be taken for reducing the numbers of the Royal Irish Constabulary to such extent as appears to him necessary by reason of the said withdrawal, and such order shall be duly executed.

(4.) Upon the Executive Committee of the Privy Council in Ireland certifying to the Lord Lieutenant that adequate local police forces have been established in every part of Ireland, the Lord Lieutenant shall within six months after such certificate, or if the certificate is given within six years after the appointed day, at such later date before the expiration of those six years, as the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty thinks expedient, order measures to be taken for causing the whole of the Royal Irish Constabulary to cease to exist as a police force, and such order shall be duly executed.

(5.) Where the area in which a local police force is established is part of the Dublin Metropolitan Police District, the foregoing regulations shall apply to the Dublin Metropolitan Police in like manner as if it were the Royal Irish Constabulary.

PART TWO.

Regulations as to Pensions for Officers and men of Royal Irish Constabulary and of Dublin Metropolitan Police. As to Officers.

For the purpose of executing the orders of the Lord Lieutenant mentioned in Part One of this Schedule any officer or man of the Royal Irish Constabulary or the Dublin Metropolitan Police, as the case may be, shall, if so required, retire, and upon such retirement there may be awarded to him a pension as follows, that is to say :—

(1.) If he is an officer there may be awarded to him—

- (a) if he was appointed on or before the eighteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, a pension equal to one-fiftieth of his annual salary for each completed year of service, with an addition of ten years to his actual years of service ; and
- (b) if he was appointed since the eighteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, a pension equal to one-sixtieth of his annual salary for each completed year of service, with the addition of twelve years to his actual years of service.

Provided that—

(i.) The pensions awarded to an officer appointed before the tenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six shall not be less than the pension which could have been awarded him under the provisions of the Act of the session of the tenth and eleventh years of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter one hundred, intituled "An Act to regulate the superannuation allowance of the constabulary force in Ireland and the Dublin Metropolitan Police," if he had served as an officer over forty years ; and

(ii.) In no case shall a pension exceed the maximum pension which, under the existing law, could be awarded to the officer if he had retired for length of service.

(3.) Salary shall be calculated and service reckoned in accordance with the Constabulary (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1882.

(4.) In this Schedule the expression "officer" includes the Inspector-General, the Deputy Inspector-General, an assistant inspector-general, the assistant inspector-general commandant at the depôt, the town inspector at Belfast, a county inspector, a surgeon, the storekeeper and barrack master, the veterinary surgeon, and a district inspector.

As to Constables.

(5.) If he is a constable there may be awarded to him a pension equal to one-fiftieth of his annual pay for every completed year of service, with the addition of ten years to his actual years of service.

Provided that—

(i.) The pension awarded to a constable appointed before the tenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, shall not be less than the pension which could have been awarded to him under the Act of the session of the tenth and eleventh years of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter one hundred, intituled "An Act to regulate the superannuation allowance of the constabulary force in Ireland and the Dublin Metropolitan Police," if he had served as a constable more than thirty years ; and

(ii.) In no case shall the pension exceed the maximum pension, which under the existing law could be awarded to the constable if he had retired for length of service.

(6.) In the case of a constable the amount of the annual pay shall be ascertained at the date of his retirement, and shall be calculated and his service reckoned in manner provided by the Constabulary and Police (Ireland) Act, 1883, and every year of service from the twenty-first to the twenty-fifth, both inclusive, shall be reckoned as two years.

(7.) In this Schedule the expression "constable" includes the head constable major, a head constable, sergeant, acting sergeant, and constable, in the case of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and includes every member of the Dublin Metropolitan Police not being of higher rank than chief superintendent.

Miscellaneous.

(8.) If any officer or constable enters with the approval of the Lord Lieutenant any local police force in Ireland, there may be awarded to him a pension at the rate above mentioned for every year of completed service, with the addition to his actual years of service of such number of years not exceeding the number above mentioned as the Lord Lieutenant assigns.

(9.) The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871, shall apply to persons to whom, on retirement, a pension is awarded under this Schedule, in like manner as if they had retired from the permanent civil service of the Crown on the abolition of their offices, and any terminable annuity payable in respect of the commutation of a pension shall be payable out of the same funds as the pension.

(10.) Where an officer or constable at the time of his retirement would, if he served for a few months more (not exceeding six) complete another year's service, that year shall be reckoned as a completed year of service.

(11.) The reserve force of the Royal Irish Constabulary shall for the purposes of this Schedule be deemed to be part of that force.

SIXTH SCHEDULE.

REGULATIONS AS TO HOUSES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND
THE MEMBERS THEREOF.*Legislative Council.*

(1.) There shall be a separate register of electors of councillors of the Legislative Council which shall be made, until otherwise provided by Irish Act, in like manner as the parliamentary register of electors.

(2.) Where, for the election of councillors any counties are combined so as to form one constituency, then until otherwise provided by Irish Act,

(a) the returning officer for the whole constituency shall be that one of the returning officers for Parliamentary elections for those counties to whom the writ is addressed, and the writ shall be addressed to the returning officer for the constituency with the largest population, according to the census of 1891.

(b) the returning officer shall have the same authority throughout the whole constituency as a returning officer at a Parliamentary election for a county has in the county.

(c) the registers of electors of each county shall jointly be the register of electors for the constituency.

(d) for the purposes of this Schedule "county" includes a county of a city or town, and this Schedule, and the law relating to the qualification of electors shall apply, as if the county of a city or town formed part of the county at large with which it is combined, and the qualification in the county of a city or town shall be the same as in such county at large.

(3.) Writs shall be issued for the election of councillors at such time not less than one nor more than three months before the day for the periodical retirement of councillors as the Lord Lieutenant in Council may fix.

(4.) The day for the periodical retirement of councillors shall until otherwise provided by Irish Act be the last day of August in every fourth year.

(5.) For the purposes of such retirement, the constituencies shall be divided into two equal divisions, and the constituencies in each province shall be divided as nearly as may be equally between those divisions, and constituencies returning two or more members shall be treated as two or more constituencies, and placed in both divisions.

(6.) Subject as aforesaid, the particular constituencies which are to be in each division shall be determined by lot.

(7.) The said division and lot shall be made and conducted before the appointed day in manner directed by the Lord Lieutenant in Council.

(8.) The first councillors elected for the constituencies in the first division shall retire on the first day of retirement which occurs after the first meeting of the Irish Legislature, and the first councillors for the constituencies in the second division shall retire on the second day of retirement after that meeting.

(9.) Any casual vacancy among the councillors shall be filled by a new election, but the councillor filling the vacancy shall retire at the time at which the vacating councillor would have retired.

Legislative Assembly.

(10.) The Parliamentary register of electors for the time being shall, until otherwise provided by Irish Act, be the register of electors of the Legislative Assembly.

Both Houses.

(11.) Until otherwise provided by Irish Act, the Lord Lieutenant in Council may make regulations for adapting the existing election laws to the election of members of the two Houses of the Legislature.

(12.) Annual sessions of the Legislature shall be held.

(13.) Any peer, whether of the United Kingdom, Great Britain, England, Scotland, or Ireland shall be qualified to be a member of either House.

(14.) A member of either House may by writing under his hand resign his seat, and the same shall thereupon be vacant.

(15.) The same person shall not be a member of both Houses.

(16.) Until otherwise provided by Irish Act, if the same person is elected to a seat in each House, he shall, before the eighth day after the next sitting of either House, by written notice, elect in which House he will serve, and upon such election his seat in the other House shall be vacant, and if he does not so elect, his seat in both Houses shall be vacant.

(17.) Until otherwise provided by Irish Act, any such notice electing in which House a person will sit, or any notice of resignation, shall be given in manner directed by the Standing Orders of the Houses, and if there is no such direction, shall be given to the Lord Lieutenant.

(18.) The powers of either House shall not be affected by any vacancy therein, or any defect in the election or qualification of any member thereof.

(19.) Until otherwise provided by Irish Act the holders of such Irish offices as may be named by Order of the Queen in Council before the appointed day, shall be entitled to be elected to and sit in either House notwithstanding that they hold offices under the Crown, but on acceptance of any such office the seat of any such person in either House shall be vacated unless he has accepted the office in succession to some other of the said offices.

Transitory.

(20.) The Lord Lieutenant in Council may, before the appointed day make regulations for the following purposes :—

(a) The making of a register of electors of councillors in time for the election of the first councillors, and with that object for the variation of the days relating to registration in the existing laws, and for prescribing the duties of officers, and for making such adaptations of those laws as appear necessary or proper for duly making a register ;

(b) The summoning of the two Houses of the Legislature of Ireland, the issue of writs and any other things appearing to be necessary or proper for the election of members of the two Houses ;

(c) The election of chairman (whether called Speaker, President, or by any other name) of each House, the quorum of each House, the communications between the two Houses,

and such adaptation to the proceedings of the two Houses of the procedure of Parliament, as appears expedient for facilitating the conduct of business by those Houses on their first meeting;

(*d*) The adaptation to the two Houses and the members thereof of any laws and customs relating to the House of Commons or the members thereof;

(*e*) The deliberation and voting together of the two Houses in cases provided by this Act.

(21.) The regulations may be altered by Irish Act, and also in so far as they concern the procedure of either House alone, by Standing Orders of that House, but shall, until altered, have effect as if enacted in this Act.

APPENDIX II

MEMBERS OF H.M. GOVERNMENT, 1893 MR. GLADSTONE'S FOURTH CABINET

<i>First Lord of the Treasury</i>		
<i>and Lord Privy Seal</i> ...	Mr. Gladstone.	
<i>Lord Chancellor</i> ...	Lord Herschell.	
<i>President of the Council and</i>		
<i>Chief Secretary for India</i>	Earl of Kimberley.	
<i>Chancellor of the Exchequer</i>	Sir William Harcourt.	
<i>Home Secretary</i> ...	Mr. H. H. Asquith.	
<i>Foreign Secretary</i> ...	Earl of Rosebery.	
<i>Colonial Secretary</i> ...	Marquess of Ripon.	
<i>Secretary for War</i> ...	Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.	
<i>First Lord of the Admiralty</i>	Earl Spencer.	
<i>Chief Secretary for Ireland</i>	Mr. John Morley.*	
<i>Secretary for Scotland</i> ...	Sir G. O. Trevelyan.	
<i>President of the Board of</i>		
<i>Trade</i> ...	Mr. Mundella.	
<i>President of the Local Govern-</i>		
<i>ment Board</i> ...	Sir Henry Fowler. †	
<i>Chancellor of the Duchy of</i>		
<i>Lancaster</i> ...	Mr. James Bryce.	
<i>Postmaster-General</i> ...	Mr. Arnold Morley.	
<i>First Commissioner of Works</i>	Mr. Shaw Lefevre. †	
<i>Vice-President of the Council</i>	Mr. A. H. D. Acland.	

* Lord Morley of Blackburn. † The late Lord Wolverhampton.

‡ Lord Eversley.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

Parliamentary Secretaries—

<i>Home Office</i>	...	...	Mr. H. Gladstone.*
<i>Foreign Office</i>	...	...	Sir E. Grey.
<i>Colonial Office</i>	...	...	Mr. Sydney Buxton.
<i>India Office</i>	...	...	Mr. G. W. E. Russell.
<i>War Office</i>	...	...	Lord Sandhurst.
<i>Board of Trade</i>	...	...	Mr. T. Burt.
<i>Local Government Board</i>			Sir W. Foster. †
<i>Attorney-General</i>	...	...	Sir Charles Russell. ‡
<i>Solicitor-General</i>	...	...	Sir John Rigby.
<i>Lord Advocate (Scotland)</i>	...		Mr. G. B. Balfour. §
<i>Solicitor-General (Scotland)</i>			Mr. A. Asher.
<i>Lord Chancellor (Ireland)</i>	...		Mr. S. Walker.
<i>Attorney-General (Ireland)</i>			The Mr. MacDermot.

* Lord Gladstone.

† Lord Ilkeston.

‡ The late Lord Russell of Killowen.

§ The late Lord Kinross.

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